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The 2010 National Space Policy of the United State of America introduced by
President Obama directed NASA to set far reaching exploration milestones that in-
cluded a crewed mission to a Near Earth Asteroid by 2025 and a crewed mission to
Martian orbit by the mid-2030s. The policy was directly influenced by the recommen-
dations of the 2009 Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee,
which called for an evolutionary approach to human space exploration and empha-
sized the criticality of budgetary, programmatic, and program sustainability. One
potential method of improving the sustainability of exploration architectures is the
utilization of orbital propellant depots with commercial launch services.
In any exploration architecture, upwards of seventy percent of the mass required
in orbit is propellant. A propellant depot based architecture allows propellant to
be delivered in small increments using existing commercial launch vehicles, but will
require three to five times the number of launches as compared to the using the NASA
planned 70 to 130 metric ton heavy lift launch system. Past studies have shown that
the utilization of propellant depots in exploration architectures have the potential of
providing the sustainability that the Review of United States Human Space Flight
Plans Committee emphasized. However, there is a lack of comprehensive analysis to
determine the feasibility of propellant depots within the framework of human space
exploration.
The objective of this research is to measure the feasibility of a propellant de-
pot and commercial launch based exploration architecture by stochastic assessment
of technical, reliability, and economic risks. A propellant depot thermal model was
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developed to analyze the effectiveness of various thermal management systems, de-
termine their optimal configuration, quantify the uncertainties in the system models,
and stochastically compute the performance feasibility of the propellant depot sys-
tem. Probabilistic cost analysis captured the uncertainty in the development cost of
propellant depots and the fluctuation of commercial launch prices, and, along with
the cost of launch failures, provided a metric for determining economic feasibility.
Probabilistic reliability assessments using the launch schedule, launch reliability, and
architecture requirements of each phase of the mission established launch success fea-
sibility. Finally, an integrated stochastic optimization was performed to determine
the feasibility of the exploration architecture.
The final product of this research is an evaluation of propellant depots and com-
mercial launch services as a practical method to achieving economic sustainability
for human space exploration. A method for architecture feasibility assessment is
demonstrated using stochastic system metrics and applied in the evaluation of tech-
nical, economic, and reliability feasibility of orbital propellant depots and commercial
launch based exploration architectures. The results of the analysis showed the pro-
pellant depots based architectures to be technically feasible using current commercial
launch vehicles, economically feasible for having a program budget less than $4 billion
per year, and have launch reliability approaching the best single launch vehicle, Delta
IV, with the use of redundant vehicles. These results serve to provide recommenda-
tions on the use of propellant depots in exploration architectures to the Moon, Near




The purpose of this research is to measure the overall feasibility of propellant depot
and commercial launch based exploration architectures by stochastic assessment of
technical, reliability, and economic metrics. The research will focus on three sub-
topics: the detailed system modeling of the orbital propellant depot thermal system
to enable technology requirements definition and optimization, the economic benefits
of commercially launched and fueled propellant depot as determined by stochastic
cost analysis of all of the relevant systems, and demonstration of improvement in
launch reliability of an orbital propellant based exploration architecture compared to
existing exploration plans.
1.1 Motivation
In 2009 the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee, also
known as the Augustine Committee, was charged by the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy to review the multitude of options for human spaceflight and human
exploration after the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle Program. The result of
the six month review was a 150 page report documenting various recommendations
for the future of United States space policy [1]. The committee’s primary finding
was to achieve the goal of human space exploration to other planetary bodies would
require budgetary, programmatic, and program sustainability. The committee judged
the nine year old Constellation Program [2] to be so far behind schedule and under-
funded that meeting any of its objectives would be impossible. In response to the
review, President Obama canceled the Constellation Program and enacted the 2010
National Space Policy of the United States of America [3].
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Figure 1: Augustine Commissions Options for Exploration within Flexible Path
Strategy [1]
The National Space Policy set forth new and far-reaching exploration milestones
that include a crewed mission to a near Earth object (NEO) by 2025 and a crewed
mission to Martian orbit by the mid-2030s. The exploration milestones was inspired
by the “Flexible Path to Mars” strategy outlined by the Augustine committee [1].
The goal of the flexible path strategy is to take incremental steps towards Mars,
allowing astronauts to learn, live, and work in free space under similar conditions to
those found on the way to Mars. Following the flexible path strategy allows humanity
to gain ever-increasing operational experience in space, growing in duration from a
few weeks to several years in length, and moving from close proximity to the Earth
to as far away as Martian orbit. These incremental steps involve several intermediate
destinations to explore before reaching the Martian surface. Figure 1, reproduced
from the Augustine committee’s report [1], shows a notional representation of the
flexible path option to Mars.
Following these recommendations, NASA assembled a Human Exploration Frame-
work Team (HEFT) to begin defining new exploration plans for NASA. The primary
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Figure 2: Human Exploration Framework Team Concept of Operation for Crewed
Mission to Near Earth Object [4]
Figure 3: Human Exploration Framework Team Campaign Profile for Crewed Mis-
sion to Near Earth Object [4]
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challenge for the exploration framework team was to define an exploration plan that
satisfies the exploration science goals, while also meeting budget constraints and be
able to weather any changes in the political climate. The current baseline HEFT
architecture is a manned mission to a Near Earth Object (NEO) shown in Figure
2 [4] with a campaign profile and schedule shown in Figure 3. The baseline explo-
ration architecture calls for the development of a Space Shuttle derived Heavy Lift
Launch Vehicle (HLLV), as well as seven additional unique in-space exploration ele-
ments: a Solar Electric Propulsion stage (SEP), a Multi-Mission Space Exploration
Vehicle (MMSEV), a Deep Space Habitat (DSH), a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV),
a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (CPS), an Electric Propulsion Module (EPM), and a
Kick Stage (KS).
The development of these unique systems has a tremendous impact on the overall
cost and schedule for the mission. HEFT’s analysis estimates that the NEO baseline
mission would require a 20 year development and integration program with a total
architecture cost of roughly $144 billion (FY11) [4] with yearly costs between $5.5
billion and $8.5 billion. This two-decade exploration program would culminate in a
single manned mission to a near Earth asteroid (NEA) in 2031. At first glance, this
plan does little to address the sustainability requirement laid out in the Augustine
Commission’s report because it is essentially the same architecture as the cancelled
Constellation program but to a different destination.
HEFT cost estimate, summarized in Table 1, shows the most costly elements
are the Space Shuttle derived heavy lift launch system and the supporting ground
operation and infrastructure. HEFT estimates the total cost of the heavy lift launch
system development program to be $54 billion (FY11) over the next 20 years [4]
which would include six test flights (increasing payload capability from 70 metric ton
(mT) to 130 mT) and the first three operational flights of the 100 mT version of the
HLLV to deliver hardware for the 2031 NEA mission. The launch cost of the HLLV,
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Table 1: Human Exploration Framework Team Program Total Cost Estimate in
FY11 $million [4] for 2030 Near Earth Asteroid Mission
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle $53,921 m 37.47%
Ground Operation & Infrastructure $16,801 m 11.68%
Crew Transfer Vehicle-E Prime $15,153 m 10.53%
Solar Electric Propulsion $14,875 m 10.34%
Deep Space Habitat $9,617 m 6.68%
Program Integration $9,187 m 6.38%
Multi-Mission Space Exploration Vehicle $6,315 m 4.39%
Cryogenic Propulsion Stage $4,813 m 3.34%
Commercial Crew Development $4,453 m 3.09%
Commercial $3,883 m 2.70%
Mission Operation $3,175 m 2.21%
Robotic Precursor $1,703 m 1.18%
Total $143,896 m
estimated by summing the development and operation cost over the entire program
and dividing by the total number of flights, is close to $8 billion per flight. As a
point of comparison, the Apollo’s Saturn V rocket and the Space Shuttle were both
estimated to cost $3.7 and $1.6 billion per flight over the course of their respective
programs [5].
For all human exploration beyond low Earth orbit, HLLVs have played an integral
part in delivering the crew and mission elements into orbit [6–8]. In all of these
architectures, the development and operation of these heavy-lift vehicles are major
cost drivers. The Apollo program was able to overcome the high cost of heavy-lift
launch vehicles because of the enormous budget it had in the mid to late 1960s. Figure
4 plots NASA’s budget as a percentage of the United States’ Federal Spending from
1958 to present. NASA’s budget peaked in 1966 at 4.4% of the all federal spending [9]
and has steadily decreased since then. After the first few moon landings, the Apollo
program felt the impact of federal budget restrictions and eventually was cancelled
because it was unsustainable under the reduced budget.
With the average yearly cost of the HEFT program at greater than $7 billion and
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Figure 4: NASA’s Budget as Percentage of U.S. Federal Spending from 1958 to
2010 [9]
the current exploration system budget of $3.5 billion per year, the architecture does
not seem to be economically feasible. In order to achieve sustainable human space
exploration, a radical change is needed to create an innovative architecture that does
not rely solely on large HLLVs that account for more than 50% of the projected
program budget. The Augustine committee recognized this, and identifies several
technology areas that are critical for sustainable exploration [1]. One of the identified
technologies is “Propellant Storage and Transfer in Space.” Numerous studies in
the past decade have examined using this technology in exploration architectures
especially in tandem with commercially available launch vehicles that are operated
by private companies. A comprehensive literature review of these studies is given
in Chapter 2. Some studies have shown the potential of dramatically reducing the
cost and improving the flexibility of the architecture [5, 10–12], other studies argue
that the technology required is too risky [13] and that the depot based architecture
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cannot replace the need for HLLV [14]. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide
a comprehensive evaluation of the utilization of the orbital propellant depot and
propellant transfer technologies in space to improve the current beyond low Earth
orbit (LEO) exploration architectures.
1.2 Research Goals
The objective of the research is to systematically assess the feasibility of propellant
depots and commercial launch based space exploration architectures. The research
will present a method for comprehensive examination of feasibility assessment for
space system architectures and application of the method to measure feasibility for
propellant depot and commercial launch based architectures. The methodology must
extend beyond traditional feasibility assessment and be able to capture the uncer-
tainties that are inherent in the analysis of different exploration architectures. In
order to achieve this, the following research question is posed that will serve as the
foundation of the research.
Research Question: How can feasibility of propellant depot based space explo-
ration architectures be comprehensively measured without bias?
Hypothesis: Feasibility can be measured objectively with definition of constraints
and systematic assessment of all areas of the architecture that may violate the con-
straints. Stochastic system metrics can be used to determine the sensitivity of ar-
chitecture feasibility to both uncertainties in metric evaluation as well comparison
between multiple design options. This definition of feasibility will be discussed in
Chapter 3.
To answer this research question and evaluate the hypothesis, this dissertation
will accomplish several research goals. They are as follows:
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1. Develop models for evaluating technical performance metrics for the
available design options.
To analyze the technical performance, system level models are created to evaluate the
various design option that are available. The models need to have the flexibility to
evaluate large number of design options for multiple areas of interest. Performance
metrics are used to determine if the propellant depot based architecture satisfies the
basic mission requirements and architecture feasibility.
2. Determine a method to incorporate constraints and requirements into
system analysis to establish feasibility.
Defining feasibility requires proper definition of constraints in each of the areas of in-
terest. These constraints must be derived from physical properties of the architecture
and requires extensive literature review to establish realistic constraints. The design
options will be evaluated to determine constraint satisfaction for the entire feasibility
topic of interest and the elimination of non-feasible designs.
3. Investigate the sensitivity of performance metrics to design options.
Feasibility of the architecture performance is extended to include the sensitivity of
the performance of the system design option within the design space. Ideally, the
most feasible architecture will have design options that have high performance in all
categories of interest and are relatively insensitive to design changes. The sensitivity
of constraint violation to the design options will serve as a major decision driver for
design feasibility.
4. Determine the impact of uncertainties in system level modeling on
the feasibility assessments and identify the high risk elements of the
architecture.
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With any models, there are uncertainties inherent in the estimation of various perfor-
mance metrics. These uncertainties can have significant impact on design feasibility
as well as the satisfaction of constraint. The uncertainties in the evaluation of all
performance metrics must be quantified, and their impact on the overall architec-
ture performance must be analyzed in detail. The understanding of the impact of
uncertainties on the architecture performance is paramount to the evaluation of ar-
chitecture feasibility.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
This chapter introduced the purpose of this research and presented the motivation
for the research and provided context for the discussion of human space exploration.
The primary research question and the research objectives are presented to set the
basis for objective feasibility assessment.
Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the background and history of the propellant
depot based exploration architecture. An extensive literature review of recent ex-
ploration architectures provides context for the discussion of the multitude of design
options within the exploration design space. This chapter also presents a detailed
discussion on the technology required to enable propellant depot exploration archi-
tecture, and defines the necessary subsystems for further evaluation. Finally, the
chapter presents a review of the challenges to a propellant depot based architecture
that will serve as a basis for feasibility evaluation.
Chapter 3 presents the definition of feasibility and a literature review of feasibility
studies to establish a method for feasibility assessment. The literature review shows a
lack of clear definition of feasibility with no standard method to evaluate feasibility of
a concept. The chapter presents the development of the feasibility assessment method
used for this dissertation that is based on the stochastic evaluation of system metrics
and the application of constraints to assess feasibility in a probabilistic manner. The
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chapter finishes with an example of the probabilistic feasibility assessment.
Chapter 4 features the first feasibility assessment topic. The chapter begins with a
definition of the exploration architecture and describes the necessary analysis to eval-
uate the propellant depot architecture. The thermal system model is developed in
the chapter because of its unique system integration, and the system mass estimation
method is presented. These models are used for the evaluation of system require-
ments for the all of the feasibility assessments in the dissertation. The performance
metrics are evaluated for the various thermal system design options. System level
trade studies are conducted to determine the optimal thermal system option for long
term cryogenic fluid storage. System level mass estimations provide the context for
feasibility assessment in other areas of interest. The uncertainties of the thermal sys-
tem performance and the system mass estimation are presented, and the performance
feasibility is assessed using commercial launch vehicle payload as a constraint.
Chapter 5 discusses the propellant aggregation mission feasibility with the uti-
lization of commercial launch vehicles. This chapter presents a method to estimate
the reliability of launch vehicles based on launch records with Bayesian probability.
The problems with utilization of newly development launch vehicles is described, and
the analysis to evaluate the probability of propellant aggregation success with differ-
ent launch vehicles is presented. This chapter ends with discussion of the impact of
redundancy on the propellant aggregation mission.
Chapter 6 investigates the economic feasibility of the propellant depot explo-
ration architecture. A system level cost method is presented to evaluate the cost of
the unique elements in the alternate architecture. The cost of these elements is in-
corporated into the baseline architecture with the common elements, and the overall
architecture cost is presented as a comparison to the baseline. An analysis of NASA’s
budget history provides an estimate of the cost constraint for the exploration archi-
tecture.
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Chapter 7 integrates the three feasibility topics of interest into an integrated
assessment of the propellant depot exploration architecture. Various design option’s
impact on system level feasibility metrics is discussed in a series of pairwise feasibility
comparisons. The chapter summarizes these feasibility assessments and presents the
overall architecture feasibility and a comparison to the baseline architecture.
Finally, Chapter 8 provides conclusions of the overall feasibility of propellant de-
pot based space exploration architecture. Discussion of the challenges to the depot
architecture is revisited, and the stochastic feasibility assessment to address each of
the challenges is summarized. The chapter finishes the dissertation with remarks on
the contribution of the dissertation to the field of engineering system studies and brief




As discussed in Chapter 1, the current NASA human exploration architecture [4]
with its reliance on HLLVs is unlikely to be sustainable due to the present fiscally
restrictive environment. In order to meet the recommendations of the Augustine
committee [1] and achieve sustainability for human space exploration, an alternate
architecture is needed. Before establishing an alternate architecture, the deficiencies
of the current architecture must be identified.
For all human exploration beyond LEO, both flown missions and conceptual de-
signs, at least one heavy lift class launch vehicle, with payload capability of 70 mT
or more, is required to accomplish the mission objectives [6–8,15]. During the Apollo
program, the mission was not possible without the development of the Saturn V
rocket, which to this day is still the largest rocket ever built. During the 1990’s, sev-
eral studies and architectures were developed for sending human expeditions to Mars,
and these design reference architectures all rely on development of a Space Shuttle
derived HLLV, which has a payload capacity of roughly 85 mT [16].
The Constellation Program [2], which is the result of then President Bush’s Vision
for Space Exploration [17] and NASA’s supporting Exploration System Architecture
Study (ESAS) [7], calls for the simultaneous development of a Space Shuttle derived
Ares I launch vehicle for the crew and a heavy lift Ares V launch vehicle for in-space
systems and transportation. Finally, the most recent iteration of the architecture
design cycle, as a result from President Obama’s National Space Policy [3], calls
for the incremental development of the 70 mT, 100 mT, and 130 mT Space Launch
System [4]. Despite the fact that the destination, mission objective, and mission
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requirements are different for all of these studies, the use of heavy lift class launch
vehicles is always assumed.
The challenge with the utilization of the heavy lift class launch vehicle is that they
are a major cost driver for the architectures [18]. Examining the cost breakdown for
the HEFT program (Table 1), one can see the development and implementation of the
Space Launch System, which along with its ground support, accounts for more than
50% of the entire program’s projected budget. Similarity, the cost overrun associated
with the development of the Ares I and Ares V were the primary contributing factors
for the cancellation of the Constellation Program [1]. Thus, there is a dire need to
investigate alternate architectures that do not require the use of HLLVs.
2.1 Propellant Depot Background
Without a heavy lift class launch vehicle, the mass required in orbit must be deliv-
ered incrementally in smaller segments with present or projected commercial launch
vehicles. This can be accomplished with the implementation of on orbit propellant
storage and transfer technologies, as recommended by the Augustine commission [1].
An orbital propellant depot is defined as a system that enables the aggregation of pro-
pellant and refueling of spacecraft elements in orbit. A propellant depot can serve two
primary purposes: it can be used to service satellites [19] that have reached end-of-life
by consuming all of its orbital maneuvering fuel, or it can be used to store propellants
for exploration missions that require large amounts of propellant. For typical explo-
ration missions beyond LEO, regardless of the destination, the propellant mass can
account for 70% or more of the total assembled mass in orbit [20]. Table 2 shows the
breakdown of the assembled mass in orbit of the four major exploration missions and
mission concepts in human history. Each of the mission’s assembled mass in LEO
consists of large quantities of propellant that are required for the mission. Typically,
the large quantity of propellant is justification for the HLLV requirement. The use
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Table 2: Breakdown of Assembled Mass in Orbit for Various Human Exploration
Missions [4, 6–8,16]
Apollo Constellation NASA Design
Program Program Reference Mission HEFT
Destination Lunar Lunar Mars Asteroid
Mass in LEO 135 168 486 254 mT
Propellant 103 126 348 192 mT
% Propellant 77% 75% 72% 76%
of a propellant depot allows the architecture to decouple a large percentage of the
required mass from the mission critical path and eliminate the HLLV requirement.
The origin of the propellant depot concept can be traced back to the Apollo
program. During the architectural selection process, a concept called Earth Orbit
Rendezvous (EOR) was considered [6,15], as shown in Figure 5. The concept included
two launches of a smaller launch vehicle (as compared to the Saturn V) to deliver
the manned spacecraft and the propellant separately. Liquid oxygen would have been
transferred from the tanker to the manned spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
before the trans-lunar injection maneuver. The single launch Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
(LOR) option was ultimately selected despite the high cost associated with the Saturn
V vehicle because the EOR option posed higher risk to the mission success due to the
two-launch requirement and the tight schedule constraint due to propellant boil-off
because of a lack of cryogenic storage technologies in the 1960s.
Propellant transfer remained a major component of architecture design even after
being eliminated from the Apollo program due to the potential for drastic increases
in capability for long duration exploration missions. However, as the focus of NASA
shifted from exploration to LEO operation with the Space Shuttle and the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS), the value of propellant storage and transfer technology
diminished. With the recent retirement of the Space Shuttle program and the re-
newed interest in beyond LEO exploration, the propellant depot concept has become
relevant again. In the past decade, NASA and industry experts have been examining
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Figure 5: Apollo Program Lunar Mission Mode Comparison [6]
the potential benefits of propellant transfer technologies to the human exploration
architecture. Below is a summary of recent literature on the topic of propellant depot
research in the context of human space exploration.
2.2 Recent Literature Review
Howell, Mankins, and Fikes’ 2005 paper [21] discussed the notional concept of using
propellant depots in exploration missions. The paper describes In-Space Cryogenic
Propellant Depot (ISCPD) as a “broad class of new concepts of operations with
the potential to meet several of the important challenges of enabling affordable pre-
positioning of key logistics (including fuel, hardware, and appropriate systems) to
points beyond LEO.” The paper states that the primary challenge to achieving sus-
tainability in space exploration and space operation beyond LEO is the affordability
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of positioning assets and consumables in orbit. The authors identified four key ele-
ments to solving this challenge: 1) Lower cost of Earth-to-Orbit (ETO) transport, 2)
Highly Autonomous assembly, 3) Affordable pre-positioning of fuel and other materi-
als, and 4) Reusable, high reliable, and high energy space transportation. The paper
concludes that the utilization of ISCPD will contribute to all four of the identified key
elements, and the technology development for ISCPD requirement is fundamental for
establishing robust space exploration infrastructure and is applicable across a wide
spectrum of exploration objectives.
Fikes, Howell, and Henley’s 2006 paper [22] examined the benefits of refueling
elements of the Constellation program in orbit. The paper provided an overview of a
broad systems study that examined the potential locations for ISCPD. The study’s
primary finding is the identification of different technology development needs (which
will be addressed in a later section), and the conclusion that “[ISCPD] systems offer
significant advantages for NASA space exploration systems.” [22].
Similarly, the Boeing Company’s 2007 paper [12] by Chandler, Bienhoff, Cronick,
and Grayson detailed the company’s study on utilizing propellant depot as a means
to improve the performance of the Constellation program. The Boeing Company’s
propellant depot concept is modular [12,23] as shown in Figure 6. The depot consists
of a central truss system with six tank modules that are derived from Delta IV
upper stages. The central truss has robotic arms to berth the tank modules and
utilizes autonomous rendezvous and docking capabilities demonstrated by Orbital
Express [24]. The depot is sized to accommodate the propellant requirements of the
lunar reference mission, specifically the descent module, as defined in ESAS. Each
tank module has a capacity of 25 mT, yielding a total depot capacity of 150 mT.
Each module holds two fluids, storing approximately 21 mT of LO2 and 4 mT of
LH2. For the Constellation program, a 180% increase in payload landed on the lunar
surface is possible with refueling of the ESAS Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and using
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Figure 6: Boeing’s Multi-Launch Dual-Fuel Modular Propellant Depot Concept, re-
produced from [23]
the full EDS for the trans-Lunar injection (TLI) maneuver. The result of the Boeing
study is confirmed by Young’s Ph.D. Dissertation in 2009 [25].
Young’s dissertation provided an extensive examination of the impact of on-orbit
refueling on the Constellation program [25]. The dissertation concludes that signifi-
cant improvement to the mission capability, in terms of payload delivery, is possible
by utilizing a propellant depot and refueling the EDS of the Constellation program.
In addition, Young concludes a significant cost saving is possible with the utilization
of ISCPD as well as improvements in the extensibility of the architecture. However,
these studies are limited to relatively short term propellant storage in space (roughly
90 days), which would not be ideal for longer duration and higher performance re-
quired missions like Mars or Asteroids.
Arney and Wilhite’s 2009 journal paper [18] and Georgia Tech’s graduate team
at the 2009 Revolutionary Technical Challenge design competition forum [26] (Figure
7) both provided optimization for propellant depot based lunar exploration archi-
tectures. Arney’s paper optimized an ESAS-like mission to the lunar surface using
commercial launch vehicles and commercial propellant depots. The optimized archi-
tecture demonstrates that it is possible to design an exploration architecture without
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Figure 7: Propellant Depot Concept Art from Georgia Tech Revolutionary Techni-
cal Challenge Graduate Research Team, reproduced from [26]
the heavy-lift launch vehicle and provide more payload to the lunar surface than the
ESAS architecture. The 2009 competition paper [26] by the Georgia Tech students
provided analysis of a more extensive design space, and optimized the architecture
based on a combination of five figures of merit; extensibility, heritage, performance,
reliability, and cost. The final optimized solution utilizes a heavy lift class launch
vehicle in tandem with small commercial launch vehicles and propellant depot. The
analysis from these two papers demonstrated the significant advantage of a propel-
lant depot based architecture as compared to a traditional architectures. A depot
based architecture provides better performance, extensibility, and lower cost when
compared to the baseline non-depot based architecture, and “creating a sustainable
space transportation system [18].”
The 2008 paper [27] by United Launch Alliance’s Kutter, Zegler, Neil and Pich-
ford detailed the efforts by the company to join the propellant depot market because
of their extensive experience with using cryogenic upper stages. Combined with the
2009’s survey paper by Goff, Kutter, Zegler, Bienhoff, Chandler and Marchetta [23],
the three primary ULA depot designs are presented. The first is a disposable single-
use propellant depot, using a Centaur upper stage tank and its residual propellant to
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Figure 8: United Launch Alliance’s Single-Fluid, Single-Launch Depot Concept, re-
produced from [23]
resupply another vehicle. This single-use tanker would have limited storage capability
and a very short designed lifetime. It would likely be used at first as a technology
demonstrator and later as a tanker spacecraft to refuel other orbital depots. The ben-
efit of this concept is that it requires very little technology advancement. The tanks
are derived from existing Centaur tanks and can be launched on existing boosters.
Thermal management of the cryogenic fluid is entirely passive utilizing multi-layer
insulation as well as minimum structural penetration design and pre-launch pressur-
ization and cooling. The tanks would hold approximately 20 metric tons of liquid
oxygen and can develop experience with on-orbit cryogenic propellant handling, stor-
age and transfer.
The second concept is a simple, single-fluid, single-launch concept [23,27], shown
in Figure 8. This concept has longer duration storage capability than the single-use
concept and has the ability to be refueled. This concept consists of a 4.57 meter
diameter tank with MLI and sun-shield for thermal management. It can be launched
on an existing 5 meter diameter payload fairing on an Atlas V, Delta IV, or Arianne
5. It contains only a single fluid, capable of housing 140 mT of LO2 or 15 mT of LH2.
The third and final ULA concept is a near-term, single-launch LO2/LH2 depot
to support manned space flight beyond LEO [23], shown in Figure 9. The LH2 tank
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Figure 9: United Launch Alliance’s Double-Fluid, Single-Launch Propellant Depot
Concept, reproduced from [27]
is similar to the single-fluid reusable concept with a 5 meter diameter fairing. The
LO2 tank is constructed by modifying the launch vehicles existing upper-stage to
accommodate the requirements set by the depot. The two tanks are joined in the
middle by an equipment deck that holds the attachment points for the sun-shield
and the solar panels. The exact size of the depot depends on the modifications to
the upper stage. The design, based on the ULA Advanced Common Evolved Stage
(ACES), would hold 121 mT of total propellant (106 mT of LO2 and 15 mT of LH2).
Bell Aerospace also provided a depot concept derived from a Centaur vehicle [28],
shown in Figure 10, which is very similar to ULA’s first design concept. The depot
stores both LO2 and LH2. The LH2 module is a modified Centaur tank. The LH2
module tank is launched with ambient temperature helium to reduce the requirement
on the skin gauge. The LH2 module holds 7.6 mT of propellant and utilizes vapor
cooling, a composite strut, and GH2 (gaseous hydrogen) ullage. The LO2 module uses
the Centaur’s LH2 tank to store the LO2, with a volume of 48 m
3, and a capacity
of 53 mT. New valves and plumbing are required to convert the Centaur vehicle to
handle different cryogenic fluids.
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Figure 10: Bell Aerospace’s Simple Propellant Depot Concept, reproduced from [28]
Zegler and Kutter’s 2010 paper [29] provided an expanded discussion on the uti-
lization of the ULA propellant depot and provided a compelling argument for the
need for a propellant depot based architecture. The paper laid out a plan for evolu-
tionary steps to gradually increase the capability of the propellant depot to satisfy
the demands of increasing mission difficulty. Zegler and Kutter conclude that the
propellant depot technologies are foundational to space exploration and “no serious
Lunar or Mars architecture can avoid depots.” The reasoning behind this conclu-
sion is their belief that the heavy lift system path is not sustainable because it can
only “economically perform the highest-level exploration tasks...due to its size, cost,
[and] organizational entanglements.” [29] This sentiment is routinely shared among
other authors [5, 18, 30] who have examined the benefits of propellant depot based
architectures.
Both Goff [23] and Kutter [27] conclude that while significant technology devel-
opment effort is still required, the ability to refuel propulsion stages in orbit has
tremendous potential benefits to the entire space community. Both studies presented
near-term options as well as technology needs to provide long-term benefits to more
aggressive exploration missions and destinations. Currently, ULA is preparing for a
demonstration flight to test many relevant technologies for on-orbit fluid management
and transfer. This demonstration flight, the Cryogenic Orbital Testbed (CRYOTE)
mission [31] shown in Figure 11, is slated to be one of the first official proof-of-concepts
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Figure 11: ULA’s Cryogenic Orbital Testbed Vehicle on an Atlas V Launch Vehicle,
reproduced from [23]
for large volume on-orbit fluid management and transfer of cryogenic fluids. The mis-
sion was scheduled to be flown as a secondary payload on an Atlas V mission in 2012;
however, funding issues have yet to be resolved and the mission is still pending.
2.3 Propellant Depot Taxonomy
In order to fully understand the technological needs for a propellant depot based
exploration architecture, a proper definition of the different components of a propel-
lant depot is necessary. By examining the literature, the propellant depot system
can be broken into four primary categories; structural subsystem, electrical power
subsystem, propulsion subsystem, and the fluid management subsystem.
The structural subsystem serves as the backbone of the propellant depot system.
The primary components are the tanks that serve as storage vessels for the propel-
lant. Storage tanks are fairly common in space architectures because many of the
exploration missions require large amounts of propellants. Tanks are generally made
of aluminum alloys as a compromise between strength-to-weight ratio of the mate-
rials and cryogenic fluid compatibility. Composite materials have been proposed as
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a replacement for improved performance [32, 33]; however, testing and large scale
demonstration was conducted in 2014, but flight demonstration is still needed. The
structural subsystem also includes the inter-tank adapters, the thrust structures that
support the engine loads, and all other structural supports that are necessary for the
tanks to survive the launch and in-space environments.
The electrical subsystems provide all of the power for the vehicle during its de-
signed lifetime. For vehicles with short designed lifetime, lithium-ion batteries may
be sufficient to provide the required power. For the majority of satellites and space-
crafts, power generation from solar arrays that are designed to provide enough power
at their end-of-life operation [34]. The subsystem also includes the electrical power
distribution to the entire vehicle and conversion systems for regulating the electrical
power supply.
The propulsion subsystem provides the maneuvering capability for the propellant
depot vehicle. Depending on the design, location, and required function for the
depot system, the maneuvering requirements can be drastically different. A simple
“dummy” propellant depot may have no propulsion system and rely solely on the
rendezvous vehicle to capture the depot for propellant transfer. On the other end
of the spectrum, a sophisticated depot system may have the capability to perform
sub-orbital burns [25] to obtain orbit after separating from the launch vehicle as well
as in-space maneuvers such as station keeping burns, Earth departure burns, and
planetary insertion burns. The design for the propulsion system will be dependent of
the mission requirements and the complete architecture optimization. A few of the
available options include traditional chemical engines using cryogenic fluids, chemical
engines using storable propellants, cold gas thrusters, solid propellant motors, high
energy electric propulsion systems, and nuclear based propulsion systems [35].
The fluid management subsystem consists of different elements for long-term stor-
age and transfer of the propellant in micro-gravity environment. This subsystem is
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the most challenging as it is unique to the propellant depot system and because of
the technology development required. Insulation, refrigeration, and other thermal
management technologies will need to be employed to ensure the health of the fluids
in storage. These thermal system technologies are discussed in detail in the next
section. A work breakdown structure of the propellant depot subsystems is shown in
Figure 12.
Propellant Depot


























Figure 12: Propellant Depot Work Breakdown Structure
2.4 Propellant Depot Technology
The primary technology required for an on-orbit propellant depot is long-term cryo-
genic fluid management in a low-gravity environment. Cryogenic fluids have been used
in spacecraft since before the Apollo program and are used expensively in propulsion
and life support systems due to its high efficiency and superior performance. Thus,
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the management of these cryogenic fluids is vital to the mission success. During the
Apollo program, cryogenic fluids were used as both propellant for the trans-Lunar
injection (TLI) maneuver and fuels for the fuels cells to generate electricity and wa-
ter for the life support system [36, 37]. However, the thermal management for these
fluids was very rudimentary, limiting the mission duration of the lunar missions.
In the harsh environment of space, the management of these fluids at cryogenic
temperatures is extremely difficult. Without an active cryogenic cooling system, the
temperature of the cryogenic fluids will increase due to heat penetrated through the
insulation, causing the fluids to boil and pressure increase inside the storage tanks. In
order to maintain proper pressure in the tanks, the excess pressure needs to be vented
into space to avoid tank structural failure. This venting of the excess gas reduces the
overall useable fluid for the mission, called boil-off loss, and therefore reduces the
performance of the overall mission. During the Apollo program, after the spacecraft
has achieved orbit, the crew only had six hours to perform the necessary vehicle
health checkout before the TLI maneuver. This time constraint is due primarily to
the boil-off of the cryogenic propellant in the Saturn V’s SIV-B stage, which is used
for the TLI maneuver. If the vehicle check out cannot be performed in a timely
manner, the mission would be aborted due to the loss of performance of the upper
stage vehicle [38].
The boil-off problem is also one of the primary reasons the EOR option was not
selected for the Apollo mission. The Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR) mission requires
the launch of two smaller launch vehicles, with a rendezvous in LEO where propellant
and supplies is transferred from one to another, before the second vehicle depart for
the moon. At the time, the technology for fluid management is limited to only a few
hours on orbit, thus it would require an unreasonably strict launch schedule for the
two launch vehicles. The risk associated with the launch schedule was deemed too
high, and thus the EOR option was not selected [6].
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Figure 13: NASA Office of the Chief Technologist Mars Mission Mass Saving Po-
tential due to Technology Investment [39]
Similarly, the cryogenic fluid boil-off problem is observed in the ESAS architecture
and the Constellation program. The Constellation program adopted the EOR strat-
egy, launching an unmanned Earth Departure Stage (EDS) with the Lunar Surface
Access Module (LSAM) before a separate crew launch to rendezvous with the EDS [7].
But similar to the Apollo EOR concept, the cryogenic fluid boil-off imposed a sched-
ule constraint on the two launches. Analysis of the then state-of-the-art in cryogenic
fluid management resulted in a maximum 90 day loiter time for the EDS/LSAM stack
in LEO before the crew is launched and the TLI burn. Failure for the crew launch to
meet this schedule resulted in a loss of mission, as the performance of the EDS would
be insufficient to perform the TLI maneuver due to boil-off losses.
For longer duration missions, the problem of cryogenic boil-off is even more pro-
found. Combined with the enormous amount of cryogenic propellant that is required
for high performance exploration missions, to Mars and beyond, makes in-space cryo-
genic fluid management a critical technology. In fact, NASA’s Design Reference
Architectures for human Mars mission requires zero boil-off (ZBO) technology for all
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of its mission modes to be successful [8,16]. NASA’s Office of the Chief Technologist
identifies cryogenic thermal management as the biggest game changing technology
development for the reduction of mass required in orbit, as shown in Figure 13 [39].
Advancement in long-term cryogenic thermal management can significantly reduce
the cost of an exploration architecture. An orbital propellant depot will benefit from
the development of long-term thermal management. As the literature review showed,
reduction in cost and complexity as well as increase in reliability, extensibility and
flexibility of an exploration architecture are possible with the utilization of orbital
propellant depots.
Dr. David Chato of NASA Glenn Research Center presented an assessment of
the current state of technologies required for a cryogenic propellant depot [13]. A
summary of this assessment is presented in Table 3 [13]. The Technology Readiness
Level (TRL) for each technology element is given along with notable accomplishments
performed in ground tests. Also, issues for in-space application and the desirability
of a flight test are presented. Note that, to advance to a TRL of 6, the technology
must be tested in a relevant environment, which typically involves a flight test. The
Cryogenic Propellant Storage and Transfer (CPST) demonstration flight, scheduled
for 2018, was unfortunately cancelled due to escalating cost.
2.4.1 Cryogenic Fluid Management
The first three technologies identified by Chato [13] addresses the long term in-space
cryogenic fluid management challenge. Passive storage describes different techniques
to mitigate the boil-off of the cryogenic fluids without directly interacting with the
fluids. Instead, these technologies serve as a barrier between the external heating and
the cryogenic fluids. The simplest form of passive storage management technology
is insulation materials that can be applied directly to the storage tank wall. Most
launch vehicles that employ cryogenic fluids for its propulsion systems have some
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Table 3: Assessment of Technologies for a Cryogenic Propellant Depot [13]
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form of spray-on foam insulation (SOFI) to protect the cryogenic fluids from the
environmental heat on the launch pads [40, 41].
The most commonly used passive cryogenic thermal management system in space
is multi-layer insulation (MLI). MLI is constructed of multiple layers of thin sheets of
high reflective materials with thermal spacers between the layers. Its primary purpose
is to reduce heat loss rate by thermal radiation and conduction. Currently it is used
extensively on spacecrafts [42, 43] and satellites. MLI systems are efficient in the
space vacuum environment due to low conduction heat loss and no convection heat
loss mechanism. As noted by Chato [13], current state of the art in MLI technology
can reduce the boil-off of LH2 to roughly 3% per month, which can still be substantial
in long duration exploration architectures. This improved technology led to the 90
days on orbit constraint for the Constellation program, as compared to 6 hours for
the Apollo program in the 1960s.
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Figure 14: James Webb Space Telescope’s Sun Shield, reproduced from [44]
The other primary forms of passive storage technologies are various types of optical
shields such as sun-shields [23,29,45], which are being employed on the James Webb
Space Telescope [44,46] as shown in Figure 14, or vapor cooled shields [47], which can
be considered a semi-active storage technology because it uses the vented gas from
the storage tank to keep the shields cold. These shields are not directly attached to
the storage tanks, but serve as an additional barrier between the environment and
the cryogenic fluids. The James Webb Space Telescope uses the sun-shield (Figure
14) to block direct sun light to both improve the imagining capability of the telescope
and to keep the receiver mirror at near absolute zero temperature. ULA’s propellant
depot concept (Figure 9) also utilizes a form of optical sun-shield to improve the
performance of the other thermal management system.
It must be noted that regardless of which form of passive storage technology is em-
ployed, the inherent nature of the technology is that it can only reduce the heat rate
penetration, it cannot completely eliminate it. Thus, boil-off of the cryogenic fluid is
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inevitable if only passive storage technologies are employed [30]. For short term mis-
sions, the boil-off of the fluid may be manageable, as seen during the Apollo program
and the Constellation program; however, for multi-year manned Mars missions, the
losses need to be eliminated completely.
The second technology area identified by Dr. Chato [13] is active storage cry-
ocooler which maintain the temperature of cryogenic fluids with refrigeration. Cry-
ocoolers transfer heat from the cryogenic fluids to another working fluid and releases
the heat through heat exchangers to maintain the temperature of the cryogenic flu-
ids below its boiling point. Cryocoolers have been used extensively on spacecraft in
the past two decades. All of the space-qualified cryocoolers developed to date have
been used on small satellites or probes maintaining the small amounts of cryogenic
fluid used for cooling instruments [48, 49]. These cryocoolers have a relatively small
amount of cooling capacity at the cryogenic temperature required.
ter Brake [50] in 2002 and Radebaugh [51] in 2009 provided two recent surveys
on the state-of-the-art in cryocooler technologies. ter Brake cataloged performance
data from 235 cryocoolers with cooling capacities below a few tens of watts and
operating temperature between 4 and 120 Kelvin (K). The 2002 survey [50] combined
the data from several previous surveys, including the 1969 survey by Daunt [52],
1974 survey by Strobridge, the 1984 survey by Smith [53], and the 1999 survey by
Bruning [54]. Several papers have examined the use of cryocoolers for propellant
depot architectures [30, 55], and many exploration architectures often assume ZBO
technology exists [8,16,26] in order to make the mission possible. The implication of
the ZBO assumption will be addressed in this dissertation.
2.4.2 Propellant Acquisition and Transfer
In addition to the long-term management of cryogenic fluid on orbit, two major areas
of technology development are necessary for cryogenic propellant depots. The first is
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Figure 15: Schematic of a Pressure Fed Propellant Transfer System [59]
acquisition and transfer of the cryogenic fluids in a low-G environment. Transferring
propellant from one system to another in orbit is a fairly routine operation today.
The Russian Space Agency pioneered the propellant transfer techniques back in the
1970’s with numerous mission demonstrations with the Salyut Space Station [56].
Since then, NASA has performed experimental missions such as the Orbital Refueling
System in 1984 aboard the Space Shuttle Challenger (STS 41-G) [57], the Super Fluid
On-Orbit Transfer demo in 1993 on the Space Shuttle Endeavor (STS-57) [57], and
the Orbital Express demonstration mission in 2007 [19]. In addition, both the Russian
Space Agency’s Progress Vehicle and European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer
Vehicle have performed numerous propellant resupply missions to the International
Space Station [58].
Propellant transfer in orbit is challenging due to the low-gravity environment. The
European Automatic Transfer Vehicle uses a secondary tank to provide high pressure
gases to force liquid from the transfer tank to the receiver tank on the International
Space Station [58]. Figure 15 shows a schematic of this type of transfer [59]. This
option provides an efficient way of moving fluids; however, using this system on a
large resupply propellant tanker may require larger than acceptable pressurization
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Figure 16: Schematic of a Thrust Fed Propellant Transfer System [59]
tanks. Russian Progress vehicles [57] have used bladders or membranes to transfer
storable liquids to resupply the space station. This is a simple method for propellant
transfer; however, most bladders are polymer or synthetic rubber based and have not
been demonstrated for use with cryogenic fluids. Another method utilizes a transfer
pump system, much like the demonstrated Orbital Express mission [19]; however, the
system has yet to be utilized to transfer cryogenic fluid.
The most mature concept is propellant settling that leverages on decades of experi-
ence with upper stage engines for start-up in orbit. Upper stage engines address fluid
transfer with acceleration by firing small solid rocket motors to provide appropriate
engine start-up propellant flow rate from the tanks to the combustion chamber [35].
Figure 16 shows a schematic of this type of transfer [59]. For a propellant depot,
depending on the required flow rate, the acceleration required can be addressed with
small reaction control system thrusters using the excess boil-off, expendable solid
rocket motors on the propellant tankers, or centripetal acceleration. The disadvan-
tage of these systems is the need for a propulsion system to provide consistent vehicle
acceleration for the duration of the transfer.
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Several concepts have been proposed for fluid transfer without using rocket mo-
tors to settle the propellants. One of these involves generating rotational acceleration
by spinning the storage tanks to settle the propellant in the desired location for the
duration of the propellant transfer [57]. One concept envisions using electrodynamic
tethers to accomplish the rotation of the propellant depot to settle the propellant [60].
This concept provides propellant settling without using reaction mass or expending
propellants, but requires a large rotating structure which presents additional ren-
dezvous and docking challenges. Another concept uses strong permanent magnets
or electromagnets to force the liquid within the tanks to assume desired orienta-
tions [61–63]. Since LO2 is paramagnetic and LH2 are slightly diamagnetic, a strong
magnetic field can influence the fluids to behave accordingly. However, the mass of
the large magnet can be prohibitive; but it provides accurate control over the position
of the fluids.
A completely different set of technologies have been proposed for transferring pro-
pellant without settling of the fluids. NASA Glenn has been conducting extensive
research in the field of no-vent fill by pressurizing the tanks with boil-off gas of the
propellant and then sub-cooling the liquid to return the vapor back to liquid state
to minimize the boil-off losses [64–66]. Ground experimental testing has demon-
strated the concept with minimal boil-off loss during the transfer; however, a flight
demonstration has yet to be completed. Another non-settled transfer concept utilizes
capillary flow and surface tension [67–69]. This type of device consists of multiple
channels located within close proximity of tank wall. The portion of the channel
facing the tank wall is covered with a tightly woven screen, and the screen tension
of the propellant trapped in the pores of the screen prevents the flow of vapor into
the channel to ensure vapor free fluid flow. A flight demonstration of this type of
technology was scheduled for 2018 but has since been cancelled.
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2.4.3 Propellant Mass Gauging
The final technology area for a propellant depot concept identified by Dr. Chato is
mass gauging. Accurate measurement of the amount of propellant in a storage tank
is vital to the success of any mission. Mass gauging in orbit is challenging due to the
micro-gravity environment. Traditional methods of performing mass gauging are not
directly applicable. Various concepts have been proposed to resolve the problem with
low-gravity mass gauging. An optical mass gauge utilizes fiber optics to transmit light
particles from the hardware to the tank and back to the receiver [70]. LO2 has good
fluid property for this particular application. In addition, laser based systems have
also been proposed and designed to serve this purpose [71]. Compression mass gauge
operate operates under the principle of slightly changing the volume of the tank by
oscillating a bellow and measuring the resulting pressure change to compute the fluid
level; however, the design of the bellow is challenging for cryogenic propellant [72].
Radio frequency mass gauge calls for measuring radio frequency response of the tank
at various levels and using the data to compare to measurement in-flight to determine
the fill level [73]. Testing of this type of mass gauge has been completed in low gravity
aircraft.
2.5 Propellant Depot Concept of Operation
The design space of an exploration architecture based on propellant depots is ex-
pansive. However, regardless of the choices, the primary enablers for depot based
architectures are the ability to decouple the propellant delivery mass from mission
critical path and the use of low-cost commercial launch providers to deliver propel-
lants. As illustrated in Table 2, regardless of destination, roughly three-quarters of
the mass required in orbit for any exploration architecture consists of propellant which
has little intrinsic value relative to the cost of the in space hardware.
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Figure 17: Notional Manned Exploration Architecture to a Near Earth Asteroid
utilizing Low-Earth Orbit Propellant Depot, reproduced from [11]
Figure 17 shows a notional exploration architecture for a manned mission to an as-
teroid using a LEO propellant depot. The exploration architecture is divided into two
distinct phases; the propellant aggregation phase and the mission operations phase.
During the propellant aggregation phase, an empty or partially filled propellant de-
pot is launched into orbit. Then propellant is aggregated over time with numerous
commercial and/or government launch vehicles delivering tankers to rendezvous with
the depot. As will be discussed later, there are no critical time constraint to the
schedule of the propellant delivery as the mission elements and the crew have yet to
be launched. However, there are scenarios in which the buildup must meet certain
schedule constraints, such as in the case of a Mars mission, where the performance
is highly depended on the planetary phasing. In this case, the utilization of multi-
ple launch providers with multiple launch pads may be more ideal than any single
launcher concept. In addition, because the primary payloads for these launches are
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Figure 18: Propellant Depot Example for a Manned Mission to Asteroid
relatively inexpensive propellants, a common propellant tanker can be used on mul-
tiple launch vehicles to reduce cost.
Separate but parallel from the propellant aggregation phase is the mission oper-
ations phase. While propellant is being aggregated in orbit, the mission hardware
as well as the crew can be prepared simultaneously. As the necessary propellant for
the mission has been accumulated, the hardware and the crew can be launched into
orbit, rendezvous with the depot to take on the necessary propellant, and perform
the mission nominally. In the notional architecture shown in Figure 17, the nominal
mission utilizes the same hardware as the current HEFT in-space elements [4], but
instead of launching the element on the heavy lift class Space Launch System, the
elements are broken down into smaller increments, launched on commercial launch
vehicles and assembled in orbit. As will be discussed later, the mass of each of the
in-space element is less than the capability of current launch vehicles. A baseline
propellant depot vehicle for the notional exploration architecture to an asteroid is
shown in Figure 18.
The notional architecture (Figure 17) shows the utilization of propellant depot
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Low Earth Orbit Existing Upper Stages LO2 Only SOFI
High Earth Orbit Dedicated Single Use LH2 Only State-of-Art MLI
Geo-Synch Orbit Dedicated Multi-Use LO2/LH2 Sun Shield
Earth Moon L1 Modular Design CH4 Only Vapor-Cooled Shield
Earth Moon L2 LO2/CH4 Vapor Venting
Low Lunar Orbit RP-1
Martian Orbit LO2/RP-1
Transfer Mass Gauging Resupply
Active
Management
Thrust Settled Optical Sensors Earth Only None
Rotation Settled Radio Frequency In-Situ Moon 80K Cryocooler




Power Propulsion Launch Vehicles
Battery None Delta IV Heavy
Fuel Cells Cold Gas Thruster Atlas V 551
Solar Array Solid Motors Falcon 9
RTG Chemical Engines Falcon Heavy
Electric Propulsion Ariane 5
Nuclear Propulsion Russian Proton/Soyuz/Zenit
in a single architecture, in reality, the design space is quite large. Many studies in
literature have mentioned the possibility of placing propellant depots in different near
Earth locations to maximize its potential benefits. Zegler and Kutter [29] discussed
the possibility of putting propellant depots in the Earth-Moon Lagrangian points to
increase the flexibility of the overall architecture. In addition, these locations may
provide provided reduced solar heating as compared to LEO [11].
Table 4 shows the potential design space for the utilization of propellant depot
in exploration architectures. The design space can be further expanded to consider
the different commercial launch operations as well as the different cryogenic fluid
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management requirements. The location for the propellant depot will directly impact
the environment in which the cryogenic fluids experiences and the payload delivery
capability of the launch vehicle resupplying the depot as well as the departure con-
dition of the exploration missions. The design and the propellant capacity of the
depot will be dependent on the mission requirements, as well as the desire for flexi-
bility and extensibility of the depot. The type of propellant stored by the propellant
depot is also dependent on the mission requirements, as well as the potential for
in-situ resources/propellant production. The exploration of the full propellant depot
architecture design space is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the
methods developed in this thesis are well suited to evaluate the architecture feasibility
of the different design options.
2.6 Commercial Launch Industry
Up until late 1970’s, all of the launch vehicles delivering payload into orbit (both gov-
ernment and commercial) were owned and operated by government agencies. Much
like passenger and cargo airlines in the early days of aviation, every aspect of the op-
eration is highly regulated and restrictive. With a combination of public and private
funding, the Arianespace Company created the first commercial Ariane launch vehi-
cles to deliver commercial and government payloads to orbit. The first Ariane launch
occurred on December 24, 1979 and delivered a payload into orbit successfully. Since
then, Arianespace and five different iterations of the Ariane launch vehicles have had
over 200 successful launches. [74]
The United States was not far behind in the commercial launch industry. Once
the Space Shuttle became operational, the government turned over existing expend-
able launch vehicles to the commercial sectors while keeping the Space Shuttle as the
primary payload delivery system for the United States. Boeing and Lockheed-Martin
operated the Delta, Atlas, and Titan families of launch vehicles and began developing
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Table 5: U.S. Commercial Launch Vehicle Payload Capability Summary [75–77]
Falcon 9 Falcon Heavy∗ Delta IV Heavy Atlas V 551
Payload 9,900 51,000 23,600 19,000 [kg]
Diameter 4.6 4.6 5.13 4.57 [m]
Length 11.4 11.4 11.7-22.4 10.2-16.3 [m]
Price (FY11) $53M $81-127M $300M $290M
$/kg $5.4k $1.6k-$2.5k $12.7k $15.3k
them for commercial use; however, it wasn’t until the Challenger accident that the
importance of these programs became apparent. The United States military, need-
ing flexibility and reliability with delivering its payloads, turned to the commercial
expendable launch vehicles. Still, the demand for the vehicles lagged behind supply.
Because the Space Shuttle and the expendable launch vehicles were unable to achieve
their designed launch rates, the fixed cost associated with the operation and upkeep
of the infrastructure of the vehicles kept the prices of launch vehicles relatively high.
Thus, the utilization of commercial launch vehicles in an exploration architecture
was always seen as undesirable because of the high cost of commercial launch and the
fairly low payload capability [14]. Less payload capability results in more required
launches which increases the total cost of the overall architecture.
In the past decade, there has been a change in the commercial launch industry
landscape. Space Technology Exploration Corporation (SpaceX) entered the market
in 2002 and may rewrite the economics of commercial launch market. SpaceX has
moved 95% of the design and manufacturing of the launch vehicles and subsystems
in house to drastically reduce the launch prices they offer, as shown in Table 5.
Much like the disruption of the low cost airlines in the 1970’s, SpaceX’s entry may
fundamentally change how commercial space companies conduct business.
The primary providers for commercial launch vehicles in the United States are
United Launch Alliance and SpaceX. The payload capabilities of the current U.S.
∗Currently in Development, First Operational Flight Scheduled for 2014-2015 [78]
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Figure 19: Boeing’s Delta Family of Launch Vehicle, reproduced from [79]
commercial launch vehicles can be summarized in Table 5. Boeing’s Delta families of
launch vehicles were first introduced in the 1960s as modified United States Air Force
Thor ballistic missiles. Currently, United Launch Alliance operates two families of
Delta vehicles; the Delta II and the Delta IV, shown in Figure 19. The largest in
the family is the Delta IV Heavy vehicle, capable of delivering 23,600 to 28,000 kg of
payload to LEO, at a FY 11 price of $300 million [76].
Similarly, the original Lockheed Martin’s Atlas family of launch vehicles (Figure
20), which began as intercontinental ballistic missiles, was converted to launch pay-
loads into orbit. Currently, only the Atlas V variant is still in operational. The largest
of which is the Atlas V 551 vehicle, with a payload capability of 19,000 kg to LEO at
a price of $290 million [77]. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 is the newest commercial launch vehi-
cle. Since the first flight in 2010, it has had eight successful flights, including sending
Dragon capsule to the International Space Station. The Falcon 9 is scheduled to have
more than 10 launches in 2014, with increasing number of launches as the demand
for the vehicle increases. The Falcon 9 has a payload capability of less than 10,000 kg
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Figure 20: Lockheed Martin’s Atlas Family of Launch Vehicle, reproduced from [79]
costing $53 million per flight. Comparing to the other two United Launch Alliance
launch vehicles, this constitutes a 50 to 70% reduction in the cost of LEO payload
delivery. The Falcon Heavy vehicle, currently slated for a 2015 first test flight, will
reduce the price of payload delivery even further, as it has a design LEO payload of
over 50,000 kg at a targeted price of $130 million.
In terms of launch reliability, both the Delta and the Atlas have impeccable launch
records that demonstrate their high reliability. Since its initial launch in 1989, there
have been 154 Delta II launches, with only three recorded failures of the vehicle [74].
The Delta IV family has 21 launches since its first flight in 2002, with only one partial
failure that caused the payload to be inserted into an incorrect orbit. The Atlas family
of vehicle, since 1968, has had 229 launches with only 16 failures [74].
Outside the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and the European Space Agency
all have their own launch vehicles that can provide payload delivery to low Earth orbit
with varying payload capability and launch prices. One of the primary analyses that
this dissertation will examine is the utilization of the emerging launch market to
satisfy the high demand of payload delivery by a propellant depot based architecture.
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The analysis and discussion will be presented in a later chapter.
2.7 Challenges to Propellant Depot Based Architecture
The potential benefits of a propellant depot enabled exploration architectures were
briefly described in Chapter 1. As with any new ideas and concepts, there are nu-
merous challenges to its implementation. The primary challenges to the propellant
depot based exploration architecture can be divided into three topics; the technol-
ogy and performance requirements of the proposed depot system, the reliability and
safety of the overall mission with the large number of required flights, and the cost of
requiring higher number of launch vehicles. These three challenges were summarized
by former NASA administrator Dr. Michael Griffin in his opinion editorial in 2011
titled “Propellant Depots Instead of Heavy Lift?” [14].
The primary challenge to the technology requirement is due to the management
of on-orbit boil-offs of the cryogenic fluids, as the “the ability to maintain it in its
cryogenic state is critical.” [14] Dr. Griffin states that with today’s technology, on-
orbit fluid management systems can achieve “liquid hydrogen boil-off losses of about
0.35 percent per day, or about 10 percent of the fuel per month.” [14] For exploration
architectures that require hundreds of metric tons of propellant aggregated in orbit
over the course of many months, boil-off loss of up to 10% per month makes the depot
based architecture unattractive. Especially because the payload capability of current
commercial launch vehicles are relatively low. The technology requirement to achieve
zero-boil-off is relatively immature as shown by Dr. Chato’s report [13]. Thus the
boil-off loss reduces the performance of the overall system to an unacceptable level.
However, recent developments in cryogenic fluid management technology have made
dramatic impacts on the overall system performance.
Challenge to the overall safety and reliability of the architecture is the fact that by
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launching the required mass into orbit using smaller launch vehicles, the overall prob-
ability of successful mission is drastically reduced. With each launch vehicle having
an independent success probability of 98%, requiring 3 of these launches will result
in an overall success probability of roughly 94%. However, if the required number of
launches increased to 10 or 15, as in the case of a propellant depot based architec-
ture, the overall mission success probability is reduced to 81% and 74% respectively.
Thus, an architecture that requires a large number of launches cannot be seriously
considered for human space exploration if employed by this series approach.
Finally, the economic challenge is “that marginal specific cost of payload to orbit
is generally lower for larger launch vehicles.” [14] This is observed in all other forms of
transportation, where larger vehicles generally provide better economics for delivering
cargo or people from one location to another. In addition, the economic attractiveness
of a depot based architecture is subject to the ever changing economics and payload
delivery capability of the of commercial launch market. These three areas of concern
give rise to three specific research questions and hypothesis that are addressed in this
dissertation.
Research Question 1: What are the major technical and performance challenges
for a long term orbital propellant depot, and how do these challenges impact the
feasibility of the overall exploration architecture?
Hypothesis: The primary technical challenge resides in the long-term storage and
transfer of cryogenic fluids in micro-gravity. Both of these areas can be addressed
with current state of the practice technologies with minimal development efforts and
will not negatively impact the overall performance of the architecture.
Research Question 2: How does the utilization of propellant depot and commer-
cial launch impact the overall mission reliability, safety, and payload manifesting of
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exploration architectures?
Hypothesis: All currently planned mission elements can be broken down into el-
ements that fit on existing commercial launch vehicles. Overall mission reliability
can be improved with system reliability growth which benefits from increase launch
numbers. Redundant systems can be utilized with depot based architecture which
can provide additional reliability improvement.
Research Question 3: What are the economic implications of utilizing commercial
launch services with orbital propellant depots on overall feasibility of the exploration
architecture?
Hypothesis: A propellant depot with commercial launch based exploration archi-
tecture provides significant cost savings compared to the exploration plans utilizing
heavy lift launch vehicles. The propellant depot architecture presents program costs
that can fit within a more realistic level of budget expectation. The utilization of
commercial launch vehicles to deliver propellant to orbit also provides a more stable
economic platform for long term space exploration.
These research questions and their corresponding hypothesis will be addressed in
this dissertation with extensive literature search, complex modeling and simulation,
and detailed analysis of the results in the coming chapters in order to establish the
feasibility of a propellant depot based exploration architecture. Research question
1 will be addressed in Chapter 4, question 2 will be addressed in Chapter 5, and




This chapter presents the methodology used in this dissertation for evaluating explo-
ration architectures for various feasibility metrics. A literature review of the definition
and methodology for feasibility assessment is presented and the deficiencies of cur-
rent methods are discussed. To address these deficiencies, formulation of a stochastic
feasibility assessment method is presented. The use of stochastic methods in risk
assessment techniques strengthens current feasibility assessment methods and pro-
vides a quantitative evaluation of overall feasibility. This chapter concludes with a
notional feasibility assessment example. The areas of feasibility challenges identified
in Chapter 2 will be addressed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
3.1 Feasibility Definition
Feasible(adj.): capable of being done or carried out <a feasible plan>; capable of
being used or dealt with successfully; reasonable; likely. [80]
The assessment of the feasibility of any concept by definition is subjective. The
dictionary definition [80] uses terms like “likely,” “reasonable,” and “capable,” all
of which are subjective. Depending on the perspective of the individual or group
performing the feasibility assessment, drastically different conclusions can be reached
as each individual has their own definition of “reasonable” or “likely”. The definition
also uses the word “successfully” in the definition, implying that in order to for
something to be feasible, it needs to meet some objective or measure of success. In
optimization problems, feasibility is defined only in the presence of constraints [81]
and is generally a Boolean quantity.
In complex engineering systems, feasibility studies are critical to ensuring the
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Figure 21: NASA Project Life Cycle, reproduced from [82]
success of a program. NASA’s project life cycle as defined by the System Engineering
handbook is shown in Figure 21 [82]. The handbook states that the primary purpose
of Pre-Phase A stage of the project life cycle is to “devise various feasible concepts
from which new projects (programs) can be selected” and that “conceptual designs
are often offered to demonstrate feasibility and support programmatic estimates.”
The emphasis of the Pre-Phase A stage is to establish feasibility and desirability of
the concept. In essence, during this stage of a project life cycle, the feasibility of the
concepts should be well understood and only feasible concepts will progress to the
Phase A stage. However, the handbook does not specifically define the measurement
used for feasibility but relies on expert opinions which can be subjective in nature.
Feasibility studies are conducted during early phases of product life cycle where
major design decisions are made. These decisions can have dramatic impact on the
ultimate characteristics and overall cost of the system. These design decisions are
made while the knowledge of the system is very limited and minimal budget and
research effort are available to improve the knowledge during this phase. The NASA
System Engineering Handbook states that during the Pre-Phase A feasibility study,
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Figure 22: Notional Cost, Freedom, and Knowledge in Program Design Life Cycle
[83]
“analysis and designs are accordingly limited in both depth and number of options.”
[82].
This is illustrated in Figure 22 in a notional representation of the cost, design free-
dom, and knowledge about a product during the design life cycle [83]. The results of
the Pre-Phase A step in the design life cycle significantly impacts the final operational
characteristics of the system, thus “it is essential that life-cycle considerations be an
inherent aspect of the feasibility analysis activity. [84]” If a conceptual level study
can include all life-cycle considerations along with the uncertainties that are inherent
in these early design phases, the overall knowledge of the concept can be improved.
By increasing the knowledge of the design earlier in the life cycle, more informed de-
cisions can be made to maintain the design freedom during the pre-conceptual level
and thereby decreasing the cost committed early in the project.
3.1.1 Literature Review
A search for feasibility studies in the aerospace literature reveals a wide range of use
for the term applied to different levels of analysis. Some papers discussed in detail the
feasibility of subsystem level components through modeling and simulation [85,86] and
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experimental testing [87], and others addressed only with system level analysis [88–90].
A review of a selection of these feasibility studies provides a general overview of what
the aerospace community have used as benchmark to determine concept feasibility.
• Deckert and Hickey’s paper [91] in 1970 examined the feasibility of vertical and
short take-off and landing aircraft. The study provide one of the best examples
of utilizing the standard system engineering process of defining the design re-
quirements, providing a system level trade study, and evaluating the concepts
through the entire life-cycle consideration. The study provided sound design
recommendations for the different types of aircraft concept under considera-
tion; however, the study fails to discuss the actual feasibility of the various
concepts.
• Loftus et al.’s feasibility evaluation [87] in 1972 on powder rockets documented
a detailed design and testing of ammonium perchlorate/aluminum powder pro-
pellant rocket engine. The study details the design and modeling process of
estimating the performance of various powders for rocket use and follows with
experimental testing results to validate and demonstrate the feasibility of using
solid powders as a propellant in rocket engines. The success of the experimental
testing was used to validate the concept feasibility.
• Hawke et al.’s feasibility study [88] in 1981 on electromagnetic rail-gun launch-
ers presented detailed technical analysis of the proposed launcher system that
includes identification of “limiting factors that influence designs”. The design
of the rail-gun launcher was such that it satisfied the limiting factors identified.
The study concluded that although more research and development is needed
in order to extend the launch capability of the rail-gun, there are no physi-
cal limitations to the overall feasibility of the concept. These defined physical
limitations were used to justify the feasibility of the proposed concept.
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• Parlos and Metzger’s feasibility study [86] in 1994 on a contained pulsed nuclear
propulsion engine utilized detailed modeling of the overall engine and prelim-
inary analysis using off-the-shelf materials to demonstrate a potential for the
engine to have thrust-to-weight ratio greater than one. The conclusion of the
study states that, after the complete analysis, it is conceivable that the con-
cept can be built and tested without physics and engineering challenges. The
requirement for engine thrust-to-weight ratio greater than one is the author’s
definition of the technical challenges to the concept’s overall design was used as
the constraint for concept feasibility.
• Heaton and Longuski’s feasibility assessment [85] in 2003 on Uranian satellite
tour using Galileo style trajectory focuses on the design and analysis of potential
trajectories for an example mission to the Uranian satellites. The study provides
an example trajectory given a set of guidelines and constraints and demonstrates
that the feasibility of the mission by showing feasible solution.
• Takayanagi et al.’s feasibility assessment [89] in 2010 on a nonstop Mars sample
return system provided a detailed parametric study of aeroshell designs for a
Mars aero-flyby sample collection mission. The conclusion of the assessment was
a selection of a candidate aeroshell that is feasible for the mission with emphasis
on ease of the manufacturing process. In addition, experimental testing was
conducted to demonstrate the accuracy of the computational models. These
experiment validations can be related to TRL completions which makes the
concept feasible.
• Brophy et al.’s feasibility study [90] in 2011 on an asteroid return mission ex-
amined concept of sending a robotic system to retrieve a 10,000 kg asteroid to
the ISS. The study identified eight feasibility issues with the concept, ranging
from the identification of potential asteroids to trajectory of the asteroid return
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and the docking of the asteroid to the ISS. A detailed technical analysis of each
of the identified issues was presented and the study concludes that the concept
is feasible by the end of this decade (2019) because there were no show stoppers
identified.
From the literature review, it is clear that there is a general lack of uniformity
when using the term “feasibility study.” In many instances, the title of the paper
would include the term; however, no discussion of how feasibility is demonstrated
exist in the text. The most common use for the term seems to focus on the ability
for the concept to satisfy the goals or requirements set forth in the introduction and
many of these requirements are limited in scope. Additionally, the subjectivity of the
term feasibility is observed as each author uses their own opinion to describe what
they think constitutes a feasible solution.
In order to determine the feasibility of a propellant depot in the framework of an
exploration architecture, there is a need to quantify feasibility. From the literature
study, one can determine the methods required to evaluate feasibility. Deckert and
Hickey [91] demonstrated the need for a system level trade study and the evaluation
of the concept to help assess the feasibility. Loftus [87] showed how feasibility can be
proven with experimental testing of the concept in question. Hawke [88], Parlos [86],
and Heaton [85] all showed the need for requirements and constraint definition in the
feasibility assessment process. Finally, Takayanagi [89] and Brophy [90] showed the
need to present solutions that meet all the necessary requirements to demonstrate
the feasibility of the proposed concept. The next section describes in more detail
the methods used in literature to analyze a system or concept for feasibility so the
deficiencies with current feasibility studies can be identified.
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Figure 23: System Engineering Process, reproduced from [92]
3.2 Feasibility Assessment
For a conceptual level study to be feasible, the concept must be capable to be designed
and developed successfully, as per the definition [80]. In this sense, the feasibility of
a concept can be separated into two components: whether or not the concept can
accomplish its objective and satisfy its constraints and whether or not the concept
can be developed and built within a time and budget constraint (NASA System
Engineering Handbook [82]). These are two separate questions: one addressing the
performance of the proposed design and the other addressing the economics and
system integration requirement of the concept.
3.2.1 Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation portion of the feasibility assessment is the most common
type of feasibility study conducted in literature. The evaluation process closely follows
the first few steps of the system engineering process [92] (Figure 23), from mission
and requirement analysis and definition to concept design and evaluation. All of the
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examples of feasibility studies presented in the previous section provided this form of
feasibility assessment.
The primary goal of the performance evaluation is to investigate whether the
concept is capable of meeting the requirements of the study. All of the studies pre-
sented in the literature search have specific requirements in mind and the subsequent
analyses in the paper were conducted to meet these requirements. For example, Bro-
phy [90] wanted to investigate the possibility of retrieving an asteroid from beyond
the cis-lunar space and bring it back to the ISS for examination. The team analyzed
potential targets for retrieval, conceptually designed a capture system for the aster-
oid, simulated low-thrust trajectories for the mission, and provided mass estimates
for the spacecraft and subsystems.
Brophy’s analysis focused on the technical aspects of the mission design. Can
a candidate asteroid be identified? Yes; the paper showed that there should be a
plethora of candidate asteroids that fit within the requirement of 10,000 kg mass.
Can the asteroid be captured? Yes; the paper demonstrated a concept to retrieve
the asteroid using a newly developed system. Can a spacecraft get to the asteroid
and back? Yes; using a new solar electric propulsion system, the team designed a
trajectory to send the craft to and from the asteroid. Can the spacecraft be launched
into orbit? Yes; with mass estimate of each of the components, the spacecraft has
low enough mass to be launched on currently available launch vehicles.
All of these performance evaluations demonstrated that for each of the feasibility
questions, a technical analysis can be performed to answer the question. Thus, the
concept is feasible because there exists a solution that satisfies the requirements set
forth by the study. However, even though the analysis showed that the solution ex-
ists, very little consideration is given to the actual integration and operation or the
overall cost of the proposed concept. The concept proposed the use of several new
technologies such as the solar electric propulsion system and the asteroid retrieval
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device. The performance of these devices was assumed to be capable of satisfying the
requirements. The feasibility claim of the study hinges on the performance assump-
tions of these new technologies, thus the technology integration must be part of the
feasibility analysis. To accomplish this, NASA utilizes different readiness scales to
quantify the technology maturation process.
3.2.2 Readiness Levels
The second part of feasibility assessment addresses the technology and system in-
tegration requirement for the proposed concepts. With any proposed concept the
infusion of new technologies or new systems is inevitable. The performance of these
new technologies and systems are captured in the performance evaluation and these
evaluations can be crucial to the overall success of the concept. Thus, the belief that
these new technologies can be iterated into the concept successfully is pivotal to the
determination of overall concept feasibility.
The successful integration of different technologies into a concept is difficult to
quantify. There isn’t a mathematical equation or analysis that can show whether or
not a technology is going to be successful or not. In order to combat this difficulty,
prescriptive or soft metrics are needed to make informed decisions. NASA developed
a readiness scale to assess the maturity of technologies and to provide a consistent
comparison of the level of advancement of the different technologies. NASA’s scale
defines the maturity of any technology into nine levels and the definition of each of
the levels was published by Mankins [93] in a 1995 white paper. The Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) scale is summarized in Table 6.
The TRL scale provided a definition of different levels of technology maturity.
TRL level 6 is typical level of technology maturity in which the initiation of a de-
velopment program is appropriate. Using the scale to evaluate technologies that are
required for any proposed concept provide a preliminary measure of feasibility of the
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Table 6: NASA’s Definition of Technology Readiness Levels [93]
Level Technology Readiness
1 Basic principles observed and reported
2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or character-
istic proof-of-concept
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory
environment
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant
environment
6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a rele-
vant environment (ground or space)
7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
9 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and
demonstration (ground or space)
9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission oper-
ations
concept that is useful in comparing multiple concepts. For example, if concept A
utilizes ten technologies that are all TRL 4 and concept B utilizes ten technologies
that are all TRL 7, then it may be said that concept B is more feasible than concept
A. However, this type of comparison is flawed on two fronts.
First, while the example provided a somewhat clear winner when it comes to
feasibility, in reality, the required technologies are typically scattered across the TRL
scales which can make the feasibility claim more challenging. If concept A utilizes
two technologies with TRL 4 and two with TRL 7 while concept B utilizes one
technology with TRL 2 and three with TRL 9, it would be difficult to determine
which of the two concepts is more feasible. Second, while the TRL scale provided
a way to systematically evaluate the technologies that are required for any concept,
there is no information regarding the advancement difficulty or probability of the
technology to advance from one level to another. NASA recognizes this deficiency
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Table 7: NASA’s Definition of Research & Development Degrees of Difficulty [94]
Level Research Development Degree of Difficulty
I A very low degree of difficulty is anticipated in achieving research
and development objectives for this technology
Probability of Success in Normal R&D Effort 99%
II A moderate degree of difficulty should be anticipated in achiev-
ing R&D objectives for this technology
Probability of Success in Normal R&D Effort 90%
III A high degree of difficulty anticipated in achieving R&D objec-
tives for this technology
Probability of Success in Normal R&D Effort 80%
IV A very high degree of difficulty anticipated in achieving R&D
objectives for this technology
Probability of Success in Normal R&D Effort 50%
V The degree of difficulty anticipated in achieving R&D objectives
for this technology is so high that a fundamental breakthrough
is required
Probability of Success in Normal R&D Effort 20%
and developed a second scale to evaluate the degree of difficulty of the technology
maturation process. This scale is published in a second white paper by Mankins [94]
in 1998 and the definition is summarized in Table 7.
The Research & Development Degree of Difficulty (RD3) scale ranks the difficulty
of the technology maturation from level one through five. The goal of the develop-
ment of the RD3 scale is to work in tandem with the TRL scale to provide a more
comprehensive evaluation of the maturity of technologies. However, the same prob-
lems experienced with using TRL scales also exist with the RD3 scale. There is no
systematic way to evaluate two concepts if the technologies it uses are across multiple
TRLs and RD3s. There are system engineering techniques that can be employed for
selection of the concept based on different weighting scales, such as the Technology
Need Value (TNV) [95], but these methods do not fully address the problems with
using TRL and RD3 scales. In general, moving technology from one readiness level
to the next requires research and development efforts that can have dramatic impact
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on the economics of the concept. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
3.2.3 Feasibility Study Deficiencies
The aerospace industry examples demonstrate two distinct areas of deficiencies in a
feasibility study. The first area is the incompleteness in the analysis of a concept for
feasibility. The examples listed in the previous section demonstrate the narrow focus
of typical feasibility studies. For example, while the Uranian satellite tour proposed
by Heaton [85] is technically feasibility in the sense that a trajectory can be designed,
no considerations were given to whether or not propulsion and guidance systems can
achieve the accuracy of the proposed trajectory. In addition, the study was conducted
under specific guidelines and constraints; however, no analysis is presented to discuss
the impact of these guidelines on the feasibility of the trajectory or any uncertainty
involved with the modeling and simulation results. In the asteroid retrieval case [90],
the analysis provided a rigorous examination of all of the different technical aspects
of the mission, but it gave no considerations to the cost of achieving the objectives
or the benefit of such a mission.
To adress this problem, techniques from the corporate and business world can
be used as a guide. In the business world, feasibility assessment mainly focuses on
the economics of the proposed concept. Rigorous cost-benefit analysis is typical in
a business feasibility assessment and formal Return on Investment (ROI) analysis is
used as the primary figure of merit to determine feasibility [96]. The ROI provides the
assessment of whether or not the proposed concept is “bankable.” The ROI analysis
is critical in the risk assessment of business proposals to determine the likelihood
of the concept being profitable. In addition to economic aspect of feasibility, the
business world’s feasibility study also addresses other topics such as the schedule,
operation, and legal aspects of the concept. These areas of investigation make up
the TELOS feasibility acronym (Technology, Economics, Legal, Operation, Schedule)
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that is common in the corporate setting [97,98].
The TELOS feasibility technique outlines the systematic approach to analyze a
concept for feasibility. The general question for each area can be summarized as [99]:
Technical: How likely is the concept capable of being built?
Economic: How likely is the concept return worth the investment?
Legal: Will the concept violate any laws or create legal problems for the
company?
Operation: Will the concept solve the problem that it is created to remedy?
Schedule: Is it likely the concept be built in time to realize the benefit
and/or meet constraints?
By applying the TELOS feasibility approach to aerospace system feasibility studies,
one can begin to analyze the concept in a more comprehensive format, thereby in-
creasing the knowledge during the pre-conceptual phase of the project life cycle and
mitigating the impact of poor decisions early in the life cycle.
The second area of deficiency is the lack of objective measure for feasibility. The
technology and system integration portion of the feasibility assessment may use readi-
ness scales that are defined by NASA and evaluated by subject matter experts. The
fundamental problem with these evaluation metrics is that they are qualitative in
nature. By using qualitative measures to evaluate concepts, information that may be
critical for feasibility assessment may be lost. The two scales, presented in the previ-
ous section and other scales available in literature, are only as good as the opinion of
the technical experts and their interpretation of the scales. Furthermore, these scales
are subject to the opinion and motivation of the evaluators. Adding to the complexity
of concept feasibility definition, feasibility studies in literature perform assessments at
different stages of system maturation; ranging from the pre-conceptual design phase
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to the experimental testing phase. The declaration of concept feasibility across such a
wide range of maturation levels creates confusion in the use of feasibility assessments.
In addition, by categorizing the technologies into discrete levels, the information
that is used to aid the evaluators in selecting the levels for the different technologies
is lost. The information may provide more insight into the specific technologies and,
most importantly, the impact of the technology on the overall concept. The readiness
scales are not sufficient for systematic evaluation of architecture feasibility due to
these deficiencies. From an engineering/scientific standpoint, the feasibility of a con-
cept cannot be demonstrated or proven unless the concept can be manufactured and
perform exactly as described. This creates a problem for studies in the conceptual
design phase. How can one determine the feasibility of proposed concept when it
cannot be proven or demonstrated without significant investment to test the concept
to in a relevant environment? Of course, in the business world, the answer to this is
the simple ROI analysis. However, ROI would be very difficult to apply to aerospace
concepts as the benefit of a scientific mission or space exploration architecture cannot
typically be quantified in monetary value. Also, the investment uncertainty and risk
is can be very difficult to quantify. Instead, the feasibility of the proposed concept
will depend highly on the underlying motivation and the level of risk the decision
makers are willing to take.
There is a need to correlate the feasibility of a concept with the level of risk that
the concepts present. Going back to the definition of feasibility, recall that concepts
must be able to carried out successfully. Thus, by correlating risk into the feasibility
analysis, the question changes from Is the concept feasible? to How likely is it that the
concept is feasible?. Therefore, given a set of requirements and constraints that the
concept need to meet, the question becomes What is the likelihood for the concept
to meet all of the requirements and constraints?. And if new technologies or new
integration techniques are needed, then the question becomes What is the likelihood
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that the system can be built to achieve all of the performance requirements? The
assessment of risk, however, is not an easy task as it may be an “imprecise process
involving judgment and intuition” [100].
In order to demonstrate feasibility at the conceptual study level and avoid sub-
jectivity in the conclusion of feasibility, metrics that are used to make the conclusion
must include all of the uncertainties that exist in the analysis. The analysis must be
comprehensive, including all the factors that can threaten the likelihood of concept
maturation, and it must provide enough data for the decision makers to make unbi-
ased evaluation. Many conventional engineering designs use deterministic approach
and provide mostly single point data for decision makers. Typically, uncertainties in
the design are handled with the application of design margins or factors of safety.
This is demonstrated in almost all of the example feasibility studies examined in
the presented literature search. There is a need for an alternate method to evalu-
ate concepts performance to better capture these uncertainties. The method in this
dissertation utilizes stochastic performance evaluation and quantification of the un-
certainty in technology and system integration to provide probabilistic evaluation
metrics for feasibility assessments.
3.3 Stochastic Feasibility Assessment
The two primary deficiencies of current feasibility assessment methodology are that
they are generally limited to technical areas and are subjective in nature. During
the conceptual design phase, the system performance prediction is vital to ensure
that the system meets its requirements, delivered on schedule, and developed within
allocated cost. Early in the design process, these performance predictions are critical
to the concept feasibility assessments. Poor predictions during this phase can have
devastating impact on the system’s performance, cost, and schedule. The previous
section discussed these deficiencies in detail and presented the need for feasibility
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assessments that is probabilistic in nature [101]. The reasoning behind the need for
stochastic based techniques stems from the desire to infuse the technical uncertainties
of the proposed concepts in the conceptual design process. Feasibility claims that rely
on the author’s expertise in the field and determination of the lack of “show stopping”
technical issues for the concept is simply not sufficient [102].
To accomplish an objective evaluation of concept feasibility, the requirements and
constraints to the concept must be defined and the corresponding system level metrics
evaluated through system analysis. In the simplest form, feasibility of the concept
can be established with an evaluation that ensures all constraints and requirements
are satisfied. However, this method does not account for the technical assumptions
and their uncertainties in the computation of the system evaluation metrics. Quan-
tification of these uncertainties and the evaluation of the impact of uncertainty on the
feasibility of proposed concepts are crucial to providing an objective evaluation. In
addition, sensitivity of the concept feasibility to requirements and constraint changes
during the analysis must also be part of the overall evaluation process.
3.3.1 Uncertainty Definition
For any system metric evaluation, two types of uncertainties exists; aleatory uncer-
tainty and epistemic uncertainty [103, 104]. Aleatory uncertainty describes inherent
variation in the physical system, typically due to the random nature of input data.
It is also called objective uncertainty and irreducible uncertainty because it cannot
be reduced by gathering more data. Material properties such as density, emissivity,
and absorptivity are good examples of aleatory uncertainty because these attributes
can vary from different production batches of the materials. These variations can be
captured mathematically with a probabilistic distribution [105] through experimental
testing of material samples from different batches. Similarly, environmental parame-
ters such as air pressure and temperature can be considered as aleatory uncertainty
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and probability distribution of these parameters can be developed from historical
data.
Epistemic uncertainty describes variation due to ignorance, lack of knowledge,
or incomplete information of the system under consideration. If knowledge of the
system can be improved, then the epistemic uncertainty can be reduced. Thunnis-
sen [106] separates epistemic uncertainty into three categories: model, behavioral, and
phenomenological. Model epistemic uncertainty stems from the lack of data about
a parameter or value of the system. For example, the generation of mass or cost
estimating relationships based on historical data has model epistemic uncertainty.
Behavioral epistemic uncertainty is related to actions of an individual or an organi-
zation. For example, the uncertainty of projecting the NASA budget for program
planning has large behavioral epistemic uncertainty. Finally, phenomenological epis-
temic uncertainty addresses the “unknown unknowns” of the system when extreme
conditions or unimaginable phenomena occur. Theoretically, if perfect knowledge of
the system is achieved, epistemic uncertainty is completely eliminated [105].
Ideal feasibility assessment can be conducted only after complete knowledge of the
system is available and epistemic uncertainty is eliminated; however this is rarely the
case. As stated in previous section, feasibility studies are typically conducted during
the Pre-Phase A step of the project life cycle where the knowledge of the system is
very low. This lack of knowledge contributes to a high level of uncertainty to the
concept under consideration and therefore high levels of risk. Complete knowledge
of the system is rarely achievable and is almost impossible during the early phases of
the project life cycle. Thus, it is paramount to address uncertainty directly within
the feasibility assessment process.
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3.3.2 Uncertainty Assessment
The process of uncertainty assessment reveals valuable information about the po-
tential areas of concern for feasibility and provides understanding of the important
metrics that impacts the concept feasibility. Uncertainty assessment is critical in or-
der to understand the implication of the lack of knowledge of a design. Uncertainty
assessment begins with the collection of data where information of similar systems in
the past can provide insight into key metrics that may derail the development of the
current system. Historical data is a common source for information in uncertainty
assessment. From past concepts, experimental or physical flight data can be collected
and assembled into estimating relationships that correlates design variables to the
system metrics of interest. These estimating relationships take the average of the
existing data, while the uncertainty in this estimation can be drawn directly from
the residuals of the data. Probabilistic distribution functions can be assembled from
the residuals of the data points to best capture the behavior of the data and can be
used in the modeling and simulation step to capture the uncertainty of the estimating
relationship.
If no historical data exists for a system, e.g. new technology, the data collection
process becomes more complex. The only other source of information is the judgment
of experts. This requires the elicitation of beliefs from knowledgeable experts in
the area of interest. Any historical information that helps the expert formulate the
elicitation values may be used. In this form, experts estimate the probability of a
performance metrics given a set of assumptions; and if enough experts are sampled,
the expert’s opinions can be used to generate the probability distribution function
used to construct the model.
Regardless of the method, the data must be synthesized with the performance
evaluation of the concept. This process typically involves statistical sampling and
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Figure 24: Monte Carlo Simulation Method
simulation to capture the variation in the performance estimation. Monte Carlo sim-
ulation [107] is often used in this capacity. A Monte Carlo simulation is a stochastic
simulation in which a statistical sampling experiment is performed with a model,
as illustrated by Figure 24. The resulting output distribution describes the behav-
ior of the performance metric as a function of the uncertainties of both the system
(Epistemic) and the design variables (Aleatory). These behaviors are critical in the
evaluation of the concept feasibility, as it directly impacts the requirement and con-
straint satisfaction.
3.3.3 Requirements & Constraints
The addition of uncertainty analysis to the feasibility assessment process allows for
better understanding of the relationship between the system metric of interest and its
associated constraints or requirements. Rather than a simple comparison of the sys-
tem metrics to ensure all constraints are satisfied, uncertainty of the system metrics
is quantified to generate probability distributions of the system metrics. The corre-
sponding constraint can be evaluated on this probability distribution to compute the
probability of satisfaction of the constraint by the particular system metric, therefore
completing a stochastic evaluation of feasibility.
For example, the feasibility of using a new power supply unit on a spacecraft may
be constrained to the mass allowance of the unit. Uncertainty in the mass estimation
of the power supply unit exists during the preliminary design phase. Historical data
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Figure 25: Example Stochastic Feasibility of a Power Supply Unit for a Spacecraft
exists for power supply units of the same class and function, so the uncertainty of the
mass estimation can be quantified with Monte Carlo simulation sampling the residuals
of the mass estimating relationships. The probability distribution of the power unit’s
mass and the allocated mass constraint are then used to evaluate the feasibility of
using this particular power supply unit on the spacecraft. An example cumulative
distribution function of the power supply unit mass and the corresponding sample
constraint for the spacecraft is shown in Figure 25. In this particular example, the
intersection of the cumulative distribution function and the 1,000 kg mass constraint
show that there is a 70% probability that the mass of the power unit will be less
than or equal to the constraint. Therefore, if the mass constraint is exactly 1,000 kg,
then there is a 70% probability that the power unit mass will meet this particular
constraint given the uncertainty in the mass estimation, equating to a 70% probability
of being feasible.
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By converting feasibility from a Boolean quantity to a probabilistic quantity, in-
formation is used to evaluate concept feasibility. In fact, it leaves the decision of
feasibility to the decision maker in terms of the levels of risk they are willing to take.
For example, one decision maker may decide that a 50% probability of system metric
meeting the constraint is enough for a concept to be feasible; another decision maker
may have a threshold at 90%. The ability to present the information to the decision
makers provides a better understanding of the risk levels in the design.
3.4 Architecture Feasibility
Feasibility of the overall architecture must be comprehensive in nature. The method-
ology described in this chapter can be implemented for each of the areas presented
in Section 2.7 with proper definition of the constraints in each areas and stochastic
evaluation of the system metric. Sensitivity of the architecture feasibility to the con-
straint can be determined with stochastic analysis of system metric and evaluation of
the probability of satisfying the constraints. In addition, uncertainty in the constraint
itself can be examined with joint probability distribution of the system metric and
accompanying constraints. The overall feasibility of the architecture can be quanti-
fied with joint probability distributions of the different feasibility areas with properly
defined weightings if desired.
The technical and performance feasibility of the depot architecture is dependent
on the successful utilization of on orbit cryogenic fluid management technologies. To
evaluate this area of feasibility, a system model of the cryogenic fluid management
system is necessary. The formulation of this model and the performance evaluation
of the various cryogenic fluid management technologies are presented in Chapter 4.
The uncertainty in the performance of the cryogenic fluid management technology
is integrated with mass estimation uncertainty. The system mass is used as the
performance metric, and launch vehicle payload is used as the constraint for evaluation
65
of system feasibility.
The mission launch reliability feasibility is dependent on the choice of launch
vehicle and the vehicle’s launch reliability. An examination of historical launch records
can provide an initial estimate of launch vehicle reliability; however, this method
cannot estimate the reliability of a newly developed system. Detailed probability risk
assessments [108, 109] of the launch vehicle’s subsystem can be time consuming and
is not ideal for conceptual level studies. As defined later in Chapter 5, utilization
of Bayesian probability methods allows the use of existing launch records to predict
the inherent reliability of the launch vehicle. The overall launch reliability of the
propellant depot architecture is evaluated utilizing Monte Carlo sampling of launch
reliability distribution derived from Bayesian probability. The formulation of the
launch reliability distribution and the evaluation of launch reliability feasibility are
presented in Chapter 5.
The economic feasibility of the propellant depot architecture is dependent on both
the chosen cryogenic fluid management technology and the chosen launch vehicles.
The cost performance evaluation is performed using cost estimating relationships that
are derived from historical programs [110]. The uncertainty in the cost estimation
is quantified by using probabilistic simulation or the residuals to capture the vari-
ability in the cost of the historical programs. The economic feasibility evaluation
methods and results are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, the three areas of feasibility




TECHNICAL AND PERFORMANCE FEASIBILITY
ASSESSMENTS
The long term storage of cryogenic fluids in orbit is one of the major technical chal-
lenges of an on-orbit propellant depot [14]. The Earth Orbit Rendezvous option
during the Apollo program [6] was deemed too risky in 1961 because of the schedule
constraint resulting from the boil-off of the cryogenic fluids. The recent Constella-
tion Program [7] attempted to mitigate the effects of boil-off by imposing a 90-day
loiter limit between the cargo launch and the crew launch, which placed significant
schedule constraints on the program. NASA’s human exploration of Mars’ design ref-
erence architecture [8] assumed zero boil-off of cryogenic fluids with the assumption
of advanced thermal management technologies.
To understand the impact of these technologies on the overall feasibility of the
propellant depot architecture, a model for the thermal properties of propellant depot
was developed. This model analyzes a passive insulation system to mitigate the heat
that penetrates to the cryogenic fluids from external sources. In addition, an active
system is modeled to remove the excess heating using cryogenic refrigeration system.
The primary figures of merit for the system level analysis are the boil-off of the
cryogenic fluids when there is excess heat and the additional refrigeration mass that
mitigates the boil-off.
4.1 Space Thermal Environment
The primary factor in determining the on-orbit heat load is the space environment.
In LEO, factors that contribute to the heat load include the sun’s direct radiation,
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albedo reflected off the Earth’s surface, and the infrared energy emitted from its
surface. Direct solar radiation is the greatest source of environmental heating on all
orbiting spacecraft. The solar irradiance at the Earth’s mean distance from the sun
(1 AU) has an average value of 1,367 W/m2 [34]. Due to Earth’s slight elliptical orbit
around the sun (eccentricity = 0.017) [111], the intensity varies approximately plus
or minus three and a half percent [112], from 1,322 W/m2 to 1,414 W/m2 [34, 112].
Earth’s albedo, sunlight that is reflected off the surface, experienced by an orbiting
spacecraft is dependent on both orbit inclination and altitude. Reflectivity is generally
greater over land as compared to the ocean. Ice, snow, and cloud coverage as well
as the local solar incident angle can all have direct impact on the overall reflectivity.
Energy that is not reflected by Earth is absorbed and eventually emitted as infrared
(IR) energy. The amount of IR energy experienced by an orbiting spacecraft is also
dependent on the orbit and location, because the local temperature of the Earth’s
surface changes the amount of energy emitted.
These different heat load sources contribute to the overall system heat load de-
pending on the orientation of the spacecraft. The overall thermal control of a space-
craft in orbit is achieved with energy balance. The radiation emitted by both the Sun
and Earth can be either absorbed or reflected by the spacecraft’s surface, depending
on the material. Conservation of energy for thermal equilibrium requires that the
energy absorbed and the energy generated by the spacecraft must equal the energy
dissipated.
Eabsorbed + Einternal = Edissipated (1)
The total thermal energy transferred into and out of the spacecraft is a function
of the spacecraft’s surface absorptivity, emissivity, surface area, and the geometric
orientation with respect to the thermal radiation source. Absorptivity is the material
property that describes the percentage of incoming energy that is absorbed by the
68
material. Emissivity is the material property that describes the percentage of energy
emitted relative to an ideal black body at the same temperature. A true black body
would have an emissivity value of 1, while any real world object or materials would
have an emissivity value between 0 and 1. Absorptivity and emissivity are dimen-
sionless quantities. Figure 26 shows typical values for absorptivity and emissivity of
different types of spacecraft and thermal control materials [113].
The solar energy of an orbit is a function of the specific orbit altitude and
orientation of the spacecraft. One method to accomplish this is with Analytical
Graphic’s System Tool Kit software and the built-in Space Environment and Effect
Tool (SEET). SEET has the capability to compute the spacecraft’s equilibrium tem-
perature based on the spacecraft’s orientation and surface properties. SEET treats
the spacecraft as a single isothermal node to determine steady state temperature with
the user specified surface thermal characteristics. The temperature computation is
based on either spherical or planar objects with a specified orientation. With the en-
ergy conservation equation and the Stefan-Boltzmann Law, the equilibrium external












Where σB is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.670373 × 10−8W/m2-K4), Qsun is
the direct thermal radiation from the Sun, Qer is the Earth reflected albedo, QIR is
the radiant infrared power emitted from the Earth, Qi is the heat produced by the
spacecraft’s internal systems, β is the surface absorptivity, ǫ is the surface emissivity,
and Ao is the total radiating surface area. Figure 27 show the contour plots for the
average equilibrium temperature for a spherical isothermal node in a 400 km circular
orbit at 28.5 degree inclination over the course of a year. This plot can be examined in
concert with Figure 26 to determine the average temperature of spacecraft constructed
with various materials. The figure shows the average temperature ranges between 200
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Figure 27: Average Equilibrium Temperature (K) Contours of a Spherical Node in





















Figure 28: Equilibrium Temperature Profile of Spherical Node with White Paint
(α = 0.22, ǫ = 0.85) in 400 km 28.5o Inclination Circular Orbit
K and 400 K.
The temperature of an actual spacecraft will depend highly on the outer surface
thermal properties. To minimize the surface temperature, materials with low ab-
sorptivity and high emissivity are desired. For white paint, the absorptivity ranges
from 0.15 to 0.29 and the emissivity ranges from 0.76 to 0.92, as shown in Figure
26 [113]. The wide range of absorptivity and emissivity can have dramatic impact on
the surface temperature, and consequently, the thermal heat load on the cryogenic
propellant. Figure 28 shows the equilibrium temperature profile of a spherical node
using medium values for the absorptivity and emissivity (α = 0.22ǫ = 0.85) of white
paint in a 400 km circular orbit at 28.5 degree inclination. The equilibrium tempera-
ture for the day ranges between 190 K and 240 K. Over the course of an entire year,
the average temperature for the spherical node is 219 K.
The average temperature for the spacecraft can fluctuate further due to the ranges
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Table 8: Yearly Average Temperature Experience by a Spherical Node with White




0.78 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.92
0.29 227.9 227.3 226.6 226.0 225.4 224.8 224.3 223.7 K
0.27 226.1 225.4 224.8 224.2 223.6 223.1 222.5 222.0 K
0.25 224.1 223.5 222.9 222.4 221.8 221.3 220.8 220.3 K
0.23 222.1 221.5 221.0 220.4 219.9 219.4 218.9 218.4 K
0.21 220.0 219.5 218.9 218.4 217.9 217.4 217.0 216.5 K
0.19 217.9 217.3 216.8 216.3 215.9 215.4 215.0 214.5 K
0.17 215.6 215.1 214.6 214.1 213.7 213.3 212.9 212.5 K
0.15 213.2 212.7 212.3 211.8 211.4 211.0 210.7 210.3 K
of absorptivity and emissivity of the material. Table 8 shows the average yearly
temperature for the same spherical node from Figure 28 when the node’s absorptivity
and emissivity is varied across the range for white paint (Figure 26). Across the
entire range, the average temperature can vary from 210 to 228 K. Additionally,
the overall temperature that the spacecraft experiences can vary due to the actual
geometry of the spacecraft. For example, a cylindrical shaped object will experience
an approximately 10% reduction in the average yearly temperature because it has
more surface area exposed to the darkness of space. Due to these factors, the range
of temperature is utilized to capture the uncertainty in temperature estimation and
will be included in the overall stochastic analysis. For the baseline deterministic
scenarios, the average temperature of 219 K is assumed.
4.2 Passive Thermal Management
The most common form of thermal management for an orbiting spacecraft is passive
insulation materials. These insulation materials are used to either prevent excessive
heat loss from internal components or excessive heating from the environment. To
compute the effectiveness of insulation materials, the heat transfer from the environ-
ment to the cryogenic propellant must be computed. There are three forms of heat
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transfer: conduction, convection, and radiation [114]. Conduction is the transfer of
energy in a solid medium through the collision of atomic particles, convection is the
transfer of energy by the flow of a fluid, and radiation is the transfer of energy between
two bodies without physical interaction or a continuous medium. In the absence of
an atmosphere, heat transfer of orbiting spacecraft is governed by conduction and
radiation. Radiative heat transfer is the mechanism in which the thermal heat load
from the Sun and Earth is computed in the previous section and is governed by the
Stefan-Boltzmann law (Equation 3), which describes the power radiated from a black
body in terms of its temperature [34].
q = ǫAT 4 (3)
Thermal conduction is governed by Fourier’s law, which states that the time rate
of heat transfer through a material is proportional to the negative gradient in the
temperature and to the area, at right angles to that gradient, through which the heat
is flowing (Equation 4), where k is the thermal conductivity of the material.
→
q= −k∇T (4)
An analytical model for the heat load through MLI was developed by NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center [115]. The layer-by-layer model is a one-dimensional
computation of the heat transfer and accounts for the possibility of the MLI material
to have varying density, as shown in Figure 29. The model computes the total heat
rate through the shield by computing the radiation between the shields, as well as
solid and gas conduction through the spacer material. The equations for the three
heat load modes are shown in Equations 5, 6, and 7.
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For the radiation equation, σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, TH & TC are
the hot side and cold side temperatures, and ǫH & ǫC are the hot and cold side
emissivity of the insulation material. For the solid conduction equation, C2 is a
material constant, f is the relative density of the spacer material compared to solid
material, k is the conductivity constant of the material, and dX is the actual thickness
of the spacer material between the layers. For the gas conduction equation, P is the
gas pressure between the insulation layers (typically negligible in vacuum), αc is an
accommodation coefficient (typical value of 0.1), C1 is a gas constant computed by
Equation 8 in which γ is the ratio of specific heat for the gas inside the insulation
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Figure 30: Comparison Between the Analytical Insulation Model to Lockheed and
MHTB Experimental Data [116,117]
layers, R is the universal gas constant, T is the average temperature of the gas, and
M is the molecular weight of the gas.
The gas conduction of the insulation material assumes that there is residual gas
trapped between the layers of insulation. The heat load through gas conduction
is typically minimal in vacuum condition, as the pressure term in the equation is
nearly zero. The analytical equation was formulated for each layer, with hot and cold
temperatures for each layer as well as layer distance and emissivity of the material if
it is not uniform across the layers. This creates a system of N equations with N +
1 variables, where N is the number of layers. Thus, the system of equations can be
solved numerically until the heat rate in successive iteration is within a user specified
convergence limit.
To validate the insulation thermal model, experimental data from Lockheed Mar-
tin’s study in 1974 [116] as well as Marshall Space Flight Center’s 2002 Multipurpose
75
Table 9: Heat Load Through Insulation Comparison between Experimental Data
[116,117] and Analytical Model
Experiment Analytical
Density TC TH (W/m
2) (W/m2) % Error
Lockheed
48 layers/cm
41 K 83 K 0.079 0.184 +133%
41 K 257 K 0.829 0.947 +14.2%
42 K 302 K 1.19 1.20 +1.04%
44 K 366 K 1.84 1.60 -13.0%
Lockheed
39 layers/cm
39 K 251 K 0.514 0.559 +8.78%
41 K 300 K 0.756 0.725 -4.13%
42 K 367 K 1.23 1.00 -18.7%
Lockheed
28 layers/cm
39 K 86 K 0.025 0.053 +112%
41 K 251 K 0.227 0.284 +25.2%
41 K 301 K 0.353 0.388 +10.0%
42 K 367 K 0.615 0.574 -6.63%
MTHB
12 layers/cm
20 K 164 K 0.086 0.081 -6.33%
20 K 235 K 0.194 0.160 -17.6%
20 K 305 K 0.300 0.302 +0.67%
Hydrogen Test Bed (MHTB) are utilized [117]. Figure 30 shows the comparison be-
tween the analytical model and the results from both experiments and Table 9 shows
the summary of the comparison. From the comparison, the model tends to over pre-
dict the heat loads through the insulation materials at low hot boundary temperature
and under predicts the heat load at high hot boundary temperatures. At higher MLI
density, the low hot boundary temperature error is quite large, as the model predicts
more than twice the heat load compared to the experimental results. For typical hot
boundary operating temperatures (between 200 and 240K as seen in Table 8), the
error for the model heat leak prediction is on the order of 10 - 20%.
The primary benefit of the analytical model is that it provides the analysis for
varying material properties of the MLI used for trade studies of new MLI materials
without the need to generate empirical coefficients from experimental data. With
the large temperature range expected for an on-orbit spacecraft, as shown in Figure
27, the performance of the MLI can vary greatly. The analytical model incorporates
the temperature fluctuation with the performance estimation of the MLI. With the
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Table 10: MLI Materials Property [114,116]
Source Thickness Specific Weight
(mm) (kg/m2)
Double-Aluminized Mylar Standard Packing Corp. 0.0064 8.81e-3
Double-Aluminized Mylar Sheldahl, Dunmore 0.0064 9.30e-3
Illusion Silk Net Spacer John HeathCoast Co. 0.13 5.93e-3±1.38e-3
Dacron Netting Spacer Apex Mills 0.16 6.30e-3±0.85e-3
properties of the analytical model, a stochastic analysis of the performance of MLI











∗N ∗ At (9)
Thermal insulation mass estimation is a function of the geometry of the propellant
tanks, the material properties, and installation configuration of the insulation system.
From Equation 9, the mass of the MLI is a function of the specific mass of the Mylar
sheets (γm) and the spacers (γs), the thickness of the Mylar sheet (tm) and spacer
(ts), the density of the installed MLI blankets (N̄ , numbers of layer per centimeter),
and the surface area of the tank (At) as well as the number of layers (N) installed.
The material properties of the MLI blankets are based on the Lockheed Missiles &
Space Company report [116], reproduced in Table 10.
4.3 Active Thermal Management
The use of thermal insulation materials is modeled like a resistor, and these can only
reduce the heat rate experienced by cryogenic fluids on orbit. For permanent or very
long-term storage of these cryogenic fluids, in order to eliminate or further reduce
boil-off losses, active thermal management is required. Active thermal management
describes systems that directly interact with the fluids, such as electrical refrigeration
system or cryocoolers. Cryocoolers transfer energy from the cryogenic fluids to a
working fluid through the use of heat exchangers.
Cryocoolers have a wide variety of applications. Figure 31 shows a map of the
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Figure 31: Map of Cryocooler Applications with Cooling Power versus Temperature,
Reproduced from [51]






























Figure 32: Performance of Cryocoolers from Appendix A
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major cryocooler applications in terms of net cooling power and operating temper-
ature required. For propellant depot applications, the propellant that requires the
most cooling power is liquid hydrogen, which would require the cryocooler to op-
erate below its boiling point temperature of 20 K with net cooling power between
1 and 1,000 kW [51]. The diverse applications of cryocoolers also mean that the
design of commercial cryocoolers can be dramatically different. Almost all of the
space-qualified cryocoolers developed to date have been used on small satellites or
probes to cool instruments. Most of these coolers operate with a cold head tem-
perature ranging from 4 and 120K and have cooling capability ranging from several
milliwatts to tens of watts [51]. A survey of cryocoolers is compiled from a variety
of sources [53, 114, 118–123] and can be found in Appendix A. These cryocoolers are
shown in Figure 32 on the same scale as Figure 31. The survey includes both space
qualified and ground based cryocooelers. Space qualified cryocoolers are currently
used on satellites and probes to keep scientific instruments at near absolute zero
temperatures. These space qualified cyrocooler have very stringent vibration and
reliability requirements to ensure the lifetime of the scientific missions.
For an operating temperature of 80 K (below the boiling point of liquid oxygen),
the cooling capacity of the surveyed cryocoolers ranges between 0.1 watts and 300
watts. For operating temperature of 20 K (boiling point of liquid hydrogen), the
cooling capacity ranges between 0.1 watts and 70 watts. For example, the CryoMech
AL-325 is a single stage Gifford-McMahon cryocooler that is capable of producing
70 watts of cooling power at 20 K [123]. The surveyed cryocoolers represents the
current state-of-the-art in space qualified cryocooler technology. The current limit in
cryocooler capacity is not indicative of technical limit, rather it is a due to the lack of
requirements for space based cooler technology at high capacity [51, 124]. The only
limitation is the performance, in terms of both electrical efficiency and system mass,


































Figure 33: Pressure-Volume and Temperature-Entropy Diagram for a Carnot Cycle
with a Condensing Working Fluid [126]
4.3.1 Cryocooler Limitations in Space
Cryocoolers can be classified as either recuperative or regenerative. Recuperative
cryocoolers operate with a steady flow of fluid or gas through the system and use
recuperative heat exchangers only. The working fluid is compressed at the high tem-
perature end of the cryocooler and expansion occurs at the low temperature end where
net refrigeration power is generated. Regenerative cryocoolers operate with oscillat-
ing flow and pressure and use at least one regenerative heat exchanger. Regenerative
cryocoolers are analogous to AC electrical systems while recuperative coolers are
analogous to DC electrical systems [125,126].
The fundamental physics behind the operation of cryocoolers can be shown in
thermodynamics cycles. Figure 33 shows the Temperature-Entropy (T-S) and the
Pressure-Volume (P-V) diagrams of an ideal thermal engine in a Carnot cycle [126].
The compression and expansion of the engine produces work, which is in the center
shaded area for both figures. By the second law of thermal dynamics (δQ = T ∗ δS),
the heat extracted from the cold reservoir (at temperature Tc) is the area under the
T-S diagram (shaded in red). Thus, it can be seen that for a given thermal engine
cycle, as the temperature of the cold reservoir decreases, the amount of heat extracted
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decreases. In order to extract more heat at lower temperatures, the entropy of the
system must increase. This is done by increasing the compression and expansion
ratio of the engine, which would require larger compressor and larger volume for the
working fluid. This is the primary limitation to current state-of-the-art in space based
cryocooler. Because cryocoolers used on spacecraft are severely mass and volume
constrained, the cooling capacity are limited.
4.3.2 Cryocooler Performance Estimation
The performance of cryocoolers is typically expressed as the coefficient of performance
(COP) which is the inverse of the specific power for the cryocooler, where QC is the
cooling capacity of the cooler and Pin is the electrical input power. A cooler extracts
thermal heat QC from a cold reservoir at temperature TC and discharges the heat to





The efficiency of cryocoolers is normally quoted as a percentage of the actual cooler










The Carnot efficiency is derived from the second law of thermodynamics and it
defines a fundamental limit on the thermal efficiency of the cooling process. Using
the example from the previous section (liquid hydrogen at TC = 20 K and average
LEO temperature TH = 262 K), the theoretical limit of a cryocooler coefficient of
performance operating at these temperature is only about 8%. To generate one watt
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Figure 34: Efficiency of Cryocoolers from Appendix A with Estimating Relationship
from Strobridge [127], ter Brake [50], and AFRL [128], Superimposed on
Data Provided by Kittel [124]
of thermal cooling capacity, there must be twelve watts of electrical power. In reality,
the real performance of cryocoolers is only a small fraction of the theoretical limit
due to various loss mechanisms.
Kittel [124] provides a summary of performance correlations for historical cryocool-
ers. The survey shows three relationships to estimate the efficiency (as a percentage
of Carnot), η, of cryocoolers versus the desired cooling power. The relationships
are derived by Strobridge [127], ter Brake [50], and the Air Force Research Lab-
oratory [128] (AFRL). These relationships represent the upper limit of cryocooler
efficiencies at the time the curves were developed. The relationships are shown with
the data from Appendix A and shown in Figure 34.
The Strobridge limit represents performance estimation using the oldest data set,
while the AFRL and ter Brake include newer cryocoolers and improvements in the
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efficiencies especially at the lower power range. All of the relationships discussed are
purely empirically based. Therefore, the relationships are only for the range of their
respective data set. The ARFL correlations is valid for cryocoolers with cooling power
up to 20 Watts, while both the Strobridge and ter Brake relationships are valid for
cooling power up to 106 watts. Kittle recommended using a combination of the AFRL
correlation and the ter Brake limit. This method results in efficiency that represents
the mean of the AFRL data that does not exceed the ter Brake limit, which takes
full advantage data from the newer cryocoolers that have been built. This particular
method [124] yields the efficiency correlation given by Equation 13. QC of 18.2 watts
is the cross over point in which the ter Brake relationship predicts a lower efficiency









−1.26281 + 0.45936(log10QC)− 0.08743(log10QC)2, QC < 18.2
−0.92237 + 0.07763(log10(1 +QC)), otherwise
(13)
4.3.3 Cryocooler Mass Estimation
The mass of the cryocooler thermal mechanical unit can be estimated using the curve
fit of historical data points [129], in which the mass of the cryocooler unit is corre-
lated with one or more of the cryocooler design variables. The cryocooler database
compiled in Appendix A provides a set of data points for generating the mass esti-
mating relationships. One of the difficulties in mass estimation of Cryocooler thermal
mechanical unit is determining the proper independent variables. The data in Ap-
pendix A includes cryocoolers with a wide range of operating temperature, thermal
power, and thermal cycles. Cryocoolers operating at different temperature can have
drastically different designs and can lead to wide range of masses.
Figure 35 shows the mass of the cryocooler as functions of the operating tem-

























Figure 35: Cryocooler Thermal Mechanical Unit Mass as Functions of Operating
Temperature, Thermal Cooling Power, and Input Electrical Power (Ap-
pendix A)
independent variables, there seem to be no direct correlation to the mass of the cry-
ocooler system. A straight expoential curve fit results in the coefficient of correlation
(R2) of 0.057, 0.0273, and 0.1599 for each of the three independent variables respec-
tively. The poor fit of the MER to the existing data could result in unacceptable
levels of error in the estimation of system mass.
To provide the best mass estimations, separate relationships are generated for the
two operating temperature of interest: 80 K for liquid oxygen and 20 K for liquid
hydrogen. Figures 36(a) and 36(b) show the mass estimating relationships for the
cryocooler thermal mechanical units operating at 20 K and 80 K. The resulting Mass
Estimating Relationships (MERs), shown in Figure 36, have R2 of 0.7681 and 0.9136
for Hydrogen and Oxygen, respectively. The two figures also show the dispersion of
the data used to generate the MER. As the figure shows, the one standard deviation
dispersion for the 80 K cryocooler mass is +75% to −45% and +43% to −31% for the


































































Figure 36: Mass Estimating Relationships for Cryocooler Thermal Mechanical
Units
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Table 11: Cryocooler Sub System Mass Breakdown [130]
Program Subsystem Unit Mass (kg/W)
SHT Rad CPI Misc
Multi-spectral Thermal Imager 0.046 0.087 0.003 0.025
Third Color Experiment 0.059 0.029 0.005 0.074
Cryogenic Two Phase 0.138 0.103 0.009 0.014
Cryogenic Systems Experiment 0.119 0.078 0.026 0.008
Advanced Teal Ruby Experiment 0.070 0.058 0.082 0.064
Average 0.086 0.071 0.025 0.037
uncertainties for the architecture feasibility assessment. The uncertainty analysis and
the probabilistic simulation will be discussed in Section 4.6.
The developed mass estimating relationships only compute the mass of the cry-
ocooler thermal mechanical system; it does not provide mass estimation of the com-
pressor unit, power supply, and many of the supporting structures required to incor-
porate the cryocooler into a thermal system. McLean [28] provides specific weights for
each of the components as functions of total power required. The total cryocooler sys-
tem mass includes the thermal mechanical unit mass, the controller electronics (16% of
thermal mechanics system mass [131]), the structure and heat transport (SHT) (0.097
kg/w), the radiators (Rad) (0.071 kg/w), plumbing and insulation (CPI) (0.025kg/w),
and cables and other miscellaneous systems (0.032 kg/w). The nominal mass estima-
tion utilizes the average of the five different cryocooler programs [28] shown in Table
11.
4.4 Thermal System Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the thermal management system, the evaluation cri-
teria used is the mass loss due to boil-off as a result of the heat penetration versus
the mass of thermal management systems. If there is sufficient heat penetration from
the environment, phase change is induced for the cryogenic fluid, converting it from
liquid to a gas, thus increasing the internal propellant tank pressure. If the pressure
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Table 12: Cryogenic Fluids Thermal Properties [132]
Boiling Point, K Latent Heat, J/kg
H2 20.4 452,000
O2 90.2 213,125
approaches the design limit for the tank, the excess gas must be vented to prevent
structural failure. The result of the venting process is the loss of usable propellant,
called boil-off losses. The boil-off loss, the rate at which the fluid is converting into
gas, can be computed using the latent heat of vaporization (Hvap) at the propellant’s
boiling point [132], shown in Table 12. Note that although the boiling point of liquid
oxygen is 90 K, the majority of the cryocoolers are designed to operate at 80 K, thus





The boil-off rate, Ṁloss, in kilograms per second is the ratio of the net heat ab-
sorbed by the liquid and the latent heat of vaporization of the liquid. If the desired
mission can be specified, then the storage requirement (in terms of mass and time)
can be known, and the overall boil-off loss can be computed for comparison. Without
a specified mission, it is beneficial to represent the boil-off as a percentage of overall
propellant stored for a reference time period. For the evaluations in this section, the
primary figure-of-merit used for comparing different thermal system performance is
percent propellant boil-off per month [115].
In addition to the heat load through the insulation described in Section 4.2, there
are other heat leaks including structural (Qs), penetration (Qp), mixer (Qm), and
parasitic (Qpara) heat loads [133]. Plachta gives a brief description of the formula’s
origin and how it is adjusted for their particular study. The study uses the formula
to compute heat loads on a small cryogenic tank in orbit (on the order of 10 m3).
All the equations are functions of the size and/or mass of the tanks or the amount of
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propellant in the system, which helps scale the heat load. For conservatism, a multi-
plier can be applied to these heat load equations, and the impact of such multiplier
can be evaluated. In this study, no multipliers were applied. The heat load formulas
given by Plachta are the following:
Qs(LO2)=























H − T 2C) (20)
Where Mtank is the mass of the propellant tank, Mprop is the mass of the propellant
stored in the tank, and Vtank is the volume of the propellant tank. C2 is the duty
cycle of the mixer, where the typical value ranges between 0 and 1 to represents the
precedence of time the mixer is in operation. For this study, C2 is held constant at
a value of 1 to represent conservative estimate of the heat load. feclipse is the eclipse
factor for the cryocooler, i.e. the percentage of time the spacecraft is in eclipse and
the cryocooler is not in operation, which is approximately 38% for LEO orbits. Notice
that only the structural heat load is dependent of the propellant level in the tanks
and it scales linearly with the decreasing propellant load. The majority of the heat
load into the system is through the multi-layer insulation materials.
4.4.1 All-Passive Thermal System Performance
An all-passive thermal system utilizes only insulation materials that are applied to the
propellant tanks. For a baseline scenario, the current state-of-the-practice materials
are used to compute the resulting boil-off rates. This utilizes insulation constructed
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from aluminized-mylar sheets sandwiched between silk-net spacer materials. This
type of MLI is considered to be high in TRL and is used frequently for design and
testing of cryogenic propellant storage techniques [115, 134]. The maturity of this
technology yields higher level of confidence in its application for propellant depot
concepts. This mature technology will reduce the overall development cost of the
depot system due to its maturity and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Figures 37 and 38 show the percent boil-off per month for an all-passive thermal
management strategy with varying layers of MLI at four levels of MLI density. Over-
all, as expected, the boil-off rate correlates directly to the heat load experienced by
the cryogenic fluid and decreases with increasing number of MLI layers. The plots
also show that as the layer density increases, the boil-off also increases, as the heat
load through conduction increases. In the case of liquid oxygen, the boil-off mass de-
creases rapidly as the MLI layer increases up to about 100 layers. Above 100 layers,
the boil-off reduction diminishes. For liquid hydrogen, the MLI effectiveness is highly
dependent on the MLI layer density. To minimize the boil-off, lower density MLI is
preferred.
The passive option is attractive due to the simplicity of the system. However, as
the analysis shows, the use of passive thermal protection cannot completely eliminate
boil-off. The effectiveness of the MLI is greatly diminished beyond 100 layers and
the boil-off rates level off. The minimum boil-off obtainable for an MLI only scenario
for MLI density of 12 layers per centimeter is slight above 0.5% per month for liquid
hydrogen and roughly 0.25% per month for liquid oxygen. For short duration missions
to the lunar surface or a near Earth object, the propellant boil-off can be manageable
like during the Apollo program. However, as the mission duration increases, the
boil-off loss can become a significant challenge to the overall mission and architecture
feasibility. For example, a propellant depot with 200 mT of propellant at a mixture
ratio of 5.5 would have roughly 2,000 kg/year hydrogen boil-off and 6,000 kg/year
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N̄ = 48 layers/cm
N̄ = 39 layers/cm
N̄ = 28 layers/cm
N̄ = 12 layers/cm
Figure 37: Percent Boil-Off Per Month as Function of # of Layers of MLI and MLI
Density for 193 mT of LO2 Storage





































N̄ = 48 layers/cm
N̄ = 39 layers/cm
N̄ = 28 layers/cm
N̄ = 12 layers/cm
Figure 38: Percent Boil-Off Per Month as Function of # of Layers of MLI and MLI
Density for 32 mT of LH2 Storage
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oxygen boil-off.
4.4.2 Integrated Passive & Active Thermal System Performance
To evaluate the joint performance of the passive insulation and active cryocoolers,
the MLI density was held constant at 12 layers/cm (similar to the MHTB experiment
[117]) while the number of MLI layers was varied from 1 to 100 and the cryocooler
cooling capacity was varied from 0 to 100 watts. For each combination of MLI layers
and cryocooler cooling power, the total heat load on the propellant was computed
using the developed thermal model, and the propellant boil-off rates were computed.
The results of these computations are shown in Figures 39 and 40, which plot the
percent boil-off per month contours for both hydrogen and oxygen.
The figures show that for low number of MLI layers (<20 layers for Oxygen and
<60 for Hydrogen), the boil-off rate remains relatively insensitive to the application
of an active cryocooler. As previously discussed, the heat loads through the MLI
increases exponentially with fewer layers of MLI resulting in extremely high cryocooler
power requirements. The cyrocooler’s cooling capacity is utilized to remove the heat
load through the MLI material and ZBO is achieved when the depot’s thermal balance
(see Equation 1) is greater than zero. For liquid hydrogen, the 20 K cryocoolers are
limited to less than 70 watts of cooling capacity as discussed in Figure 32. As Figure
40 shows, ZBO for hydrogen is achievable with a minimum of 60 layers of MLI. For
liquid oxygen, ZBO is achievable with a combination of between 50 layers of MLI
and cryocooler cooling power around 60 watts, which is well within the capability of
current state-of-the-art coolers.
4.5 Thermal System Mass Trades
As discussed in the previous section, there are a number of combinations of passive
and active thermal management that can result in the same boil-off rates for the
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Present 80 K Cooler ≈ 300 Watts
Figure 39: Constant Boil-Off Contours (%/Month) for 193mT LOx Storage in LEO
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Present 20 K Cooler ≈ 70 Watts
Figure 40: Constant Boil-Off Contours (%/Month) for 32mT LH2 Storage in LEO
with Combination Active and Passive Thermal Management, N̄ = 12
layers/cm
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given targeted boil-off rate, it is desired to determine the mass optimal combination
of cryogenic thermal management system.
4.5.1 Subsystem Sizing and Mass Estimation
The primary figure of merit for evaluating the cryogenic thermal system performance
is the propellant boil-off loss during the long term storage of the propellant versus
the mass of the thermal management system. Section 2.3 provides a breakdown
of the common elements in a propellant depot system. To estimate the mass of the
various subsystems, a literature search was performed to gather historical data for the
relevant systems. Mass estimating relationships were generated using the historical
data, and the sizing routine was developed to estimate the mass of each component.
The collected data points encompass a wide range of design conditions, requirements,
and technology levels; thus, the resulting equation gives a mean approximation of the
subsystem mass across this range.
The primary structure of the propellant depot system consists of the two propel-
lant tanks (oxidizer and fuel) and the supporting structures surrounding these tanks.
In addition, if the depot system is designed to have propulsion capabilities, additional
structure is necessary to support the engine and carry the thrust load through the
entire spacecraft. The propellant tanks are sized using historical data for launch vehi-
cle propellant tanks. These tanks are designed specifically for the various launch and
flight loads that a spacecraft experiences and is better suited than a simple pressure
vessel calculation where less than 50% of the mass is computed. All of data used to
generate the relevant mass estimating relationships are in Appendix B.
The mass estimating relationships for the two propellant tanks generated from the
historical data is shown in Figures 41(a) and 41(b). Using an exponential curve fit on
a log-log scale, the coefficient of determination (R2) can be defined as the goodness














































































(d) Skirt & Adapter
Figure 41: Propellant Depot Subsystem Mass Estimating Relationships [135]
means the estimation predicts the data perfectly and the error is zero. The hydrogen
and oxygen tank curve fit results in R2 of 0.9997 and 0.9753 respectively, indicating
an excellent approximation of the data.
The propellant tanks must not only store the propellant, but also manage the
propellant’s transfer and usage according the mission profile. Previous chapters dis-
cussed the various options for propellant management for the purpose of propellant
tankers and depots. The utilization of a propulsion system to generate acceleration
for propellant transfer represents the most complex concept. The propulsion system
mass sizing can be conducted using MERs generated by historical data, depending
on the size and thrust requirement of the desired engine. Table B.1 shows a survey of
historical launch vehicle and spacecraft engines [135]. The design thrust is a function
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Table 13: Summary of Mass Estimating Relationships
LH2 Tank: M = 5.4949Volume
1.0630
LO2 Tank: M = 10.744Volume
1.0318













20 K Cryocooler: M = 51.482Q0.4274C
80 K Cryocooler: M = 3.8712Q0.7374C
Engine: M = 0.0506Thrust0.7443
Power: M = 132.1Power(kW)
of the desired mission. For propellant transfer, minimal thrust is required to generate
enough acceleration for the transfer activity. However, if the depot is designed to be
a hybrid cryogenic propulsion stage [136], then the thrust requirement for the overall
system would be much higher. The propulsion system MER is shown in Figure 41(c).
Table B.3 shows the historical data collected [135] from the Apollo program for
the various intertank adapters and forward and aft skirts. These skirts and adapter
are the structural supports for the propellant tanks and are necessary to integrate the
system into a cohesive vehicle. The adapters are also necessary to carry part of the
structural loads experienced by the depot during ascent and propellant refueling. The
mass estimating relationship for the intertank and skirt is generated as a function of
the device’s wetted area. The MER and the coefficient of determination are shown
in Figure 41(d).
The depot typically operates for long duration, solar arrays are required to gen-
erate the power required to operate the electronic systems on board. The sizing of
the solar array and the mass estimation are taken from Laron [34]. The power re-
quired for the operation of the cryocooler and other on-board systems is delivered by
a solar array with batteries for operation during eclipse. The solar array and bat-
tery system are similar to those used on the International Space Station and have a
95
specific power of 7.54 W/kg [34] or specific mass of 132.1 kg/kW, which includes the
solar cell, mast, gimbals, and other supporting structures. The power distribution
system, communication subsystem, instrumentation, and other subsystems are sized
using mass estimating relationships generated from historical spacecraft data [135]. A
summary of the mass estimating relationships developed for the mass trade analysis
is shown in Table 13.
4.5.2 Mass Trades


























































Figure 42: Liquid Oxygen Zero-Boil-Off Thermal System Mass Trade






















































Figure 43: Liquid Hydrogen Zero-Boil-Off Thermal System Mass Trade
The most interesting and relevant scenario for mass tradeoff is the ZBO scenarios
for both oxygen and hydrogen. Figures 42 and 43 show a scatter plot of the thermal
system dry mass (MLI + cryocooler + power) as functions of both number of layers
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of MLI and cryocooler cooling power. The figures show all the data points in the
design space sweep that results in ZBO for both liquids, which are the shaded regions
depicted in Figures 39 and 40. For these plots, the design space is limited to less than
100 layers of MLI and less than 100 watts of cryocooler cooling capacity.
For the liquid oxygen thermal management, the plot shows the minimal ZBO
cooling power required is 50 watts but utilizing the minimal cooling power cryocooler
does not result in the minimal thermal system mass. As the number of layers of
MLI increases, the cryocooler cooling capacity required to achieve ZBO is reduced.
However, there is a clear tradeoff between the increase in number of MLI layers and
the decrease in cryocooler cooling power in terms of the overall system mass. For
oxygen, the mass minimal thermal system combination is 33 layers of MLI and 68
watts of cryocooler cooling power, while the mass minimal combination for hydrogen
is 80 layers of MLI and 58 watts of cooling power. The low number of MLI layers
required for oxygen in the mass optimal scenario is because the cryocooler efficiency is
much higher at 80 K and thus the cooler and power system mass increase is less than
the mass required for higher number of MLI layers. In contrast, the mass optimal
solution for hydrogen requires larger number of MLI layers because the cryocooler
system mass is much higher for the operating temperature of 20 K. It is important
to note that for both fluids, the mass optimal solutions fall well within the range for
current state-of-the-art cryocooler capacity. Additionally, utilizing cryocoolers with
cooling power lower than current state-of-the-arts can still achieve ZBO but doing so
could result in significant mass penalty.
As shown in Table 8, the hot side temperature that the depot experience can vary
between 210 K and 228 K with an average temperature of 219 K. The optimized
thermal management in Table 14 assumes the average temperature; however, this
does not capture the full range of temperature fluctuation. This leaves the possibility
that the optimized ZBO scenario does not truly provide enough thermal management
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Table 14: Minimal Thermal System Dry Mass for Zero Boil Off for 32 mT of Hy-
drogen and 192 mT of Oxygen
MLI Qc MLI Cryo Power Total
Layer (watts) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg)
Hydrogen @ 20 K 80 58 1,610 1,890 1,850 5,350
Oxygen @ 80 K 33 68 274 417 761 1,450
Table 15: Cryogenic Fluid Management Scenario Description
Oxygen Hydrogen
# MLI Layers Qc(watt) # MLI Layers Qc(watt)
A: Passive 80 0 80 0
B: Zero Boil-Off (219 K) 33 68 80 58
C: Zero-Boil-Off (228 K) 35 72 82 61
to eliminate boil-off. Performing the same thermal analysis and optimization for the
higher temperature results in only a slight increase ( 5%) in the thermal management
requirements. The mass optimal thermal requirement for ZBO for 228 K hot side
temperature is 35 layers of MLI and 72 watts of cryocooler power for oxygen and 82
layer of MLI and 61 watts of cryocooler power for hydrogen.
For the purpose of providing comparison between active thermal management
systems and a passive thermal management system, three cryogenic thermal man-
agement scenarios are created and summarized in Table 15. The all-passive scenario
utilizes no active thermal management, but employs 80 layers of MLI for both oxy-
gen and hydrogen. The MLI layers are limited to 80 layers due to the difficulties
of manufacturing MLI. There are no documented literature that shows MLI greater
than 80 layers. The two ZBO scenarios utilize the mass optimal thermal management
combination for the two hot side temperatures.
For the three scenarios given in Table 15, overall system mass for each configura-
tion is shown in Table 16. For each of the scenarios, the structure and propellant tank
mass are the same while the other components have slight variation due to the chang-
ing requirement in the thermal system. All three scenarios results in propellant depot
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Table 16: Propellant Depot System Dry Mass Breakdown for Different Cryogenic
Fluid Management Scenarios
Passive ZBO (219 K) ZBO (228 K)
Active Thermal 0 2,300 2,500 kg
Passive Thermal 2,280 1,880 1,940 kg
Power System 970 2,620 2,780 kg
Structure 2,600 2,600 2,600 kg
Propellant Tanks 6,100 6,100 6,100 kg
Propulsion System 1,300 1,330 1,350 kg
Total 13,250 16,830 17,270 kg
Boil-Off Loss 12,000 0 0 kg/yr
dry mass less than 18 mT, which compared to the potential launch vehicle capability
shown in Table 5, all but the smallest launch vehicle have enough payload capability
to deliver the depot into orbit. The ZBO scenarios represent a 50% increase in system
dry mass as compared to the all-passive scenario, but this increase in dry mass can
provide a boil-off saving of 12 mT per year. The two ZBO scenarios differ only in
the level of thermal management applied to the system and the difference between
the two scenarios is only 400 kg. Thus, the modest increase in the system dry mass
can provide much higher probability of achieving ZBO due to the variability of the
hot side temperature. Overall, these results demonstrate that the commercial launch
systems have more than enough performance capability to be utilized for hardware
delivery.
The overall system level trade between the passive thermal system and active
thermal system seem to favor the active thermal system for all but the shortest
missions. This is illustrated in Figure 44. The depot shows the direct trade between
the overall system mass for the three CFM scenario as a function of time. For storage
durations less than four months, the all-passive CFM scenario yields the lowest total
mass. Due to the mass loss to boil-off, the ZBO option remains the most mass efficient





































Figure 44: Propellant Depot Dry Mass Plus Boil-Off Mass as Function of Storage
Time
4.6 Uncertainty Analysis and Probabilistic Simulation
The results shown so far are consistent with the majority of the literature discussion
and conclusions on propellant depot presented in Chapter 2. Like most literature
conclusions, the ZBO option is very attractive as it provides fairly significant mass
savings in terms of propellant boil-off loss for a modest increase in overall system dry
mass. However, these results, like all the results in the literature, do not account
for the uncertainties in the performance and mass estimations. Traditionally, during
preliminary design process such as this, design mass margins are applied to account
for mass growth and uncertainty in the estimations. To improve the analysis, a
probabilistic simulation is employed to quantify the effects of the uncertainty on
overall performance.
The MERs generated with historical data creates mass estimations that represent
the mean of the available data, resulting in model uncertainty in the estimation of
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Table 17: MER Correction Factor Statistical Analysis Summary
Variable Distribution Parameter
χηC Gamma a = 1.769 b = 0.384
χMO2Tank LogNormal µ = -1.21E-7 σ = 0.275
χMH2Tank Gamma a = 447.5 b = 2.237E-3
χMSkirts Gamma a = 37.36 b = 0.027
χMEngine LogNormal µ = -1.45E-8 σ = 0.075
χM20K Gamma a = 8.234 b = 0.129
χM80K Gamma a = 3.655 b = 0.315
χMSHT Uniform a = 0.059 b = 0.138
χMRad Uniform a = 0.029 b = 0.103
χMCPI Uniform a = 0.003 b = 0.082
χMMisc Uniform a = 0.008 b = 0.074
χγm Uniform a = 8.81e-3 b = 9.30e-3
χγs Uniform a = 3.90e-3 b = 7.30e-3
system performance. To model the uncertainty in the MER, the MER curve is shifted
by utilizing a correction factor. The correction factor is derived from the error of the
MER. The error of the MER is defined by the ratio of the residual and the actual
mass of the system and the residual of the MER is the difference between the actual













To determine the value of the correction factor, a statistical analysis was conducted
using the residual data for each subsystem. A probabilistic distribution is fitted to
the correction factor for each of the subsystems to capture the variability of the
prediction. Normal distributions would typically be used to represent this type of
data [135]; however, the normal distribution has the domain of x ∈ (− inf, inf) which
is not ideal because the correction factor cannot be negative. Therefore, both the
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LogNormal and the Gamma distributions are used to fit the data to capture the
variability. For each of the subsystems, the distributions are fitted to the data, and
the best fit distribution (based on the maximum log likelihood of the fit) is chosen.
For limited data subsystems like the cryocooler subsystems and the MLI blanket and
spacers, uniform distributions from the maximum to minimum values, based on Table
11 and Table 10, are used to capture the potential variability of the mass estimation.
Table 13 shows a summary of the mass estimating relationships described in this
section and Table 17 shows the statistical analysis and the resulting correction factor
distributions for each of the MERs. The one standard deviation bounds for each of
these correction factors can be seen in the MER plots for the individual subsystems
(Figures 36 and 41).
To capture the uncertainty inherent in the mass estimation, Monte Carlo simu-
lation is performed using the correction factors described by Equations 21 and 22
with the input distribution given by Table 17. Two scenarios were considered for this
analysis: the passive thermal management shown as scenario A in Table 15 and the
max temperature ZBO scenario shown as scenario C in Table 15. The average tem-
perature scenario was not considered due to the relatively small difference between
scenarios B and C.
Figure 45 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
propellant depot system dry mass of a 10,000 case Monte Carlo simulation for the all-
passive thermal management strategy. The figure shows that due to the uncertainty in
the mass estimation, the total system dry mass can vary between 9 mT and 18.2 mT.
The deterministic solution, as given by Table 16, shows a nominal system dry mass
of 13.3 mT. Therefore, by using the deterministic solution, there is approximately a
50% probability that all of the uncertainties in the subsystem mass estimation are
captured. In another word, there is a 50% chance that the actual system mass of the
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Figure 45: Empirical CDF for All Passive Propellant Depot Dry Mass (mT)


























Figure 46: Empirical CDF for Zero Boil-Off Propellant Depot Dry Mass (mT)
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Table 18: Nominal Payload Capability to Low Earth Orbit for Various Launch Ve-
hicles [4, 75–77]
ULA Atlas V 551 19,000 kg
ULA Delta IV Heavy 23,600 kg
SpaceX Falcon Heavy† 51,000 kg
NASA Space Launch System‡ 70,000 kg
For a system that requires high accuracies in the mass estimation, such as the
case of a launch vehicle payload, this represents an unacceptable level of risk to the
overall payload feasibility. If a 30% mass margin is applied to the system, as is
typical in aerospace system designs in the preliminary design phase [137, 138], the
depot system dry mass would increases to 17.3 mT, which increases the probability
of capturing the mass uncertainty to well over 99%. Thus for the all-passive thermal
management scenario, a properly applied design mass margin is sufficient in capturing
the uncertainty in the mass estimation.
Figure 46 shows the empirical CDF for the propellant depot system dry mass
with the mass optimal combination of passive & active thermal management that
achieves ZBO for the max temperature (scenario C in Table 15). With the addition
of active thermal management systems, the overall system dry mass as well as the
uncertainty in the mass estimation are higher as compared to the all-passive scenario.
The depot dry mass varies from 12.6 mT to over 50 mT. The deterministic solution
of 17.3 mT represents on the 20th percentile of the empirical CDF, implicating 80%
probability that the actual system mass would exceed the deterministic solution.
Applying a 30% mass margin result in a system mass of 22.5 mT and increases the
probability of capturing the mass uncertainty to roughly 55%. The dramatic increase
in the variability of the depot dry mass for the ZBO scenario is primarily due to the
uncertainty in the estimation of the coefficient of performance for the cryocooler. As
†Currently in Development, First Operational Flight Scheduled for 2015 [78]
‡Currently in Development, First Test Flight Scheduled for 2017 [4]
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Table 19: Probability of Depot System Dry Mass of Meeting Launch Vehicle Payload
Constraint
Passive ZBO
ULA Atlas V 551 > 99% ≈ 38%
ULA Delta IV Heavy > 99% ≈ 65%
SpaceX Falcon Heavy† > 99% ≈ 94%
NASA Space Launch System‡ > 99% ≈ 97%
Figure 34 shows, there is significant data dispersion for the performance estimation
for cryocoolers, and this effect is compounded with the mass estimation for both
cryocooler mass and the electrical power requirement for the depot. This resulted
in a high uncertainty with the mass estimation of the propellant depot system mass
when a cryocooler is utilized.
For both scenarios, the application of mass margin can increase the confidence
of the mass estimation. However, the application of mass margin can have negative
impact on the overall architecture feasibility depending on the selection of launch
vehicle. For system mass estimation and the uncertainty analysis surrounding it, the
feasibility assessment of the physical system depends on the ability for the designed
system to be delivered to orbit on various available launch vehicles. Thus, the figure
of merit in which performance feasibility is evaluated upon is the overall system dry
mass of the system and the constraint imposed on the figure of merit is the payload
capability of various launch vehicles. The nominal payload capabilities of the various
launch vehicles are shown in Table 18. Another way to look at the problem with mass
estimation uncertainty is to examine the available payload capability of the launch
vehicles and determine the likelihood of the designed system fitting under the payload
constraint given the uncertainty. These probabilities are shown in Table 19.
The four launch vehicles considered are more than capable of delivering the passive
propellant depot into orbit, with better than 99% probability that all of the mass
†Currently in Development, First Operational Flight Scheduled for 2015 [78]
‡Currently in Development, First Test Flight Scheduled for 2017 [4]
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estimation uncertainty can be captured. The high variability in the system mass
due to uncertainty for the ZBO scenario results in poor performance for the two ULA
vehicles. The two largest vehicles, SpaceX Falcon Heavy and NASA’s initial 70 metric
ton Space Launch System, the large payload capability results over 94%probability
of successful delivery of the depot system to orbit regardless of the uncertainty in
the system mass estimation. From a pure performance feasibility standpoint, using
either the Falcon Heavy or the Space Launch System provides the highest degree
of confidence that the mission will be successful. Of course there are other factors
such as launch cost and vehicle reliability that must be taken into consideration when
evaluating the overall architecture feasibility. These will be discussed in subsequent
chapters.
4.7 Summary of Technical Feasibility Assessment
The technical performance feasibility of propellant depot was examined in this chap-
ter. System models were developed to evaluate the performance requirements for
storing cryogenic propellant on orbit. These requirements were used to size the pro-
pellant depot system to estimate the overall system mass and performance feasibility
was determined by comparing the overall system mass to the potential launch ve-
hicle performance capabilities. The results from this chapter show that the current
state-of-the-art in cryocoolers are capable of providing enough thermal management
to prevent the boil-off of cryogenic fluids in orbit. For mission durations shorter
than four months, there is a positive mass trade of the all-passive scenario over the
ZBO scenario. However, the mass of the boil-off loss becomes greater than the added
system mass of the active thermal system for mission durations greater than four
months.
The chosen thermal management system has direct impact on the performance
feasibility of the launch vehicles. Using cryocooler technology in a propellant depot
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system can drastically reduce the performance feasibility of the overall system due to
the large uncertainty with the performance and mass estimation. The results of the
probabilistic simulations show that for all but the largest available launch vehicles, the
probability that the chosen launch vehicle is capable of handling the potential growth
in the system mass due to uncertainty is very low. The all-passive scenario can be
an attractive option due to the lower overall system dry mass and the decrease in
the complexity of the system integration. The penalty of the all-passive depot is the
propellant loss due to boil-off. Analysis of both the economic and reliability feasibility
is required to determine what, if any, impact boil-off loss has on either metric to
determine the optimal strategy for propellant depot based exploration architecture.
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CHAPTER V
LAUNCH RELIABILITY AND PROPELLANT
AGGREGATION FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
One of the major challenges to a propellant depot based exploration architecture is
the increase in the total number of launches required as compared to a heavy-lift based
architecture. Due to the increase in the required launches, some have argued that
the overall mission reliability is unacceptable [14]. In order to fully understand the
impact of this effect, this chapter presents an analysis of the overall reliability of the
launch vehicle mission architecture, and more specifically the propellant aggregation
launch requirements and feasibility assessment.
5.1 Historical Launch Reliability
One of the most critical phases of any space mission is delivering the required payload
into orbit. A failure of the launch vehicle during this phase can have catastrophic
consequences for the current mission and future missions. Since the Soviet Union
launched Sputnik atop the R-7 Rocket on October 4, 1957, the world has seen thou-
sands of rocket launches with payloads varying from small communication satellites
to sending humans to the lunar surface. Assessing the risk, or probability, of launch
failure is a critical element of architecture decision and planning. However, the pro-
cess of quantifying this risk is very difficult, especially for new vehicles that have
relatively few launch attempts. The thousands of worldwide rocket launches in the
past 50 years provide a fairly small sample size of launch vehicles to make an accu-
rate assessment of launch vehicle reliability. In comparison, commercial aviation has



























Figure 47: Summary of Global Rocket Launches from 1957 to 2012 [74,139,140]
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course of a year or two, the data generate can give fairly high confidence in the result
of frequency of failure analysis.
Figure 47 shows the summary of the majority of rocket launches from around
the world between 1957 and 2012. The launch records are based on a variety of
sources, most notably the International Reference Guide to Space Launch System by
Isakowitz [74], Space Launch Report [139], and NASA’s Major Launch Record [140].
The records include nearly all of the orbital flights from the United States, Russia
(former Soviet Union), Japan, and European Space Agency, as well as launches from
India, China, and other small countries. The data also includes the majority of the
suborbital test flights in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s as these flights were often
used as test beds for orbital launch vehicles.
The summary of global launches shows that the total number of rocket launches in
the world peaked in the mid 1960’s during the space race between the United States
and Soviet Union. There were a large number of failures during this first decade
of rocketry, and while the number of failures has diminished since then, the overall
success-to-failure ratio on a yearly basis hasn’t seen any dramatic change since the
1970’s. Between 2003 and 2012, the worldwide rocket launches have seen an average
of 3.1 failures per year with an average annual launch rate of 56.9 per year, resulting
in launch reliability of approximately 0.948. In comparison, the overall reliability of
launch vehicles in the 1990’s and 1980’s were 0.953 and 0.934 respectively.
Figure 48 shows the yearly and cumulative probability of launch success based on
the global launch data collected between 1957 and 2012. In total, there are 4,654
recorded launches with 435 failures and 4,219 successes. For the purpose of the
analysis in this dissertation, a launch failure includes all launches that resulted in loss
of vehicle as well as any launches that result in payload delivery into incorrect orbit.
The figure shows that the yearly launch success probability rose sharply between 1957

































Figure 48: Global Rocket Launch Yearly and Cumulative Success Probability [74,
139,140]
dip below 0.9 (1986, 1996, 1999). A particularly good year was 1989, as all 81 of the
recorded launches were successful. Since 1970, the world experiences an average of
4.6 launch failures per year with an average launch rate of 79 per year. Cumulatively,
the overall rocket launch probability of success has reached just above 0.90, and this
cumulative probability has been fairly steady for the past decade.
Figure 48 shows the overall success probability of launch vehicles from a classical
statistic standpoint. It would be simple to take the cumulative or the yearly success
probability and apply it directly to the propellant depot architecture to determine
the overall architecture reliability feasibility. For example, assuming rocket launch
as independent events, the success of multiple launches is simply the product of the
individual events. This is typically the method used in literature to assess the mission
risk when multiple launches are involved. However, there are two deficiencies with this








































Figure 49: Individual Launch Family Historical Launch Reliability Growth Curve
[74,139,140]
The first problem is the inability for this analysis to provide any confidence in
the results. Simply put, there isn’t enough data to justify the use of frequency
of failure analysis with high enough confidence. Second, and more importantly, is
that both the depot based architecture and the baseline heavy lift architecture have
launch vehicles that have been recently developed or still in development. Although
knowledge of rocket technology has improved dramatically over the past 50 years,
the risk associated with a newly developed system is still relatively high and blind
application of historical reliability would provide an inaccurate assessment of the
overall mission success rate.
As Morse et al. [141] discussed in their paper, the historical success and fail-
ure record of launch vehicles demonstrates clear reliability growth over successive
launches. This effect is shown in the cumulative worldwide launch reliability in Fig-
ure 48 as well as the individual launch vehicle reliability growth curve in Figure 49.
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Figure 50: Reliability Growth Estimate of Various Stages of the Apollo Program,
reproduced from [15]
Figure 49 shows the cumulative reliability of seven of the major launch vehicle families
from around the world that has a record of over 100 launches. The figure shows the
high variability of the launch success probability during the first 50 to 100 launches
and the growth of the overall success probability expends beyond 200 flights in several
cases. To accurately analyze the overall launch vehicle reliability, both of these issues
must be addressed, and the results of which are presented in the following sections.
5.2 Launch Vehicle Infancy Reliability
One of the major concerns with assessing the risk of launch vehicle failures is the
“infancy” problems with new launch vehicles. The reliability of any new launch vehi-
cle is highly uncertain and can only be proven with a large number of demonstrated
flights. Reliability growth was a major concern during the Apollo program [15] be-
cause the estimate of initial probability of success for the first few lunar missions was
very low. This is demonstrated by the initial reliability assessment of the various
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stages of the Saturn rocket shown in Figure 50. The initial reliability assessment of
the three Saturn V stages was 0.77, 0.8, and 0.8 (assuming the SIV third stage has
the same reliability as the SII stage with only one J-2 engine instead of five). This
reliability equates to an initial reliability of 0.5 for the Saturn V vehicle.
For mature launches vehicles like the Delta and Atlas family, which have extensive
launch records, the infancy problem has long been resolved (as shown in Figure 49).
However, the design space of the propellant depot architecture includes vehicles that
are currently under development and the heavy lift baseline architecture is solely de-
pendent on the newly developed Space Launch System albeit based on Space Shuttle
engine and other technologies. In order to provide a fair comparison between exist-
ing launch vehicles with newly developed vehicles with no launch record, the infancy
problem must be addressed.
The infancy problem (or the infant mortality problem [141,142]) is well known in
the reliability assessment field, though the meaning is slightly different when exam-
ining launch vehicle reliability. Typically, the infancy problem refers to the increased
failure rate of a product at beginning of life. For example, a new light bulb might
have a higher probability of failure on its first on/off cycle than any other cycle af-
ter that. Mak [142] states that the explanation for these failures is typically defects
within the manufacturing process. With launch vehicles, one can think of a family of
launch vehicles as a product, and there is increased probability of failure during the
first few launches of that particular family of vehicle. The cause of these failures can
be attributed to a large number of causes. Unlike a light bulb, a launch vehicle is
an extremely complex system with millions of parts and hundreds of subsystems that
must work in unison. Thus, there are two potential levels of infant mortality problem,
first at the subsystem level if any of the subsystems used are new and second at the
system level if the integration method of the launch vehicle is new.


































Figure 51: Summary of the First Ten Launch Attempts by 99 of the Worldwide
Launch Vehicles [74, 139,140], Appendix C
Table 20: Summary of the Results of the First Ten Launches for the Family of
Launch Vehicle in Appendix C [74,139,140]
Mean Standard Deviation
Successes Failures Failure Rate of Failure Rate
1st Launch 66 33 0.333 0.471
2nd Launch 76 23 0.232 0.422
3rd Launch 64 28 0.304 0.460
4th Launch 70 16 0.186 0.389
5th Launch 58 22 0.275 0.447
6th Launch 58 15 0.205 0.404
7th Launch 56 12 0.176 0.381
8th Launch 49 14 0.222 0.416
9th Launch 50 9 0.153 0.360
10th Launch 39 16 0.291 0.454






















Figure 52: Histogram of the Distribution of Launch Vehicle Probability of Success
through the First 10 Launches with more than 5 Launch Attempts [74,
139,140]
vehicle database compiled for this dissertation. The 4,654 launches recorded between
1957 and 2012 can be classified into 99 launch families with at least two launches
per family. The first ten launches of each of the family are recorded in Appendix C,
shown in Figure 51 and summarized in Table 20. The summary shows that the mean
failure rate for the first ten flights of rocket launches varies between 0.176 and 0.333.
The highest of the failure rates is the first launch of each of the family, with one-
third failure rate. The table shows the cumulative probability of the launch vehicles
through the first 10 attempts, which provides some insight into the overall probability
of success, which on average is around 75% compared to the 90% observed in Figure
48 when the launch vehicles are mature.
One way to examine the data is to examine the distribution of the failure/success
rate across the 99 launch vehicles through the first 10 launches. Figure 52 shows the

























Figure 53: Mean Failure Rate Trend of the First 10 Launches for all Launch Vehi-
cles with Error Bars Representing One Standard Deviation of the Mean
Failure Rate
note that of the 99 launch vehicles examined, only 55 of them have reached the 10th
launch and 19 of the launch vehicles did not reach the 5th launch before cancellation.
So, the data in Figure 52 shows only the reliability of launch vehicles with at least 5
launches. Of the 80 vehicles that have at least 5 launch attempts, 17 have a perfect
launch record and 9 of these vehicles were a perfect 10-for-10. The distribution of the
success probability provides insight into the overall variability of the success proba-
bility in the first ten flights of a new launch vehicle. A probability distribution can
be applied to the observed data to model the estimation of success probability of new
launch vehicles. However the data, presented in this form, provides no information
on the actual growth of the launch vehicle reliability through the first ten launches.
To analyze this growth, the progression of mean failure rates from one launch to the
next is examined.
Figure 53 shows the progression of the mean failure rate for the first ten flights
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of all the launch vehicles with the error bars representing the one standard deviation
of the mean failure rate. The mean failure rate of the launch vehicles does seem to
decrease as more experience is gained by consecutive launches in the family; however
the overall downward trend it fairly minimal. Table 20 also shows the standard
deviation of the failure rates for each of the launch attempts. Because the sample
size is fairly small, the standard deviation is quite high. The lower bound of the error
bar is limited to zero because negative failure rate is not possible. The error bar
shows that there is significant uncertainty involved with estimating the overall failure
rate for vehicles in the first ten flights. Even though over 4000 launches have been
recorded, the majority of these flights are conducted by families of launch vehicles
with significant experience. There is simply not enough data of different launch
vehicle families to make a good large-sample approximation of the overall failure
rates. Guikema and Pate-Cornell [143] echo this sentiment in their analysis of 41
launch vehicle’s launch infancy problem.
To address the hypothesis that the launch vehicle failure rate decreases with in-
creasing launch attempts, Guikema and Pate-Cornell uses standard statistical hypoth-
esis testing with the Smith-Satterthwite method, which is the standard two-sample
z-test [144]. To make the case for increased launch vehicle reliability (or decreased
failure rate) for consecutive launches, there must be 95% confidence that there is a
statistical significant difference between the mean failure rates for each consecutive
launches. For the testing, the null hypothesis is
Ho : µ1 − µ2 = 0 (23)
indicating that there is mean of the failure rates of consecutive launches in the family
is the same, or in other words, there is no statistical significance of changes in failure
rates for consecutive launches in the family. The goal is to reject the null hypothesis
with high confidence while accepting the alternate hypothesis,
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Ha : µ1 − µ2 > 0 (24)
indicating the mean failure rate decreases with consecutive launches. The standard










with the rejection region given by standard z table [144] for a 95% confidence as,
RR : z > 1.65 (26)
Table 21 shows the resulting z-Values for each of the pairwise comparison of the
consecutive launches. To reject the null hypothesis with more than 95% confidence,
the z-Value must be greater than 1.65. In the nine pairwise comparisons, only the
third to fourth launch satisfies the requirement to reject the null hypothesis. Examin-
ing the mean and standard deviation of failure rates, there is a sharp decrease in the
failure rate from the third launch to the fourth launch in the mean failure rate and
slight decrease in the standard deviation. These combined to give a fairly high level
of confidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. However, generally speaking
across the first ten launches of the vehicles surveyed, there is not enough statistical
significance in the data to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, from a classical
statistics standpoint, the failure rates for the first ten launches in the launch vehicle
family are indistinguishable from one another. Guikema and Pate-Cornell [143] came
Table 21: z-Values for Hypothesis Test of the Failure Rates for the First Ten
Launches of Launch Vehicles
1st→2nd 2nd→3rd 3rd→4th 4th→5th 5th→6th
z-Value 1.59 -1.12 1.86 -1.36 1.01
6th→7th 7th→8th 8th→9th 9th→10th
z-Value 0.439 -0.655 0.992 -1.80
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to similar conclusion with their work using only data from the first five launches of
41 families of launch vehicles.
The implication of this statistical test is that for a new launch vehicle system, as
observed by the data, there is evidence to suggest that the overall reliability of the
launch vehicle is poorer in the early launches; however, the improvement of reliability
cannot be statistically demonstrated through the first ten launches. In order for the
growth of the launch vehicle reliability to make a statistical significant impact, more
than ten launches of any vehicle is required. Of course, as Guikema and Pate-Cornell
pointed out, this interpretation of the statistical data can be problematic. The use of
95% confidence comparison with the mean of a data set that has fairly small sample
size can lead to large uncertainty with the conclusion of the hypothesis test. This
deficiency in the analysis of launch vehicle reliability leads to the use of Bayesian
probability methods to model and analyze not only the mean and standard deviation
of the infancy reliability of launch vehicles, but a complete probability distribution of
the reliability. The method used for this formulation, and the results are presented
in the next sections.
5.3 Bayesian Reliability Method
The driving force behind the use of Bayesian probability to discuss reliability is that
the reliability metric, like the other feasibility assessment metrics discussed in this
dissertation, has uncertainty associated with it. The uncertainty in the assessment
of reliability means that it should not be thought of as a deterministic property
but rather it must be treated as a random variable. The classical statistics analysis
conducted in the previous section should not be discarded, however, but the interpre-
tation of those results will be different with the Bayesian methods. The key difference
is by using the Bayesian method, the single value of reliability is expanded to a full
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probability distribution, which can provide some level of confidence with the estima-
tion, and it allows for the distribution to be updated with new evidence that either
support or detracts from the previously computed distribution.
Fundamentally, Bayesian probability derives from Bayes’ theorem, which gives
the relationship between two events A & B, the probability of each of the events
occurring, P (A) and P (B), and the conditional probability of A given B and B given
A, P (A|B) and P (B|A). The standard conditional probability is given by [144],
P (A|B) = P (A ∩ B)
P (B)
(27)
P (B|A) = P (A ∩ B)
P (A)
(28)
where P (A ∩ B) is the joint probability of both events occurring. Substituting the
joint probability from the second equation into the first gives the standard form of
Bayes’ theorem [144],
P (A|B) = P (B|A) ∗ P (A)
P (B)
(29)
The classical statistic interpretation of the Bayes’ theorem formula is that it shows
the relationship between the two conditional probabilities as fractions of the proba-
bility of the independent events. The Bayesian interpretation is based on degree of
belief in a proposition before and after evidence is presented. In the above equation,
P (A) represents the initial belief of the event A (the prior), P (A|B) represents the
updated belief of event A when event B has been taken into account (the posterior),
and the ratio of P (B|A) and P (B) represents the support event B provides for event
A. Bayesian probability provides a method to update current or prior belief with new
information.
In the context of launch vehicle reliability, the prior distribution in the Bayesian
formulation can be thought of as the computed reliability, or estimated reliability
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of the launch vehicles before any launch has been attempted. For a new launch
system, this can be estimated from the infancy data shown in the previous section.
The likelihood function, or the evidence used to update the prior distribution, are
the actual launch records of the particular system of interest. Finally the posterior
distribution, update of the infancy reliability with actual launch records, is the current
best estimate of the launch vehicle’s reliability going forward. The Bayesian theorem
given in Equation 29 is useful to compute simple probability.
For launch reliability, where the distribution of the reliability is desired, the equa-
tion must be modified to relate probability distribution functions. The continuous
random variable version of Bayes’ theorem allows the computation of a probability
distribution of the updated launch vehicle reliability given prior knowledge of launch
reliability and actual launch records. The computation of these reliability distribu-
tions allow for Monte Carlo simulation to estimate overall reliability of architectures
given various launch requirements. The equation is derived from the conditional
probability of continuous random variables,








Combining these equations yields Bayes’ theorem for continuous random variables,




In this version, fA(a) is the probability distribution of launch vehicle reliability
prior to any launch, while the posterior, fA(a|B = b), is the updated probability
distribution give that the observed launch reliability is b. The likelihood function
represents the probability that the observed reliability is b given that the prior dis-
tribution of launch reliability is represented by fA(a). The likelihood function can be
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modeled with various density functions that best represent the process being modeled.
For example, if the individual launches can be viewed as independent Bernoulli pro-
cesses with success probability given by the prior distribution, the likelihood function
can be modeled using the binomial distribution function [145].
Guikema and Pate-Cornell [145, 146] use beta distributions for the prior distri-
butions because it is compliment to the binomial distribution used to model the
likelihood function; this allows for the posterior distribution to be solved analytically.
For all other types of prior distributions, the posterior distribution is solved numer-
ically by integrating over the entire range of probability distribution. Guikema and
Pate-Cornell [146] gives the equation for this numerical method where the likelihood
function is replaced by another conditional probability statement, and the denomi-
nator represents a renormalization factor to make the resulting distribution a valid
distribution.




fB(B = b|x)fA(x) dx
(33)
This Bayesian updating process can be demonstrated in Figure 54. The figure
assumes an initial launch reliability distribution that is modeled by a triangular dis-
tribution with the mean of 0.757. The mean of the launch reliability is taken from the
summary of the first ten launches of the launch vehicle database (shown in Table 20 as
mean failure rate and Figure 52 as success probability). The tree diagram shows the
progression of the launch reliability distribution with each launch success or failure.
The distribution in blue represents the prior distribution, while the distribution in
red represents the posterior distribution.
The updated distribution has two fairly interesting characteristics. First, with
each successive success or failure of the launch vehicle, the mean of the overall dis-
tribution shifts left or right accordingly. Second, from observing the cases where
there are equal numbers of successes and failures, the order of success or failure is
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Figure 54: Bayesian Updated Launch Reliability Distribution Given Initial Triangular Distribution and Observed Success and
Failure Combination for the First Three Flights, Prior Distribution in Blue, Posterior Distribution in Red
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Table 22: Observed Launch Record for Launch Vehicles of Interest and Related
Family, through January 31, 2014
Vehicle Related Family
Success Failure Success Failure
Atlas V 48 1 305 55
Delta IV 23 1 632 81
Falcon Heavy 0 0 10 3
Space Launch System 0 0 0 0
inconsequential to the resulting posterior distribution. For example, the posterior
distribution for the Fail-Fail-Success and the Success-Fail-Fail cases are identical to
each other despite coming from two separate branches of the Bayesian tree. Using
this technique, the observed empirical data can be used to update the launch vehicle
reliability as more evidence is gathered.
For the launch vehicles of interest to the propellant depot architecture, the ob-
served launch records for each are shown in Table 22. To estimate the future reliability
of each of these vehicles, a prior distribution for the launch vehicle is needed. If no
information exists to create a prior distribution, a simple uniform distribution from
0 to 1 can be used. For the Atlas and the Delta vehicles, even though these largest
vehicles have fairly limited launch record, the vehicles are derived from other vehicles
that have extensive launch records. Thus, prior reliability distribution can be cre-
ated from analyzing the historical reliability of the other vehicles in the family. The
number of trials for these launch vehicles is quite large, thus computing the Bernoulli
trial probability is not possible because of the computation of large number facto-
rials and raising the probability to the power of several hundred. Thus, for bp > 5
and b(1 − p) > 5, the Bernoulli trials probability can be approximated by a normal
distribution where µ = bp and σ2 = b(1− p) [144].
For the Falcon heavy vehicle, it utilizes three Falcon 9 cores integrated together
with potential cross feeding technologies. The new development, makes the estimation





































Figure 55: Prior Distribution of Launch Vehicle Reliability Based on the History of
Related Launch Vehicles in the Family
the Space Launch System, even though the development is new, the vehicle utilizes
many of the elements from the Space Shuttle vehicle. So some information may be
gained from using the reliability of the Space Shuttle. However, the implementation
and integration of these elements are very different from the Space Shuttle, thus the
prior reliability estimate should be closer to that of a new vehicle.
The prior distribution for each vehicle is derived from the historical launch record
of the family of launch vehicles that the new vehicles evolved from. The starting
point for the launch reliability of family of launch vehicle assumes a simple uniform
distribution from 0 to 1, as these vehicles were developed during the early era of
rocketry and there was very little information about the reliability of rocket vehicles.
The Falcon Heavy is preceded by the Falcon 1 and Falcon 9 vehicles, both of which also
had a very limited launch record. Using the same uniform distribution, the Falcon
































































Figure 56: Posterior Distribution of Launch Vehicle Reliability Based on Observed
Launch Record (Through January 31, 2014) for the Individual Launch
Vehicle
System does not have the luxury of a history of family of launch vehicles; thus, the
prior distribution for these vehicles is modeled using the historical infancy reliability
of new launch vehicles as discussed in the previous section. Triangular distribution
with mean of 0.757 is used.
Figure 55 shows the resulting prior distribution for the reliability of the Delta,
Atlas, and Falcon given the reliability of the previous generation of the launch vehicles
along with the triangular distribution for the SLS. The figures show that because the
Delta and the Atlas come from a long line of launch vehicle family with significant
launch records, the overall projection of the launch vehicle reliability is fairly stable
with a very high peak. On the other hand, both the Falcon and the SLS have very
little launch record to support their reliability claim, thus the projected reliability of
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Table 23: Summary of the Bayesian Prior and Posterior Distribution for the Four
Launch Vehicle of Interest
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Atlas V Beta a = 305.2 b = 55.85 Beta a = 353.4 b = 56.88
Delta IV Beta a = 631.0 b = 81.74 Beta a = 654.4 b = 82.79
Falcon Heavy Beta a = 11.02 b = 4.007 Beta a = 11.02 b = 4.007
SLS Triangular a = 0 b = 0.731 c = 1 Triangular a = 0 b = 0.731 c = 1
these vehicles are much more widespread, indicating large uncertainty in the reliability
estimates for these vehicles.
Using Bayesian methods, these prior distributions are updated with the observed
launch records for each of the vehicles and the results are shown in Figure 56. For
the Atlas V vehicle, the recent success of launches moved the mean of the reliability
distribution to the right just slightly and narrowed the spread of the distribution.
The added data improved the estimate provided by the historical data. The Delta
launch vehicle, which had the most extensive prior launch record, saw very little
change in the reliability distribution with the additional data. For the Falcon Heavy
and the SLS, because there are no data available, have no change in the reliability
distribution from the prior distribution. A summary of each of these distributions is
shown in Table 23.
5.4 Propellant Aggregation Launch Requirements
To determine the overall launch reliability, the number of required launches for the
architecture needs to be determined. The biggest contributor of mission unreliabil-
ity in propellant depot based exploration architecture is the large number of launch
vehicles required for the mission. The heavy lift launch vehicle based exploration
architecture presented in Chapter 2 requires the launch and on orbit rendezvous of
three to four heavy lift vehicles. In comparison, the baseline depot based exploration
architecture, using the Falcon Heavy to deliver all of the necessary components, re-
quires 10 launches. As discussed in Chapter 2, if the launch vehicle success can be
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viewed as independent events with some probability of success, then requiring more
launches will exponentially reduce the overall success probability.
The number of launches required by a propellant depot based architecture is
depended upon several factors. The variable with the most importance is of course
the payload capacity for the selected launch vehicle. Chapter 4 presented a feasibility
analysis on the utilization of various launch vehicles to deliver the depot hardware
to orbit. The analysis showed that in order to have high confidence of successfully
delivering the hardware to orbit, the largest payload capability of the available launch
vehicles are preferred. However, this requirement does not apply to the delivery of
the propellants that are required to fill the depot. One of the most beneficial aspects
of the propellant depot based architecture is that it divides the mass required in orbit
into whatever portion is most desirable for the particular mission. This provides an
unparalleled amount of flexibility to the mission planning process.
The other important variables that drive the number of launches required are the
overall propellant mass fraction of the tanker vehicles, the flight rate of the chosen
launch vehicles, and finally the boil-off rates of the stored propellant if zero-boil-off
technology is not applied and the required storage time. The overall propellant mass
fraction of the tanker vehicle describes the percentage of the launch vehicle’s available
payload capability that can be used to deliver propellant. A portion of the payload
capability must be used to account for the tanker vehicle dry mass that includes the
propellant tanks, supporting structures, propellant transfer mechanisms, and other
subsystems that are required for the tanker to fly autonomously and rendezvous with
the propellant depot.
The actual propellant mass fraction of the tanker vehicle will be depended on
the overall design and fabrication of the vehicle. Performing a detailed design of the
tanker vehicle is outside the scope of this dissertation. One way to model the tanker
vehicle is to examine historical systems that are similar. The launch vehicle’s upper
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Table 24: Launch Vehicle Upper Stage Mass Summary
Propellant Propellant Gross Propellant
Type Mass (kg) Mass (kg) Mass Fraction
Fregat Soyuz Storable 5,350 6,435 0.8314
Ariane V Storable 9,700 10,900 0.8899
Titan II Storable 27,000 30,000 0.9000
Titan IV Storable 35,000 39,500 0.8861
Centaur II LOX/LH2 16,780 18,960 0.8850
Delta II LOX/LH2 16,820 19,300 0.8715
Centaur III LOX/LH2 20,830 22,744 0.9158
Delta IV 4-m LOX/LH2 20,400 24,170 0.8440
Delta IV 5-m LOX/LH2 27,200 30,710 0.8857
Molniya 4th LOX/RP1 5,500 7,360 0.7473
Soyuz 3rd LOX/RP1 22,800 25,300 0.9012
Falcon 9 LOX/RP1 90,719 95,254 0.9524
stage is generally good for comparison to the tanker vehicle [5]. The upper stage’s
functionality, the design, and performance are all fairly similar to the tanker vehicle
with the exception of the propellant transfer mechanism and the thermal management
systems. If the rendezvous, docking, and propellant transfer can be conducted fairly
quickly after the launch of the tanker vehicle, then the boil-off mitigation required
is minimal. These exceptions can be balanced by the fact that typically upper stage
vehicles have high performance propulsion system to perform the orbital maneuvers
while the tanker vehicle only requires orientation and docking propulsion.
Table 24 shows a summary of upper stage vehicles with different propellant types
and their respective propellant mass, gross mass, and propellant mass fraction. The
majority of the propellant mass fraction lies between 0.84 and 0.95, with the Molniya
4th stage as an outlier at 0.75 because of its relatively small propellant capacity. The
data suggest that better than 80% of the any launch vehicles payload capability can
be utilized as propellant delivered to orbit, with the average propellant fraction of
around 0.87. Thus the launch vehicle payload given by Table 18 is reduced by this
fraction to account for the dry mass associated with the tanker.
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Table 25: Launch Vehicle Flight Rates for Selected Launch Vehicles
Potential Demonstrated
Launch Vehicle Flight Rate Flight Rate
Atlas V 551 5-8/year 2/year
Delta IV Heavy 5-8/year 2/year
Falcon Heavy 8-12/year TBD
Space Launch System 0.5-2/year TBD
The final variable that drives the number of launches required is the storage time
and the vehicle launch rates. With the exception of the zero-boil-off scenario, the
boil-off of the propellant will eventually require additional flights to top off the depot
propellant before the mission can be performed. Additionally, the storage time also
depends on the vehicle launch rates. If the vehicles can be launched in rapid succes-
sion, then the depot can be filled rather quickly to minimize the effect of propellant
boil-off.
Table 25 shows the potential and demonstrated flight rates for each of the launch
vehicles under consideration. The potential flight rates are from either the vehicle
planning guide for the individual vehicle [75,76,139,147–150] or based on the demon-
strated flight rate for the vehicle’s family. The demonstrated flight rates for the Delta
IV Heavy and the Atlas V 551 are taken from the historical launch database devel-
oped. Note that the demonstrated launch rate for the Delta and Atlas are for the
specified vehicle, the launch rate for the families of vehicles are much higher (shown
as the potential flight rate). Additionally, the launch rates may be considered conser-
vative because it represent a single work shift per day and could be increased if there
is demand to justify the increase. SpaceX predicts that the Falcon Heavy can launch
as much as 10-12 times per year (up to once a month) depending on the demand
for the vehicle [148]. The Space Launch System’s potential flight rate is taken from
the budget estimate for the next 10-20 years. After first flight, the estimated cost
for the SLS is roughly $1-2 Billion per launch, and thus from the budget estimate
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(more detail in Chapter 6) this equates to somewhere between 2 launches per year to
one launch every two years. This information can now be combined with the anal-


































































Figure 57: Propellant Aggregation as Function of Time and Cryogenic Fluid Man-
agement Strategy Using Maximum Potential Flight Rates for Each of
the Launch Vehicles Under Consideration
Figure 57 shows the propellant aggregation in orbit as function of time using the
maximum potential flight rate for each of the launch vehicles given in Table 25. The
payload for each launch vehicle assumes a propellant mass fraction of 0.87 and tanker
oxidizer-to-fuel (OF) ratio of 6 for oxygen and hydrogen. For each launch vehicle, the
two cryogenic fluid management strategies discussed in Table 15 are plotted to show
the effect of boil-off on the aggregation rates. The Atlas and Delta launch vehicles
have very similar propellant aggregation rates due to the similarity between the two
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Table 26: Breakdown of Average Propellant Aggregation Rates for Each of the




LO2 268 305 kg/day
LH2 30 52 kg/day
OF Ratio 8.9 5.9
Delta
LO2 338 376 kg/day
LH2 42 64 kg/day
OF Ratio 8.1 5.9
Falcon
LO2 1,140 1,180 kg/day
LH2 180 203 kg/day
OF Ratio 6.3 5.8
SLS
LO2 238 276 kg/day
LH2 26 47 kg/day
OF Ratio 9.2 5.9
vehicles both in terms of payload capability and potential launch rates. The Falcon
Heavy vehicle has the highest aggregation rate, while the 70 mT SLS has similar
aggregation rate as the Delta and the Atlas despite having almost three times as
much payload capacity. This suggests that the propellant aggregation rate is much
more sensitive to launch rate than it is to payload capacity.
The propellant buildup rate shown in Figure 57 can be misleading, however, es-
pecially for the non-ZBO scenarios. Because the oxidizer and fuel boil-off at different
rates, the total propellant aggregated in orbit may not be suitable as a figure of merit
to evaluate the feasibility of the various launch vehicles. Table 26 demonstrates this
by separating the total average propellant aggregation rates (in kg per day) assuming
a tanker OF ratio of 6. The average propellant aggregation OF ratio is shown in
the table for each of the scenarios. The ZBO cases all result in final OF ratio of
approximately 6 as expected because no propellant is boiled off. However, for the
non-ZBO cases, the resulting OF ratio can be completely unacceptable for the mis-
sion requirement. With the exception of the Falcon vehicle, which has the benefit of
high launch rate and large payload capacity, the other vehicles all result in propellant
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aggregation rates that is oxidizer rich. Thus the tanker OF ratio must be adjusted
for the non-ZBO case to optimize for the resulting OF ratio. Alternatively, the ar-
chitecture may utilize an additional “top off” launch that provides a last minute fuel
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Figure 58: Resulting On-Orbit Propellant Aggregation OF Ratio as Functions of
CFM Strategy, Launch Vehicle, and Propellant Tanker OF Ratio
Figure 58 shows the resulting propellant aggregation OF ratio as a function of
the tanker OF ratio for all the launch vehicles with different launch rates and the
two CFM strategies. The right most column in this figure is the maximum launch
rate propellant aggregation shown in Figure 57. As expected, all of the ZBO cases,
regardless of the other variables, results in a one-to-one correlation from the tanker
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Table 27: Tanker Required Oxidizer-to-Fuel Ratio for On-Orbit Propellant Aggre-


















OF ratio to the aggregation OF ratio. For the passive scenario, because of the different
boil-off rates for the two fluids, the resulting aggregation OF ratio can be different.
The effect is most profound in the low launch rates scenarios. For the low end
of the launch rate estimates (2/year for Atlas, Delta, Falcon, and 1 every 2 years for
SLS), to achieve the desired OF ratio of 6, the tanker OF ratio needs to have a much
lower OF ratio. For the Atlas, Delta, and SLS, to achieve an aggregation OF ratio of
6, the tanker OF ratio is between 2 and 3; and for the Falcon, the tanker OF ratio is
approximately 4 to achieve aggregation OF ratio of 6. As the launch rate increases,
the curve shifts towards the right and higher tanker OF ratio can be used to achieve
the desired aggregation OF ratio. Table 27 shows the required tanker OF ratio for
each of the scenarios to ensure the propellant aggregation OF ratio is 6. The tanker
OF ratio represents another design variable that must be considered when evaluating
the propellant depot based exploration architecture.
Table 28 shows the total propellant aggregation rates for each of the scenarios
using the optimized tanker OF ratio shown in Table 27. For each of the scenarios, the
resulting propellant aggregation OF ratio matches the architecture required OF ratio
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Table 28: Total Propellant Aggregation Rates With Optimized Tanker Oxidizer-to-
Fuel Ratio Ensuring Final Oxidizer-to-Fuel Ratio of 6
Passive ZBO
Atlas
2/year 43 90 kg/day
5/year 169 226 kg/day
8/year 299 361 kg/day
Delta
2/year 63 112 kg/day
5/year 219 279 kg/day
8/year 380 445 kg/day
Falcon
2/year 181 241 kg/day
8/year 870 937 kg/day
12/year 1,320 1,390 kg/day
SLS
0.5/year 32 80 kg/day
1/year 106 160 kg/day
2/year 264 327 kg/day
of 6 for optimized performance of a LO2/LH2 in-space engine. As the table shows,
the total propellant aggregation rates are still more sensitive to the launch rate of the
launch vehicle compared to the cryogenic fluid management strategy. For example,
the 70 mT SLS can increase the propellant aggregation rate from 32 kg/day to 264
kg/day by increasing the launch rate from 0.5 per year to 2 per year, but going from
passive to ZBO only increases the propellant aggregation rate by 40-60 kg/day. This
shows the importance of the vehicle launch rate in determining the overall propellant
aggregation rates.
For a 225 mT propellant depot as required by the reference architecture to an
asteroid, the number of launches required is shown in Table 29. The numbers shown
in this table assumes a tanker propellant mass fraction of 0.87 and the tanker OF
ratio that is optimized to provide a resulting propellant aggregation OF ratio of 6.
This particular design space exploration reveals that the number of required launches
for the propellant aggregation is highly sensitive to the choice of CFM strategies
at low launch rates. As discussed with Table 28, by increasing the launch rate,
the sensitivity to the CFM strategies can be reduced dramatically. Thus from a
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Table 29: Number of Launches Required to Fill 225 mT Propellant Depot with
Tanker Propellant Mass Fraction of 0.87 with Oxidizer-to-Fuel Ratio


















technology development standpoint, the option is either to invest in long term CFM
technologies or to invest in the production and efficiency in the launch vehicle market.
By doing so, the required number of launches can be reduced by more than 50%,
thereby increasing the overall mission feasibility.
5.5 Propellant Aggregation Launch Success Probability
As the previous sections discussed, the total number of launches required to sat-
isfy the architecture requirement is dependent on a variety of design variables. The
decisions of launch vehicle selection, CFM strategy, and the maximum flight rate pos-
sible all directly impact the overall launch success probability. Computing the total
launch success probability requires certain assumptions about the launch of each of
the vehicles. The most straight forward method is to consider each of the launches
as independent events. Doing so allows for the computation of the overall launch
success as simply the probability of the individual launch, which can be obtained
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Figure 59: Mean of the Launch Success Probability as Function of Number of
Launches Required with no Redundancy and Bayesian Single Launch
Success Probability
As the number of launches increases, the overall launch success probability de-
creases at an exponential rate. This trend highlights the primary challenge to the
propellant depot based exploration architecture, as discussed in Chapter 2. Typical
exploration architectures require between one to four launches of heavy-lift class vehi-
cles, resulting in an overall launch success probability between 0.9 and 0.65 (assuming
an independent launch probability of 0.9). For a propellant depot based architecture,
the number of launches required varies between 4 and 29 (as shown in Table 29),
resulting in an overall mission success probability less than 0.65. However, the launch
reliability of each of the chosen launch vehicles must be taken into consideration when
evaluating the overall mission success probability.
Using Bayesian analysis, the current best estimate for the reliability of each of the
four launch vehicles was presented in Section 5.3 and summarized in Table 23. Figure
138

































Figure 60: Probability Distribution of Propellant Aggregation Mission Success
Probability in the Zero-Boil-Off Scenario with Bayesian Launch Reli-
ability
59 shows the mean of propellant aggregation launch success probability as a function
of number of launches required and the individual launch success probability given
by the Bayesian analysis. Each individual launch is assigned a probability of success
by sampling from the Bayesian posterior distribution and the overall mission success
probability is computed with a 100,000 case Monte Carlo simulation. The mean of
the overall mission success probability drops dramatically as the number of launches
increases. Because the Falcon and the SLS are both relatively new launch vehicles
with little launch evidence to support its reliability, these two vehicles perform rather
poorly as compared to the Atlas and Delta.
Using the minimum required launch scenario from the architecture requirement
analysis (assuming ZBO), the distribution of the propellant aggregation mission suc-
cess probability by using each of the four launch vehicles are shown in Figure 60
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Table 30: Summary of Propellant Aggregation Mission Success Probability in the
Zero-Boil-Off Scenario without Launch Redundancy
Required Mean of Mission Standard Deviation of
Launch Vehicle Flights Success Probability Mission Success Probability
Atlas V 14 0.1238 0.0092
Delta IV 11 0.2697 0.0117
Falcon Heavy 6 0.1557 0.0591
SLS 4 0.1109 0.0897
and summarized in Table 30. It is interesting to note that despite having the low-
est number of launches required, the SLS vehicle has the lowest mean probability of
propellant fill-up mission success at 11%. Overall, all four vehicles provide extremely
poor overall mission success probability, with very little chance of achieving success
probability of over 30%. The extensive launch record of the Delta and the Atlas vehi-
cles only serve to provide a narrower probability distribution for the overall mission
success, it does not improve the probability of having numerous consecutive successful
launches when each launch is treated as an independent event.
Of course, in reality the use the propellant depot based exploration architecture
relaxes the constraint of requiring multiple consecutive launches to be successful by
allowing the use of redundant launch vehicles. Because the propellant aggregation
phase of the architecture is decoupled from the mission phase, there is no reason to
require 14 successful launches out of 14 possible launches in the case of the Atlas V.
The actual probability of propellant aggregation mission success should be close to
100%. It all depends on how many launch vehicles it would require to achieve the
desired probability.
Typically, if the probability of each individual event is the same, the probability of
having k successes in n trials can be computed easily using the formula for Bernoulli
trial,
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P (K = k) =
n!
k! ∗ (n− k)! ∗ p
k ∗ (1− p)n−k (34)
where p represents the probability of success in each of the trials. However, with
the Bayesian launch analysis, each individual launch success probability is sampled
from the posterior distribution given by the current launch vehicle’s launch record.
To compute the probability of the overall mission success where the individual event
is not identically distributed, the Poisson-Binomial distribution must be used. The
probability mass function for the Poisson-Binomial distribution is computed recur-
sively by Equation 35. [144,151,152]






















The expression computes the probability of having exactly k successes in n trials given
that each of the individual events have a probability of success given by p1, p2, ...,
pn. In the Bernoulli trial scenario, each of these individual probabilities would be the
identical. The probability of having at least k success out of n trials is computed by




P (K = i) (36)
Taking the same launch requirement from Figure 60, the distribution of the overall
mission success probability using the four launch vehicles with potential launch redun-
dancy is shown in Figure 61. Each distribution represents a 100,000 cases Monte Carlo
simulation of the aggregation mission for each of the launch vehicles and redundancy
case. For each Monte Carlo case, the probability of each required launch vehicle’s
success is sampled from the Bayesian posterior distribution. This probability is used
by Equation 35 to compute the Poisson-Binomial probability mass function, then
depending on how many successful launches is required, the appropriate probability
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Figure 61: Probability Distribution of Propellant Aggregation Mission Success
Probability in the Zero-Boil-Off Scenario with Bayesian Launch Reli-
ability and Varying Number of Redundant Launch Vehicles Available
case for each of the launch vehicle is identical to the distribution shown in Figure 60,
which is computed using the simple Bernoulli trials method, thereby validating the
Poisson-Binomial method.
The distributions for all four launch vehicles clearly show a significant improve-
ment in the overall mission success probability when redundancy is introduced. The
peaks of each of distribution for all four launch vehicles shift to the right as more
redundant launch vehicles are made available. The mean and standard deviation for
the scenario depicted in Figure 61 is summarized in Table 31. For the Atlas, Delta,
and Falcon launch vehicles, having at least four redundant launch vehicles available
increases the mean of the propellant aggregation launch success probability to above
85%. The SLS is able to achieve a mean mission success probability of just over 80%
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with four redundant vehicles. For the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles, the individual
launch success distribution has very small standard deviation due to their extensive
launch records. This results in the overall launch success with very small standard
deviation as well, providing fairly high confidence in the estimation of mission suc-
cess probability. On the other hand, because of their lack of launch records, the large
spread of the individual launch vehicle reliability results in high uncertainty when
predicting the mission success probability for the Falcon and the SLS.
Table 31: Summary of Propellant Aggregation Launch Success Probability in the
Zero-Boil-Off Scenario with Bayesian Launch Reliability
Launch Required Redundant Mean of Mission Standard Deviation of

























Expanding the design space, Figure 62 shows the mean and standard deviation of
the propellant aggregation success probability given all three cryogenic fluid manage-
ment scenarios, using the launch requirement from each vehicle’s nominal launch rate.
The figure shows the mean of the aggregation mission success probability as a func-
tion of number of redundant launch vehicles available using the solid line, and with
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the dashed line representing the plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean.
For both scenarios, the overall mission success probability increases as the number of
redundant vehicle increases. The Atlas and Delta vehicles have very tight standard
deviation bounds due to the tight bound from the individual posterior distribution.
For the Atlas, the choice of cryogenic fluid management strategy does have a
large impact on the number of launches required, and thus the overall mission success
changes by roughly 10% depending on the choice. The effect diminishes, however,
when the number of redundant launch vehicles available is greater than six. Using the
Delta launch vehicle creates an interesting scenario in that the choice of cryogenic fluid
management strategy has fairly minimal impact on the mission success probability.
The difference between the passive and the ZBO scenario is only three additional
launches of the Delta, and Delta has the best individual launch success record which
yields fairly minimal change to the overall mission success probability. Having at
least four redundant Delta launches results in over 95% probability of launch success
regardless of the other design options.
Using the Falcon to fill up the propellant depot provides similar launch success
probability to the Atlas vehicle, even though the number of launches required is less
than half that of the Atlas. The relatively new launch vehicle suffers from low confi-
dence in the individual launch success estimate, which can be seen resulting in having
fairly large standard deviation bounds for the overall launch success probability. The
uncertainty of the launch success probability is reduced with increasing redundant
launches available, as demonstrated by the tightening of the distribution. Similar to
the Atlas, six redundant Falcon launches are needed to provide both high probability
of launch success and low uncertainty in the estimate.
The SLS launch vehicle provides the worst performance for overall launch success
probability. Despite having the most payload capability, the high uncertainty asso-
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Figure 62: Probability Distribution of Propellant Aggregation Launch Success
Probability in the Zero-Boil-Off Scenario with Bayesian Launch Reli-
ability and Varying Number of Redundant Launch Vehicles Available
uncertainty in the estimation of the overall launch success probability even with large
numbers of redundant vehicles. The number of required SLS launches is significantly
less than the other launch options, but the launch success probability lags behind
all the other options. The large spread of the distribution also shows there is large
uncertainty in the estimation of the overall launch success probability, and unlike the
other options, the distribution does not appear to tighten as number of redundant
launches increases.
For the architecture to be completely successful, there are additional mission
events that are required. Each of the propellant launches would require rendezvous
and docking of the tanker vehicle to the propellant depot. Additionally, after the com-
pletion of the propellant aggregation missions, the mission hardware and crew must
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be launched into orbit successfully. These elements all need to rendezvous in orbit be-
fore the mission can commence. The only difference between this chain of events and
the baseline exploration architecture is the additional requirement of tanker/depot
rendezvous. The mission element rendezvous and docking is near identical between
the two architectures. On orbit rendezvous and docking is considered to be an ex-
tremely mature technology [153], and a catastrophic failure during this phase of the
mission is unlikely due to numerous fail-safe protocols. The reliability of rendezvous
and docking maneuver is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, the increase in
number of rendezvous maneuver required will not decrease the overall mission reli-
ability because of the availability of redundancy in the architecture. Similar to the
launch reliability, a failure in rendezvous of the tanker and propellant depot can be
mitigated with additional refueling flights.
5.6 Summary of Feasibility Assessment
The launch vehicle and mission reliability feasibility was examined in this chapter.
The historical launch records for the family of launch vehicles were used to construct
prior distributions of the chosen launch vehicles, and the Bayesian posterior distribu-
tion for each launch vehicle’s reliability was computed using the actual launch records.
For newly developed launch vehicles, the lack of launch record was mitigated by us-
ing the global launch records to estimate the overall reliability. The thermal system
analysis from Chapter 4 was combined with launch schedule analysis to determine
the launch requirements to meet the propellant demand of the baseline exploration
architecture. The generated posterior distribution for the launch vehicle reliability
was used in Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the overall launch success probability
of requiring multiple launches of the same vehicle. Poisson-Bernoulli distribution was
used to compute the overall launch success probability when redundant vehicles are
made available.
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The analysis in this chapter demonstrates the feasibility challenge to the propel-
lant depot based architecture isn’t without basis. Requiring larger number of launches
to complete exploration architectures does reduce the overall launch success probabil-
ity, regardless of other design options. However, the increase number of launches in
propellant depot based architecture is mainly due to the need for the aggregation of
propellant into orbit. These propellant aggregation launches can be decoupled from
the mission critical path, which enables redundant or backup launches to be utilized.
By enabling redundancy to the launch architecture, the mission reliability risk and the
overall uncertainty of the launch success can be dramatically reduced. The use of cur-
rently available commercial launch vehicles, with extensive launch records to support
their reliability, can greatly reduce the uncertainty of launch success probability.
Additionally, the ability to utilize multiple launch providers to supply the propel-
lant launch may add another layer of redundancy to the overall architecture. If one
of the providers suffers a failure, the propellant aggregation mission does not have
to stop for the failure investigation that may take a year or two, using the Space
Shuttle as an example. The mission can continue with the other launch provider with
minor change to the overall mission schedule. Of course, the use of redundant launch
vehicles to improve probability of overall launch success isn’t without cost. The eco-
nomics of the architecture is discussed in the next chapter. Additional considerations
to the overall launch success probability, such as hardware launches and mix fleet
launch vehicle strategy, will be discussed in the Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER VI
ARCHITECTURE COST ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
The final area of challenge to propellant depot based exploration architectures ad-
dressed in this thesis is the economics of the architecture. The utilization of a propel-
lant depot results in a significant increase in the number of launch vehicles required
as discussed in the previous chapter, and this increase may have a dramatic impact
on the overall cost of the exploration architecture. This chapter provides an analy-
sis of the cost of developing and operating the propellant depot based architecture
by examining the additional cost of the launch vehicles and the development cost of
the unique hardware. The cost of the depot based architecture will be compared to
the cost of the current NASA architecture, and analysis of NASA’s current and pro-
jected budget will provide an overall economic constraint for the feasibility assessment
metric.
6.1 Space Exploration Budget Constraints
Since the close of the Apollo program, numerous missions, architectures, and concepts
of operation have been proposed for expanding the human presence beyond low-Earth
orbit. However, none have successfully achieved the goal of expanding human presence
beyond LEO. In the past decade, it became evident (especially following the loss of the
Space Shuttle Columbia) that a new transportation system would be needed even to
reach the ISS. During this period, NASA has developed two approaches to sustaining
human spaceflight. The first of these, the Vision for Space Exploration [17](VSE),







































Figure 63: NASA’s Budget in FY2011 Dollar from 1958 to 2013 [9]
demonstrator. The second, the 2010 National Space Policy of the United States of
America [3], has so far yielded only a single flight test and no active mission hardware.
The drive of the the Cold War arms race in the 1960’s pushed the Apollo program
to success. Figure 63 plots NASA’s total budget in constant FY2011 dollars. NASA’s
budget peaks in 1966 at over $40 billion just as the Apollo program was headed into
the operations stage. After the cancellation of the Apollo program, NASA expanded
its mission and vision to include more fundamental research and development in
addition to human and robotic exploration. NASA’s expansion came at a time in
which the budget restriction became tighter. In the 1970’s the budget decreased to
$15 billion as NASA shifted its focus from beyond LEO exploration to the Space
Shuttle program. In the late 1980’s, the budget was expanded to accommodate the
International Space Station program, but the budget has since fallen below $20 billion.
The 2004 Vision for Space Exploration was supposed to renew the nation’s effort












































Figure 64: NASA’s Exploration System Budget in Real Year Dollar from 2004 to
2012, and the Budget Projection from Each of the Fiscal Year Budget
Request [7, 154]
Program to free up a portion of the NASA budget for exploration systems research
and development. The FY2004 budget was the first time the Exploration System
became its own budget line item. However, the retirement of the Space Shuttle was
delayed multiple times, causing the NASA funding for Exploration Systems to be well
under the projection of the program managers.
Figure 64 illustrates the gap between NASAs projected and actual Exploration
System budget in the past decade. Each line represents the budget projection for the
particular fiscal year going forward, while the dashed line shows the actual funding
each year. From FY2006 until FY2013, each projected budget exceeded the actual
budget often by several billion dollars. Only the FY2012, FY2013, and FY2014 pro-
jections do not anticipate significant increases in NASA funding; the others forecast
an eventual yearly exploration budget of $9 billion. The failure of the Constellation
program can be directly attributed to this discrepancy, as the funding for exploration
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systems never reached the levels projected by NASA. The program was built on the
unrealistic assumption of the budget profile, which led to significant delays develop-
ment activities and ultimately to the cancellation of the entire program.
The Augustine Commission [1] provided NASA with recommendations to achieve
beyond LEO exploration in the post-Constellation era. The Commission charged
NASA to have realistic goals and expectations for the budget and to plan exploration
activities that can be supported by realistic budget assumptions. NASA has done
away with assuming significant increases in budget appropriations, especially in this
new fiscally conservative time and has adapted fairly flat budget projections starting
with the FY2012 budget proposal. Since becoming its own separate budget line
item, the Exploration System budget peaked in 2011 at $4 billion in then-year dollars
and has remain below $4 billion ever since. To evaluate a space exploration system
architecture for economic feasibility, a $4 billion then-year dollar budget level is used
as a constraint.
6.2 Baseline Architecture Exploration Cost
The current NASA Exploration Systems plan requires NASA to develop and build a
heavy lift launch system as well as all of the unique in-space elements for all future
missions. Current estimates from the Human Exploration Framework Team estimated
the cost of development and first flight of all of the hardware at approximately $144
billion (FY11) over the next 20 years [4]. Table 1 (in Chapter 1) shows the breakdown
of the HEFT cost by elements, and Figure 65 shows the cost breakdown by element
by year. The most costly components of the current exploration architecture are the
Heavy Lift Launch System (37%) and the ground operation and infrastructure that
support it (12%). The crew transfer vehicle and the solar electric propulsion system
are the only other systems that contribute more than 10% of the total cost of the
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Figure 66: Human Exploration Framework Team Yearly Cost Estimate for Near
Earth Asteroid Mission Compared to Actual NASA Exploration System
Budget and Flat $4 billion Outyear Projection [4, 154]
(FY11 dollars), with a peak of $8.42 billion (FY11 dollars) in 2021.
Figure 66 shows the yearly cost estimate of the Human Exploration Framework
team’s Near Earth Asteroid mission compared to the actual exploration system bud-
get through 2013. Plotted in dashed line is a flat $4 billion per year budget projection
from 2013 to 2031. The large discrepancy between the program’s expected level of
expenditure and actual funding received that led to the cancellation of the Constella-
tion program is still present. The out year projected budget for exploration systems
is $4 billion per year, yet the HEFT program cost is consistently $2-4 billion more
than the projected budget. The discrepancy observed in the Constellation program
was identified by the Augustine commission as one of the primary issues that must be
addressed in future NASA plans. However, it would appear that the recommendation
did not impact subsequent policy and the current program continues to operate with
an unrealistic cost profile.
153
In order for the current exploration program to be successful, NASA’s Explo-
ration Systems budget would have to be twice the currently projected level. The
budget requirement is eerily similar to the budget requirement shown in Figure 64.
Alternatively, the program can be stretched out over an additional 20 years to allow
for all of the systems to be developed under current budget projection level, pushing
the manned mission to Near Earth Asteroid to 2050. Both of these scenarios seem
very unlikely to occur. The discrepancy between what is required and what is avail-
able is simply too large to overcome without dramatic shift in national space policy,
and there is little evidence that such shift is imminent or likely.
6.3 Alternate Architecture Cost Analysis
To provide a fair comparison between the propellant depot based architecture and the
NASA HEFT baseline architecture, the majority of the baseline architecture elements
were utilized in the depot architecture. The primary cost difference between the
baseline architecture and the depot based architecture are the launch vehicles and
the development of the propellant tanker and the propellant depot.
6.3.1 Launch Vehicle Cost
A large portion of the cost of any exploration architecture is the cost of the launch
vehicle. The HEFT architecture allocates nearly 38% of the total program cost to the
launch vehicle. One of the primary purposes of a propellant depot based exploration
architecture is to eliminate the development cost of the heavy-lift launch system and
replace it with alternatives. Chapter 5 provides the analysis of the number of required
launch vehicles to complete the propellant aggregation mission. The cost of these
launch vehicles must be accounted for in the evaluation of the overall architecture
feasibility.
Table 32 shows a summary of the cost of the price of the currently available launch
vehicles in the United States. The primary difference between the commercial launch
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Table 32: U.S. Launch Vehicle Launch Price Summary [75–77],HEFT
Atlas V 551 Delta IV Heavy Falcon Heavy∗ SLS†
Price (FY11) $290M $300M $81-127M $1,600M‡
$/kg $15.3k $12.7k $1.6k-$2.5k $22.9k
“price” and the launch “cost” quoted in the HEFT cost estimate is the elimination of
the development cost of the launch vehicle. When an architecture utilizes a commer-
cial launch vehicle, the architecture pays a contracted price to deliver payload into
orbit rather than spending billions of dollars to develop the necessary hardware. The
total development cost ($17.4 billion) for the HEFT heavy-lift launch vehicle can buy
over 1,000 Falcon 9, 430 Falcon Heavy, 183 Delta IV, or 189 Atlas V launch vehicles.
The HEFT heavy lift launch vehicle is almost identical to the current Space Launch
System, so the present analysis assumes the HEFT cost as the SLS cost because no
data exist for the SLS development.
The assumed launch cost of the SLS shown in Table 32 is quoted in the Human
Exploration Framework Team’s phase I close-out report [4] as the single unit cost of
the SLS hardware. The development cost of the vehicle along with the yearly ground
operation and support cost will need to be amortized over the total number of launches
in its lifetime. The HEFT cost estimate for the asteroid mission over 20 years shows
the total development cost of the SLS to be $54 billion and ground operation and
infrastructure cost of $17 billion. The HEFT development cycle requires nine total
SLS launches, with six demonstration/test flights and three NEO mission operation
flights, as shown in Figure 3. The total amortized cost of these nine SLS flights is $7.9
billion per flight, which would make the SLS the most expensive launch vehicle in the
history of manned spaceflight. In comparison, the Space Shuttle was $1.6 billion per
flight and the Saturn V was $4.7 billion per flight.
∗Currently in Development, First Operational Flight Scheduled for 2015 [78]
†Currently in Development, First Test Flight Scheduled for 2017 [4]
‡Unit Cost Only, not including development, ground operation and support cost [4]
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For the commercial vehicles, both the Atlas V and the Delta IV are currently
operational. As with any commercial products, there is potential for price to fluctuate.
However, the launch vehicle market is in relatively low demand, which keeps the
price of the launch vehicles relatively high due to the high fix infrastructure cost. By
increasing the demand for launch vehicles, the fix infrastructure cost can be amortized
over more launches which may drive the price of the individual launch vehicles down
[155]. Additionally, if an architecture has the demand for a large number of launch
vehicles, it can be reasoned that a bulk order of a single family of launch vehicles can
further drive the price of the individual launch vehicles down. The bulk order was
used by the United States Air Force in 2013 as a method to reduce the overall cost
of programs that requires a large number of launches. The cost savings for launch
vehicle bulk buy is proprietary because it typically is based on individual negotiation
with the launch provider. The analysis in this dissertation will utilize the nominal
cost for the launch vehicle for all cost scenarios with the understanding that potential
reduction to the overall cost is still possible.
The Falcon Heavy vehicle is currently in development by SpaceX. Currently, the
vehicle is expected to have its first operation flight in 2015 [78]. Typically in a govern-
ment program, utilizing a new launch system will require the addition of development
cost to the program (as in the case of the Space Launch System). However, because
the development of the vehicle is conducted by a private company, the development
cost to the exploration program is minimal or none, depending on the contractual
agreement between the government and the commercial company.
6.3.2 Unique Element Costs
There are only two unique elements in the alternate architecture that require a sep-
arate cost estimation: the dual use propellant depot/cryogenic propulsion stage and
the propellant tanker for the propellant delivery. The expandable propellant tanker
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and their propellant transfer subsystems are referred to as the tankers in the following
text. To estimate the cost of the unique elements in the alternate architecture, the
modeling method provided by the Handbook of Cost Engineering for Space Trans-
portation System, or Transcost, was utilized [110]. Transcost is described as a statis-
tical analytical model for cost estimation of space system. It utilizes historical data
to generate cost estimating relationships (CER) similar to the mass estimating rela-
tionship described in Chapters 4. This costing method provides a top down approach
to cost estimation, relying on the overall system level inert mass as the independent
variable for cost estimation rather than detailed analysis of subsystem and compo-
nent costs. This method of cost estimation is particularly useful in conceptual level of
design as many of the subsystem level trade studies are incomplete. The uncertainty





































Figure 67: Cost History of 1 Work-Year in the United States Aerospace Industry
[110]
The Transcost data span 40+ years of space system development and operation;
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thus the CERs are generated to estimate the number of work years effort required to
develop, construct, and maintain these vehicles and subsystems rather than dollars.
The cost per work year is generated by estimating the total annual budget of a
company or agency and dividing that by the total number of productive full time
employees. The work year cost increases from year to year to adjust for inflation and
increase in worker salary. The work year cost for the US between 1960 and 2009 given
by the Transcost handbook [110] is shown in Figure 67 with the out year projection
to 2020 as a linear extrapolation from the most recent decade of data. The linear
extrapolation is given by,
Work Year Cost = 8933 ∗ (Y ear)− 17660886 (37)
The linear extrapolation estimates the 2011 work year cost to be $303,377. This work
year cost is used to estimate the cost of all of the subsystems to provide a comparison
to the FY11 cost estimate provided by the HEFT report [4].
The Transcost handbook [110] provides cost estimating relationships for several
major space vehicles categories. Although none of the categories are an exact match
to the two unique elements in the alternate architecture, the expendable vehicles most
closely resemble the elements of interest. These expendable vehicles systems used in
Transcost modeling comprises launch vehicle lower and upper stages as well as orbital
transfer vehicles. The Transcost handbook normalized the cost data to constant year
work-year, then provided an equation for the CER, as shown in Figure 68. The CER
for the development effort for expendable vehicle is given by,
HEV = 100 ∗Mref 0.555 ∗ f1 ∗ f2 ∗ f3 (38)
where the reference mass (Mref ) for the expendable vehicle development cost is the
dry mass of the vehicle less the engine. The factors, f1 and f3, are development
cost correction factors to account for the degree of difficulty of the project and the
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Figure 68: Transcost Cost Estimating Relationship for Expendable Stage Vehicles
[110]
experience of the team, respectively, while f2 is a technical quality factor that is de-
livered from technical characteristics of the individual project and varies from system
to system. These factors are subjective quantities and are summarized in Table 33.
Factors f1 and f3 are relatively subjective in nature. At the system level, it can be
difficult to quantify the system of interest into one of the categories. Each of the levels
also has a range of values for the correction factors, which enhances the variability of
the cost estimate. This inherent variability lends itself well to probabilistic modeling.
For the propellant depot system, the technical development factors can depend highly
on the level of technology it utilizes. These development cost factors can be related
to the readiness levels discussed in Chapter 3 (Tables 6 and 7). Technology with low
TRL and high RD3 would require high development cost factors.
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Table 33: Transcost Development Cost Factors [110]
f1
First generation system, new concept approach, involving new
techniques and new technologies
1.3 - 1.4
New design with some new technical and/or operational features 1.1 - 1.2
Standard project, state-of-the-art (similar system already in op-
eration)
0.9 - 1.1
Design modification to existing systems 0.7 - 0.9
Minor variation of existing projects 0.4 - 0.6
f2
Specific for each system (or element type), defined by an inherent
technical criterion
f3
New team, no relevant direct company experience 1.3 - 1.4
Partially new project activities for the team 1.1 - 1.2
Company / industry team with some related experience 1.0
Team has performed development of similar projects 0.8 - 0.9
Team has superior experience with this type of projects 0.7 - 0.8
For the three cryogenic fluid management strategies under consideration, the re-
quired technology will dictate the value of these development factors. For example,
the all passive thermal management scenario utilizes essentially technologies that have
a proven track record and is fairly common in the aerospace industry. Thus, the level
of technology can be considered as simple modification to existing systems with new
applications. The zero-boil-off propellant depot requires technologies that are new
to the aerospace system, but it does not reflect a completely new generation system,
only an evolutionary advancement in technology.
The technical quality factor (f2) for the expendable stage vehicle is a function of
the vehicle’s net mass fraction compared to the reference net mass fraction given by
historical data. The net mass fraction is defined as the dry mass plus residuals tank





The technical quality factor is computed as,
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Figure 69: Reference Net Mass Fraction Curve for Technical Quality Factor (f2) for
Hydrogen/Oxygen Expendable Vehicle Development Cost Estimate [110]




The reference net mass fraction of hydrogen/oxygen expendable vehicle is shown
in Figure 69. From the figure, a net mass fraction that is lower than the average
mass fraction from historical systems would indicate more advance technologies being
utilized, which would require increased cost to compensate for the advance technology.
The Transcost handbook does not provide an equation for the reference curve shown
in the plot. To compute the reference curve, the plot is reverse engineered to produce
data points to generate the curve shown in the figure. The generated curve gives the
net mass fraction as function of propellant mass (in kg).







Figure 70: Transcost Cost Estimating Relationship for Liquid Propellant Rocket
Engines [110]
In addition, modeling the depot as an expandable vehicle for the purpose of devel-
opment cost estimation, the development of the propulsion system that is necessary
for the propellant settling during tanker transfer is required. The Transcost hand-
book provides cost estimating relationships for rocket engines with various reference
projects. Similar to the CER for the expandable vehicles, the CER for rocket engines
is developed for work year effort, and the data used is shown in Figure 70. The
Transcost CER for liquid propellant rocket engine is given by,
HEL = 277 ∗Mengine0.48 ∗ f1 ∗ f2 ∗ f3 (42)
f2 (Engine) = 0.026 ∗ lnNQ2 (43)
where the technical quality factor is a function of the desired reliability of the rocket
engine, given by the number of qualification firing (NQ) that is required. The technical
162
Table 34: Deterministic Development Cost Summary for Propellant Depot with
Various Cryogenic Thermal Systems
Passive ZBO
Mref 11,950 15,750 kg






HEV 19,493 27,107 Wk-Yr




Total 8,653 8,800 Wk-Yr
HTotal 28,146 35,907 Wk-yr
$2011 $8.54b $10.89b
quality factor for the liquid propulsion engine has a base value of 1.0, set at 500 test
firings which represents an average value for historical engine developments [110].
Using these equations and the mass estimation from Chapter 4, the development cost
for the two deterministic propellant depots (shown in Table 16) can be computed.
The result of the development cost is shown in Table 34.
Using the Transcost development cost model for expendable vehicles, the nominal
development cost for the passive only propellant depot is $8.54 billion and the ZBO
propellant depot is $10.89 billion. The closest element to the propellant depot in the
baseline architecture is the cryogenic propulsion stage, as the combined propellant
depot/cryogenic propulsion stage (CPS) replaces the CPS. The current cost estimates
allocates $4.813 billion for the CPS development and procurement. The development
cost for the depot system is significantly more than the present NASA estimate of
the CPS. However, the method in which the CPS development cost is estimated in
the current report is unknown; thus one-to-one comparison cannot be made. Using
only the dry mass of the CPS (12,600 kg as quoted by the HEFT report [4], less
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450 kg for two RL-10 type engines) without any of the development factors, the
Transcost estimate for the development of the CPS is roughly $5.61 billion without
including the development of the RL-10 engines. The Transcost estimate is 17% more
than the CPS cost in the HEFT report. The CPS cost in the HEFT report includes
the development of a medium and a heavy class CPS as well as the theoretical first
unit cost of each of the CPS variant. The development cost of the medium CPS is
estimated by HEFT to be $3.2 billion, which represents a $2.41 billion discrepancy
between the two cost estimates. When comparing the total cost between the baseline
and the alternate architecture, the discrepancy between the cost estimation methods
must be considered. The cost analysis in this dissertation is approximately 70%
higher than the HEFT cost estimates; thus, the cost presented can be considered to
be conservative in nature.
The unit production cost for the expendable vehicles is also derived from historical
data for Transcost. The cost estimating relationship is a function of the vehicle dry
mass without the engine again. It is given by,
FEV = 1.4182 ∗M0.6464ref ∗ f4 (44)
Where f4 is a cost reduction factor relating to series production of the unit. The
theoretical first unit (TFU) cost would have f4 value of 1.0. The TFU cost for each
of the propellant depot concepts is summarized in Table 35. The unit cost for the
liquid propellant rocket engine is given by,
FEL = 3.15 ∗M0.535engine ∗ f4 (45)
The theoretical first unit costs for the depots are $230 million and $278 million
for the passive and ZBO scenario, respectively. This combined with the development
cost estimates the total propellant depot system cost to be between $8.8 billion and
$11.2 billion. As a comparison, using the Transcost unit cost method, the HEFT CPS
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Table 35: Deterministic Theoretical First Unit Cost Summary for Propellant Depot
with Various Cryogenic Thermal Systems
Passive ZBO
Mref 11,950 15,920 kg
f4 1.0 1.0
FEV 613 766 Wk-Yr
MEngine 1,300 1,350 kg
f4 1.0 1.0
FEL 146 149 Wk-Yr
Total 759 915 Wk-Yr
$2011 $230m $278m
unit cost is $187 million (compared to $175 million quoted in HEFT for the medium
CPS), which brings the total CPS system cost to $5.8 billion.
For the propellant tankers, the development and first unit cost are summarized in
Table 36. The larger tankers used on the larger launches vehicles naturally has higher
development and unit cost. The total development cost for the propellant tanker is
between $2-3 billion, with the theoretical first unit cost less than $156 million. The
one benefit that the tanker can take advantage of is the cost reduction factor relating
to the production learning curve. To complete a whole architecture, between 4 and
29 tankers are needed (as shown in Table 29) and can be manufactured in series to
reduce the overall cost of each of the tanker. However, because the exact number of
tankers required is probabilistic in nature, a learning curve factor is not applied to
the unit cost of the tankers. This provides a relatively conservative estimate for the
overall architecture cost.
6.3.3 Cost Estimation Method Comparison
Typically, to provide a fair comparison between two architectures, the architectures
must use the same cost estimation methods. However, this is often not possible. For
the HEFT architecture, despite providing detail costs for the majority of the elements,
there is a lack of detailed design information that is required to perform cost analysis
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Table 36: Deterministic Development and Theoretical First Unit Cost Summary
for Propellant Tankers for Each Launch Vehicles with Propellant Mass
Fraction of 0.87
Atlas Delta Falcon SLS
Payload 19,000 23,600 51,000 70,000 kg
Mref 2,470 3,068 6,630 9,100 kg
kNMF 0.14943 0.14943 0.14943 0.14943
kNMFref 0.13930 0.12991 0.10541 0.09839
f1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
f2 0.93221 0.86936 0.70544 0.65843
f3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
HEV 7,832 8,237 10,252 11,407 Wk-Yr
$2011 $2.38b $2.50b $3.11b $3.46b
FEV 221 254 419 514 Wk-Yr
$2011 $67m $77m $127m $156m
for each of the elements. For comparison, the Transcost method is used to estimate
the cost of several common elements. The crew transfer vehicle, deep space habitat,
and the multi-mission space exploration vehicles are all common elements to deliver
the crew from low Earth orbit to the destination. These three elements can be used
to compare the cost estimation methods used in this dissertation and those used in
the HEFT report.
The three common in space elements can be separated into two Transcost cate-
gories. The Deep Space Habitat and the MMSEV are both in-space crew systems
similar to the Intentional Space Station nodes and the crew transfer vehicle is a bal-
listic crew capsule. Transcost provides two separate cost estimating relationships for
the development cost for these two space systems but combines these two system
into one cost estimating relationship for unit cost analysis. These cost estimating
relationships are reproduced here,
HCS = 1113 ∗Mref 0.383 ∗ f1 ∗ f3 (46)
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HBC = 436 ∗Mref 0.408 ∗ f1 ∗ f2 ∗ f3 (47)
f2 (Ballistic Capsule) = (Crew ∗Days)0.15 (48)
FCS/BC = 0.16 ∗Mref 0.98 ∗ f4 (49)
HCS is the development cost for the crew space systems and it has no technical
quality factors associated with it. HBC is the development cost for the ballistic capsule
and the technical quality factor for the ballistic capsule is a function of the number of
crew the capsule is designed for and the number of days of active operation that the
capsule is design for. FCS/BC is the unit cost for both of these systems. The reference
mass for all three of these systems is the dry mass of the vehicle.
The development factors for the three common elements of interest are vastly
different. The deep space habitat is a completely new system with new application,
because the mankind has never designed a vehicle to venture beyond cis-lunar space.
The MMSEV is derived from the lunar rover concepts, and though it is a new system,
the ability for extensive testing here on Earth provides some experience with the
manufacture of the hardware. The crew transfer vehicle represents designs that have
been in use since the start of the space age.
The development and unit cost for the three common element systems are shown
in Table 37. The deep space habitat’s dry mass combined with the difficulty of
developing a new system results in a high development cost of over $20 billion and a
first unit cost of just over $1 billion. This represents a huge discrepancy compared to
the $9.61 billion estimate provided by the HEFT report. Transcost method estimates
the development cost for the MMSEV to be roughly $11 billion with a first unit cost
of $290 million. Again this is much higher than the HEFT report estimates. The crew
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Table 37: Deterministic Development and Unit Cost Summary for Deep Space Habi-
tat, Multi-Mission Space Exploration Vehicle, and the Crew Transfer Ve-
hicle
DSH MMSEV CTV
Mref 23,600 6,700 13,500 kg
f1 1.3 1.1 1.0
f2 N/A N/A 2.066
f3 1.0 1.0 1.0
H 68,432 35,750 43,623 Wk-Yr
$2011 $20.76b $10.85b $13.23b
F 3,476 955 1,960 Wk-Yr
$2011 $1,054m $290m $595m
HEFT Cost $9.61b $6.32b $15.15b
transfer vehicle’s cost estimate is slightly closer to the estimate provided by HEFT.
However, the HEFT estimate involves the evolutionary development of three different
variant of the crew transfer vehicle, while the Transcost estimate only estimate one
of these vehicles.
From this analysis, the Transcost estimates are significantly higher than the cost
provided by the HEFT report. The Transcost CERs are derived from actual programs
and are based on the actual costs that include unforeseen cost growth. By using the
Transcost model, the depot and tanker cost are much higher than predictions made by
the HEFT cost models. This extra cost margin provides conservative estimates com-
pared to the HEFT estimates where in reality the propellant depot based architecture
may have even lower cost than shown.
6.4 Total Architecture Cost Comparison
To compare the baseline architecture to the depot architecture, the cost estimates
given by the HEFT report are taken at face value and the Transcost model is utilized
for all unique elements. Examining the HEFT cost breakdown (Table 1), the depot
based architecture replaces the heavy lift launch systems and the ground operation
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and infrastructure that supports the HLLV with commercial launch vehicles, elimi-
nates the solar electric propulsion system, and replaces the cryogenic propulsion stage
with the propellant depot/cryogenic propulsion stage. Using these differences, the to-
tal architecture cost is summarized in Table 38. Note that the Atlas vehicle scenario
is not included because it does not have enough payload capability to deliver the
hardware necessary for the architecture. However, the vehicle can still be utilized for
propellant delivery to provide redundancy to the architecture. This will be discussed
in detail in Chapter 7.
Table 38: Direct Architecture Cost Comparison Using HEFT Cost at Face Value and
Updating Unique Elements with Transcost Estimates for ZBO Propellant
Depot Scenario
HEFT Delta Falcon
Crew Transfer Vehicle $15,153
Deep Space Habitat $9,617
Program Integration $9,187
Multi-Mission Space Exploration Vesicle $6,315




Launch Vehicle & Ground Operation $70,722 $7,227 $5,145
In-Space Cryogenic Propulsion $4,813 $11,170 $11,170
Solar Electric Propulsion $14,875 N/A N/A
Total $143,896 $71,883 $69,801
The common elements between the HEFT and depot architectures account for
$53.5 billion, or 37% of the entire HEFT cost estimate. Using the cost estimates from
Transcost, the zero-boil-off scenario architecture’s total costs are $71.9 billion and
$69.8 billion for utilizing the Delta and the Falcon vehicles respectively. In Table 38,
the development and first unit cost for the propellant depot is categorized as the in-
space cryogenic propulsion and the total number of commercial flights required along
with the development and unit cost for the propellant tankers are both categorized






































Figure 71: Yearly Cost for Depot Architecture with HEFT Baseline Cost for Com-
mon Elements Compared to $4 Billion NASA Outyear Budget Projection
nearly half the cost for the baseline HEFT architecture.
Figure 71 shows the yearly cost for the two depot based exploration architectures
compared with the HEFT baseline cost and the NASA projected budget. The yearly
cost for the two depot based architectures assumes an 8-year development cycle for
the propellant depot/cryogenic propulsion system between 2018 and 2026, and 2 year
development cycle for the propellant tanker from 2027 and 2028. The propellant depot
is launched into orbit in 2028, with refueling missions occurring in 2029 and 2030,
and final hardware and crew launch in 2031. Overall, the depot based architecture is
beneath the $4 billion per year budget projection for the duration of the development
cycle for the manned mission to NEA.
For the projected years (2011 to 2031), the total estimated budget is $83.3 billion,
which means the two depot architectures result in a budget surplus of $11.4 billion
(Delta) and $13.5 billion (Falcon). As a point of comparison, the current HEFT
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cost estimate results in a budget deficit of $60.6 billion over the same time period.
Using the $4 billion per year budget projection and evenly distributing the cost of
the architecture over each fiscal year, the HEFT architecture will have enough total
budget for completion in the year 2047. Alternatively, with the budget surplus, the
two depot based architectures can shorten the development cycle and complete the
NEA mission 3 or 4 years earlier than the current deadline.
6.5 Impact of CER Uncertainty in Architecture Cost
Table 39: CER Correction Factor Statistical Analysis Summary
Variable Distribution Parameter
χHEV Gamma a = 45.455 b = 0.02178
χHEL Gamma a = 62.968 b = 0.01532
χHCS Gamma a = 104.15 b = 0.009658
χHBC Gamma a = 86.098 b = 0.01168
χFEV Gamma a = 144.50 b = 0.006963
χFEL Gamma a = 44.842 b = 0.02442
χFCS/BC Gamma a = 118.36 b = 0.008408
Similar to the mass estimating relationships in Chapter 4, the historical data de-
rived cost estimating relationship has uncertainties associated with the cost estima-
tion. As such, these uncertainties are analyzed for the economic feasibility assessment.
The MER correction factor (Equation 22) can similarly be used on the Transcost CER
to capture the variability of the overall data. The statistical distribution for the CER
correction factors are shown in Table 39. Once again, gamma distributions are used
for each of the CER correction factors to have domain of x ∈ (0, inf).
Using the CER correction factor distributions, Monte Carlo simulation can be
performed to evaluate the impact of the CER uncertainty on the overall variability of
the cost estimates. Figure 72, shows the empirical cumulative distribution function
for the development plus first unit cost for the ZBO propellant depot system. The
deterministic solution only captures approximately 60% of the potential variability in
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the cost estimation. A 30% margin applied to the ZBO depot cost estimation brings
the total cost of the depot to $14.5 billion, which provides over 95% confidence in
capturing the total uncertainty in the cost estimation. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, the estimate exploration system budget surplus in the propellant depot
architecture is in excess of $14 billion. Thus, the application of the cost margin to
increase the confidence of capturing the uncertainty should not cause the architecture
to exceed the projected budget over the course of the program.
The previous sections discussed the architecture costs utilizing the deterministic
mass estimates for the unique elements to the propellant architecture. However,
as shown in Chapter 4, there exists uncertainty in the mass estimations of these
elements. The CERs are a function of these mass estimations, thus the uncertainty
of the MERs is analyzed in tandem with the cost estimation. Figure 73 shows the
empirical cumulative distribution function for the development and first unit cost for
the ZBO propellant depot in the presence of MER uncertainty only. The mass used
for this cost estimation is the same 100,000 case Monte Carlo simulation shown in
Figure 46. Comparing Figure 73 and Figure 72, there is significant reduction in the
overall variability in the development and first unit cost for the propellant depot. The
uncertainty in the mass estimation does contribute to the overall variability of the
overall cost, but, as seen from the figure, the effect is relatively minimal.
Taking the HEFT common elements at face value and only modifying the cost
estimates for the unique elements (Table 38), the empirical cumulative distribution
function for the architecture’s total cost is shown in Figure 74. The figure shows the
architecture cost for utilizing the Delta and the Falcon vehicles. The cost variability
for the propellant depot for these two options are the same, the difference in the CDF
comes from the variability in the propellant tanker development and unit cost. The























Figure 72: 100,000 Case Monte Carlo Simulation for Zero-Boil-Off Propellant Depot
Development and First Unit Cost ($billion) Estimate with CER Uncer-
tainty Only























Figure 73: 100,000 Case Monte Carlo Simulation for Zero-Boil-Off Propellant De-
pot Development and First Unit Cost ($billion) Estimate with MER
Uncertainty Only
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total architecture cost compared to the Delta architecture because the Falcon archi-
tecture requires less launches of the propellant tankers, thus reducing the variability
of the total architecture cost.




























Figure 74: 100,000 Case Monte Carlo Simulation for Zero-Boil-Off Propellant Depot
Based Exploration Architecture Total Cost ($billion) with CER Uncer-
tainty
6.6 Cost of Mission Reliability
Section 5.5 provided the analysis of the overall propellant mission success probability
given the various launch vehicles and design space options. The analysis showed that
without redundancy in the launch vehicles, the overall mission success probability is
less than 10%. To increase the mission success probability, the propellant depot based
exploration architecture requires the use of launch redundancy. The majority of the
required launches in the propellant depot based exploration architecture is delivering
propellant into orbit, thus the failure of one or more of these launches does not impact
the critical mission hardware. Of course any failure would require replacement flights
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Passive 19 LV Req.
ZBO 14 LV Req.
Figure 75: Mean of Propellant Aggregation Mission Success Probability as Function
of Additional Cost to Architecture for Utilizing the Atlas V 551 Launch
Vehicle
to deliver the required propellant into orbit. The ability to use replacement flights
in the event of single launch failure results in higher mission success probability as
shown in Section 5.5.
The number of additional launch vehicles required to increase the overall mission
success probability translates directly to the increase cost to the overall architecture.
To ensure high probability of mission success, the architecture must plan to utilize the
replacement flights and thus budget the cost associated with purchasing the additional
vehicles. As an example, Figure 75 shows the propellant aggregation mission success
probability as a function of additional cost compared to the no redundancy scenario.
To ensure a mission success probability of over 90%, the architecture will need an
additional $1.5 billion allocated to launch vehicle cost if the architecture utilizes Atlas
V exclusively for propellant delivery. If the budget can be increased by $2 billion, the
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Atlas: 14 LV Req.
Delta: 11 LV Req.
Falcon: 6 LV Req.
SLS: 4 LV Req.
Figure 76: Mean of Propellant Aggregation Mission Success Probability as Function
of Additional Cost to Architecture for Zero-Boil-Off Cryogenic Fluid
Management
propellant aggregation mission success probability can be increased to 98%. Beyond
$2 billion of additional budget, the mission success probability reaches a diminishing
return, as the probability asymptotically approaches 100%.
The cost of the individual launch vehicle can have dramatic impact on the cost
of increase mission success probability. Figure 76 shows the mean of the mission
success probability as function of increase cost to architecture for all four of the
launch vehicles under consideration. As the plot clearly shows, despite requiring the
least number of launches, the SLS provides the worse mission success probability as
a function of additional cost to architecture. This is due to both the extremely high
cost of the SLS launch vehicle and the low reliability of a newly developed system.
In comparison, even though the Falcon Heavy is a new vehicle, its low price per
launch results in the best performance compared to the other two commercial launch
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vehicles. It’s interesting to note that at a price of $1.6 billion per launch (same as
the Space Shuttle), which is already a conservative estimate by neglecting the ground
operation cost, the cost of a single additional SLS launch can buy enough launch
redundancy for the other three vehicles to achieve mission success probability better
than 90%. Additionally, not included in this analysis is the potential downtime that
an SLS would have to endure in the event of an accident, resulting in a review board
similar to the Space Shuttle accident review.
6.7 Summary of Economic Feasibility Assessment
The cost of the propellant depot based exploration architecture was discussed in this
chapter. The recent history of NASA’s exploration system budget was examined to
determine the level of funding that can be used as an appropriate assumption for the
economic constraint. Based on the data, flat funding of $4 billion per year was found
to be a reasonable constraint for the analysis. Examination the HEFT architecture
revealed the program would be $60 billion over budget during the program’s current
schedule. To achieve the same goal with the same cost, the program would require an
additional 15 years to have enough budget to complete the architecture as it currently
exists.
Using cost estimating relationships provided by Transcost, the unique elements
of the propellant depot architecture were analyzed to produce both development and
flight unit cost. The analysis showed the total development and unit cost for the
propellant depot system is just over than $11 billion. If the uncertainty in the cost
estimation and mass estimation are included, the cost can range between $6 billion
to $20 billion, while the $11 billion nominal cost represents the 60th percentile of
the cost estimation. By taking the common elements in the HEFT report cost at
face value, the total propellant depot architecture can range from $60 billion to $80
billion. The depot architecture’s total cost produces a budget surplus of between
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$3 billion to $23 billion over the same time period as the HEFT architecture. This
represents a significant improvement in the economic feasibility as compared to the
current baseline architecture. Of course the various options outlined in the previous
chapters will impact the total cost of the architecture. The next chapter will discuss





Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provided feasibility assessments of the individual areas outlined
at the end of Chapter 3. The overall feasibility of the architecture is presented in this
chapter by combining the three areas and evaluating the various exploration options
and examining the probability of meeting all of the constraints imposed with the
highest probability and least sensitivity.
7.1 Stochastic Feasibility Assessment
The goal of this dissertation is to expand on typical deterministic feasibility assess-
ments and uncertainty analysis to determine the probability of meeting the technical,
economic, and launch success constraints. The satisfaction of constraints is not a
simple Boolean function, rather each design option results in distribution functions
that have a probability of satisfying the constraints. The goal of the design space
exploration will be to maximize the probability of satisfying all of the constraints
concurrently. Further, it is desired that the design choices lead to low sensitivity of
the probability of constraint satisfaction.
To evaluate the overall architecture feasibility, all of the uncertainties variables
are incorporated into the Monte Carlo simulation. The mass estimation uncertainty
is compared to the cost estimation for the propellant depot development and unit
cost. The number of launches required is impacted by the propellant tanker capacity,
the launch vehicle launch rates, as well as the choice of cryogenic fluid management
techniques. The total mission cost has the highest variability because it aggregates
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the uncertainties in the mass estimation as well as the required number of launch
vehicles. The Monte Carlo simulation generates probability distributions for each of
the evaluation metrics and for each of the configurations of interest. Table 40 shows
the summary of the Monte Carlo simulation variables for the overall architecture
feasibility assessment.
Table 40: Architecture Feasibility Monte Carlo Simulation Variable Summary
Variable Distribution Parameter
Mass Uncertainty Correction Factors
Cryocooler COP Gamma a = 1.769 b = 0.384
Oxidizer Tank LogNormal µ = -1.21e-7 σ = 0.275
Hydrogen Tank Gamma a = 447.5 b = 2.24e-3
Intertank & Skirt Gamma a = 37.36 b = 0.027
Engine Correction LogNormal µ = -1.45e-8 σ = 0.075
20 K Cryocooler Gamma a = 8.234 b = 0.129
80 K Cryocooler Gamma a = 3.655 b = 0.315
Structure & Heat Transport Uniform a = 0.059 b = 0.138
Radiator Uniform a = 0.029 b = 0.103
Plumbing & Insulation Uniform a = 0.003 b = 0.082
Miscellaneous System Uniform a = 0.008 b = 0.074
MLI Mylar Sheet Specific Mass Uniform a = 8.81e-3 b = 9.30e-3
MLI Spacer Specific Mass Uniform a = 3.90e-3 b = 7.30e-3
Launch Vehicle Reliability
Atlas V Beta a = 353.4 b = 56.88
Delta IV Beta a = 654.4 b = 82.79
Falcon Heavy Beta a = 11.02 b = 4.007
Space Launch System Triangular a = 0 b = 0.731 c = 1
System Cost Uncertainty Correction Factors
Expendable Vehicle DDTE Gamma a = 45.4 b = 0.0218
Rocket Engine DDTE Gamma a = 63.0 b = 0.0153
Crew System DDTE Gamma a = 104 b = 0.00966
Ballistic Capsule DDTE Gamma a = 86.1 b = 0.0117
Expendable Vehicle Unit Cost Gamma a = 145 b = 0.00696
Rocket Engine Unit Cost Gamma a = 44.8 b = 0.0244
Crew System/Capsule Unit Cost Gamma a = 118 b = 0.00841
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7.1.1 Launch Success Feasibility versus Economic Feasibility
The first pairwise comparison is between the overall launch success probability and the
overall architecture cost probability. This comparison was briefly discussed in Section
6.6 by examining the cost of the increase reliability to the propellant aggregation
mission with redundant propellant tanker flights. The cost used for comparisons in
Section 6.6 uses the deterministic launch cost for the vehicle and does not incorporate
the cost of the tanker vehicles.
Figure 77 shows the joint probability density function for the ZBO Falcon Heavy
based propellant depot architecture with no redundant launch vehicles available for
the propellant aggregation mission. Figure 78 shows the same joint probability for six
redundant launch vehicles. Figure 77 shows the majority of the solutions have lower
launch success probability while the deterministic cost is around the center of the
distribution. Comparison between the two figures shows the benefit of the addition
of redundant flights. The overall launch success probability increases dramatically,
but the overall architecture cost increase is fairly minimal. The architecture cost
increase with the addition of redundant vehicles is highly dependent on the cost of
the launch vehicles. The Delta Heavy ZBO depot scenario can provide insight into
the effects of higher launch vehicle prices on the overall increase in architecture cost.
Figures 79 and 80 show the joint probability distribution for total launch success
probability and total architecture cost for the Delta Heavy based ZBO propellant
depot architecture with no redundancy and six redundant vehicles respectively. The
Delta based architecture requires more than twice the number of propellant launches
as compared to the Falcon based architecture. However, as discussed in Chapter
5, the extensive launch record for the Delta results in increased reliability for the
individual launch success rates. This results in a total launch success probability
distribution with significantly less dispersion. The Delta vehicle’s launch cost is twice
that of theFalcon Heavy. As a result, the addition of redundant launch vehicles results
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Figure 77: Joint Probability Density of Total Launch Success and Total Architec-
ture Cost for Zero-Boil-Off Falcon Heavy Based Propellant Depot Ar-
chitecture with No Backup Flight Available
































Figure 78: Joint Probability Density of Total Launch Success and Total Architec-
ture Cost for Zero-Boil-Off Falcon Heavy Based Propellant Depot Ar-
chitecture with Six Backup Flights Available
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in a difference of $170 million in the overall architecture cost per redundant vehicle
utilized.
By utilizing the Delta to deliver all of the necessary components, the overall mis-
sion probability can reach over 70% due to the high reliability of the Delta vehicle.
The probabilistic simulation shows the architecture cost for the six redundant launch
vehicle scenarios ranging from $70 to $78 billion, which is only $3 to $8 billion (4 to
10 percent) more than the Falcon scenario. The increase in launch success probabil-
ity is extremely favorable, especially considering the minimal cost increase. Recall
discussions from Chapter 6, the project budget for the duration of the architecture is
roughly $84 billion. These depot based exploration architectures are still well under
the budget constraints.
Figure 81 shows the joint probability distribution of mission launch success and
total architecture cost for both cryogenic fluid management strategy (Table 15) and
various backup flight scenarios. The figures in each row represents the joint prob-
ability density for the same CFM strategy with varying number of backup flights
available, while the each column represents the same number of backup flights avail-
able across the different CFM strategies. The simulation for the non-ZBO options
uses a uniform distribution to estimate the number of propellant flights required,
which is a function of the vehicle’s flight rates. The maximum/minimum number of
propellant flights required is shown in Table 29.
For the Falcon Heavy based depot architecture, the total mission probability is
relatively insensitive to the choice of CFM strategy. The Falcon Heavy’s large payload
capability results in almost no change to the number of launch vehicles required when
CFM strategy and flight rate is changed (either 6 or 7 propellant launches required).
The overall architecture cost does increase slightly due to the technology required for
the cryocoolers. Additionally the dispersion of the cost estimates increases as well
due to higher uncertainties in estimating the cost of the advanced technology.
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Figure 79: Joint Probability Density of Mission Launch Success and Total Archi-
tecture Cost for Zero-Boil-Off Delta IV Based Propellant Depot Archi-
tecture with No Backup Flight Available

































Figure 80: Joint Probability Density of Mission Launch Success and Total Archi-
tecture Cost for Zero-Boil-Off Delta IV Based Propellant Depot Archi-
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Figure 81: Joint Probability Density of Mission Launch Success and Total Architecture Cost for Falcon Heavy Based Propellant
Depot Architecture with Various Cryogenic Fluid Management Strategy and Backup Flight Scenario
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As previously discussed, increasing the number of available backup flights increases
the overall launch success probability rapidly. With three backup Falcon flights, the
overall launch success probability can reach as high as 60%, which is 20% higher than
the baseline HEFT architecture (assuming four required flights of the SLS resulting in
HEFT architecture reliability of 0.391). With six backup flights available, the overall
launch success can be as high as 80%. The cost increase from the backup flights is
fairly minimal compared to the overall architecture. The mean of the total architec-
ture cost for the no backup flight scenario is roughly $66 to $68 billion depending on
the CFM strategy. To include six backup flights, the mean of the total architecture
cost increases by an average of $2-3 billion, or 3-5% of the total architecture cost. It
is important to note that for all scenarios, the probabilistic simulation show that the
Falcon Heavy based exploration architecture poses no risk of exceeding the expected
budget constraint of $84 billion.
Figure 82 shows the same joint probability density function for the Delta IV
Heavy based propellant depot architecture. Generally speaking the same trend is
observed for both the Falcon and the Delta based architecture for both total launch
success probability and total architecture cost. The primary difference between the
two architectures is the dispersion of the data is significantly less for the Delta based
architecture. Because the Delta vehicle has an extensive launch record to support
its reliability, there is significantly less uncertainty with the individual launch success
probability (as shown in Figure 56). This results in tighter upper and lower bounds
for the total launch success probability regardless of the number of launches required.
Due to the lower payload capability (as compared to the Falcon heavy), the choice
of CFM strategy does have a small impact on both the overall launch success proba-
bility and total architecture cost. The number of propellant launches required varies
anywhere between 11 to 20, and this wide range (as function of both CFM strategy
and launch rates) results in the sloped probability distribution seen in the all passive
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Figure 82: Joint Probability Density of Mission Launch Success and Total Architecture Cost for Delta IV Heavy Based
Propellant Depot Architecture with Various Cryogenic Fluid Management Strategy and Backup Flight Scenario
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scenario. The distribution for the all passive CFM with up to three backup flights
available indicate decreasing overall launch success probability with increasing archi-
tecture cost. This is counter-intuitive as typically increasing cost should increase the
launch success probability. However, the cost for each of these scenarios is dictated
mostly by the launch requirements, and thus more launches required higher archi-
tecture cost while simultaneously decreasing the overall launch success probability.
The effect is eliminated with increasing number of backup flights, as the architecture
becomes less sensitive to the number of launches required. The same can be said
regarding the scenarios which utilizes cryocoolers as the range of number of launches
required is reduced.
The overall launch success probability is slightly higher for the Delta based archi-
tecture compared to the Falcon based architecture. With six backup flights available,
the overall launch success probability is centered on 70% for the Delta based archi-
tecture with very little variation, compared to the Falcon architecture, which has
launch success probability that ranges from 30% to 70%. Due to the higher launch
cost for the Delta vehicle, the overall architecture cost is slightly higher as compared
to Falcon architecture. However, none of the scenarios considered show any risk of
exceeding the projected $84 billion budget constraint.
It’s important to note that the benefit of backup flights to the architecture reaches
diminishing returns beyond six flights. Beyond six backup flights for both architec-
ture scenarios, the propellant aggregation mission reaches well over 99% probability
of success. With this many backup flights available, the contribution of the mission
unreliability from the propellant aggregation mission is insignificant, and the over-
all launch success probability is dominated by the probability of hardware launch
and assembly success. The overall launch success probability is limited by the space
hardware launches that are necessary. If the hardware launches redundancy is en-
abled, then the launch success probability can be increased even further. This will be
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investigated further in this chapter.
7.1.2 Performance Feasibility versus Economic Feasibility
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Delta Payload: 23.6 mT
Falcon Payload: 51 mT
Figure 83: Scatter Plot of Propellant Depot Dry Mass and Total Architecture Cost
of Delta IV Heavy and Falcon Heavy Based Propellant Depot Archi-
tecture with Various Cryogenic Fluid Management Strategies and Six
Backup Flights
Figure 83 shows scatter plots from the probabilistic simulation. The propellant
depot dry mass is used as a measure of performance feasibility as it is sized to provide
enough propellant to perform the mission and the launch vehicle payload capability
189
are used as constraints. The figures show the total architecture cost spread for the
six backup flight scenario as it is the most likely cost scenario (given the maximum
probability of launch success). Note that the propellant depot dry mass probabilistic
simulation is independent of the redundant flight scenario. The plot also shows the
constraint lines for both the propellant depot dry mass and the total architecture
cost.
As discussed previously, both of the scenarios fall under the budget constraint
defined in Chapter 6. The passive scenario simulations all fall under the launch
vehicle payload constraint for both the Delta and the Falcon architecture. For the
ZBO scenarios, the constraint violation becomes a significant issue for the Delta
architecture. Over 30% of the simulations violate the Delta payload constraint, while
5% of the simulations violate the Falcon payload constraint. This result shows that in
order to enable ZBO propellant depot in the exploration architecture, a larger payload
launch vehicle than the Delta is required to have higher confidence in the performance
feasibility. Despite the increase in constraint violation, the Falcon architecture has
95% of the cases in the feasible space. Looking back at Figure 81, the inclusion of the
ZBO cryocooler makes relatively little impact on the overall launch success probability
and total architecture cost for the Falcon Heavy based architecture. Because of the
Falcon Heavy’s high payload capacity and low launch cost, the benefits the ZBO
cryocoolers is greatly diminished.
7.2 Total Architecture Feasibility Summary
To summarize the total architecture feasibility assessment, Monte Carlo simulations
for each of the different CFM strategies and backup flight scenarios are performed.
The constraints for each of the feasibility evaluation metric are defined. The economic
feasibility constraint is the total budget estimate of $83.3 billion, which was derived
in Chapter 6. The performance feasibility constraints are the payload capacity of
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the launch vehicle for the particular scenario (23.6 mT for Delta and 51 mT for Fal-
con). The propellant tanker is sized for the particular launch vehicle and the mission
hardware is distributed across multiple launches. Thus the primary performance as-
sessment required is to determine if the launch vehicle has enough payload capacity to
deliver the depot in a single launch. The reliability feasibility constraint was derived
from the baseline architecture. The baseline HEFT architecture requires four launches
of the newly developed Space Launch System, this equates to a baseline launch suc-
cess probability of 39% assuming no redundancy for the hardware launches. Thus, for
direct comparison, the alternate architecture launch success probability must exceed
the baseline launch success probability. If the alternate architecture mission proba-
bility is greater than the baseline, it means that the propellant aggregation portion of
the architecture does not negatively impact the overall architecture in terms of safety
and reliability.
Table 41 shows the summary of the feasibility assessment for the both Delta
IV and Falcon Heavy based propellant depot exploration architectures. The table
tabulates the mean and standard deviation of each of the feasibility metrics as well
as the probability of constraint satisfaction in the presence of uncertainty. The color
coding (Red, Yellow, and Green) represents three levels of risk that the particular
architecture poses to violation of the particular constraint. These levels of risk are
based on both the probability of meeting the constraint and the standard deviation
of the probability distribution. Green represents low risk area, where the probability
of constraint satisfaction is greater than 90% with low variability; red represents high
risk area, where the probability of constraint satisfaction is less than 65%; and yellow
represents medium risk area in which the probability of satisfying the constraint may
be high but there is insignificant variability in the data.
The feasibility of the Falcon Heavy based architecture is moderate. The perfor-
mance feasibility for the Falcon heavy based architecture is insensitive to the cryogenic
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Table 41: Summary of Total Architecture Feasibility for Propellant Depot Exploration Architecture
Performance Feasibility Reliability Feasibility Economic Feasibility
Backups µ σ % Satisfy µ σ % Satisfy µ σ % Satisfy




















0 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.073 0.0352 0% $66.6b $1.12b 100%
1 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.196 0.0706 1% $66.9b $1.12b 100%
3 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.413 0.1008 58% $67.4b $1.12b 100%
6 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.523 0.1125 87% $68.2b $1.12b 100%
9 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.538 0.1150 89% $68.9b $1.13b 100%




0 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.084 0.0372 0% $67.8b $1.65b 100%
1 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.217 0.0715 2% $68.1b $1.65b 100%
3 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.431 0.1011 64% $68.6b $1.66b 99%
6 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.527 0.1137 88% $69.4b $1.66b 99%
9 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.537 0.1153 89% $70.1b $1.67b 99%
12 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.538 0.1150 89% $70.9b $1.67b 99%
















0 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.101 0.0254 0% $71.3b $1.34b 100%
1 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.282 0.0476 22% $71.7b $1.33b 100%
3 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.580 0.0362 100% $72.5b $1.34b 100%
6 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.692 0.0162 100% $73.6b $1.34b 100%
9 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.700 0.0158 100% $74.7b $1.35b 100%




0 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.189 0.0092 0% $67.6b $1.93b 100%
1 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.422 0.0142 98% $70.9b $1.64b 100%
3 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.655 0.0153 100% $71.7b $1.63b 100%
6 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.698 0.0158 100% $72.8b $1.63b 100%
9 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.700 0.0159 100% $73.9b $1.64b 99%
12 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.700 0.0159 100% $75.1b $1.65b 99%
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fluid management strategy. For both passive and ZBO strategies, the probability of
satisfying the performance constraint of the Falcon heavy payload is greater than
95%. However, the standard deviation of the dry mass Monte Carlo simulation is ex-
tremely high for the ZBO scenario, signifying very high levels of uncertainty with the
mass estimation. Thus, the ZBO scenario increases the risk to the overall feasibility
of the architecture.
The launch reliability feasibility of the Falcon Heavy based architecture poses
moderate to high risk to the overall feasibility of the architecture. From the Monte
Carlo simulation, it is clear that the Falcon Heavy based architecture is simply not
feasible without the use of significant number of redundant flights with the currently
established launch reliability. For the scenarios with no redundant flights, the overall
launch success probability is less than 10% for both CFM scenarios. The probability
increases as the number of redundant flights increases (as shown in Chapter 5), but
it never exceeds 54%. As discussed in the previous sections, the benefit of increasing
number of redundant flights eventually reaches diminishing returns above six flights.
With six redundant flights available, the mean launch success probability is just above
50% with standard deviation of 11%. The probability that the launch success prob-
ability is greater than the baseline probability is 88 - 87%. Thus, the overall mission
has a high probability of being more reliable than the current baseline architecture,
but the risk to the overall architecture feasibility still exists as the nominal probabil-
ity is relatively low. The launch of the mission hardware, which in this analysis does
not have redundancy, becomes the major limiting factor for overall launch success
probability.
The economic feasibility is greater than 99% for all of the design options under
consideration. As discussed in the previous sections, taking the common elements
cost from the HEFT report and estimating the cost of the unique elements with
Transcost, the propellant depot based architecture poses nearly no risk of exceeding
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the estimated exploration system budget estimate of $4 billion per year. Even with
the cost estimation uncertainty, the Monte Carlo simulation shows the probability of
constraint satisfaction of over 99% for all of the depot design scenarios considered.
Additionally, the standard deviation of the architecture cost is less than $2 billion
for all scenarios considered, so the dispersion of the architecture cost is minimal. For
both of these reasons, the economic feasibility for the Falcon Heavy based propellant
depot exploration architecture is high.
For the Delta IV architecture, the primary difference between the constraints
for the two architectures are the reduction of the performance feasibility constraint
to match the Delta IV Heavy payload. Overall, the feasibility of Delta based ar-
chitecture is similar to the Falcon based architecture. The performance feasibility
assessment reveals increased risk to the performance feasibility for the ZBO scenario.
The probability of the vehicle’s payload capability to capture the uncertainties in the
performance estimation is only 66% and poses higher risk to the overall architecture
feasibility as compared to the Falcon architecture. The simulation shows little to no
risk of exceeding the cost constraint, and though the overall cost is slightly higher
than the Falcon based architecture, the dispersion of the cost estimation remains
relatively low and the probability of constraint satisfaction remains high.
The reliability feasibility assessment for the Delta architecture shows improvement
as compare to the Falcon architecture. Despite the fact that the Delta architecture
typically requires more launch vehicles due to its lower payload capability, the over-
all launch success probability is better than the Falcon architecture. The extensive
launch record for the Delta launch vehicle results in high reliability and high confi-
dence in the launch vehicle’s performance (Figure 56). This results in improvement
to the overall launch success probability as compared the Falcon based architecture.
The reliability feasibility is still dependent on the use of redundancy in the propellant
aggregation phase, as the overall launch success probability remains less than 20%
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without redundancy. The launch success probability exceeds the baseline HEFT ar-
chitecture with high confidence with only 2-3 redundant launch vehicles in the Delta
architecture, as compared to 5 - 6 in the Falcon architecture. Coincidentally, the
cost for 2 - 3 Delta IV Heavy is nearly identical to the estimate cost for 5 -6 Falcon
Heavys.
Table 42 shows the architecture feasibility summary for the two launch vehicles
options with space hardware redundant flights. The performance feasibility remains
unchanged from the previous discussions, while the launch success probability and
the architecture cost are updated. For the launch success probability, the potential
for hardware launches to have redundancy results in significant increase in the overall
launch success probability. For both the Delta and Falcon scenarios, with six or
more redundant flights, the overall launch success probability is greater than 95%.
If the baseline HEFT architecture’s SLS has the high reliability of a Delta vehicle,
the four launches required will result in a launch success probability of 70%. Using
this as new constraint, the overall risk of the propellant depot architecture reliability
feasibility would still require at least six redundant launches to ensure high probability
of meeting the constraint. The economic feasibility remains unchanged for both
scenarios. With the inclusion of hardware launch redundancy, the total architecture
cost increases by $1 to $6 billion depending on the scenario, but the probability of
satisfying the constraint is still over 97% for all of the scenarios considered.
From an architecture decision making standpoint, the Delta based architecture
seems to be the better option because of the increase in reliability feasibility with little
to no impact to the other two feasibility metrics. However, with the high projected
launch rate of the Falcon Heavy, its reliability may be significantly improved by
the time the exploration architecture begins. It is interesting to note that the total
architecture cost for the Delta based architecture is relatively insensitive to the choice
of CFM strategy. The reduction in launch cost in the ZBO scenario is completely
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Table 42: Summary of Total Architecture Feasibility for Propellant Depot Exploration Architecture with Hardware Redun-
dancy
Performance Feasibility Reliability Feasibility Economic Feasibility
Backups µ σ % Satisfy µ σ % Satisfy µ σ % Satisfy




















0 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.073 0.0352 0% $66.6b $1.12b 100%
1 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.236 0.0820 40% $68.7b $1.12b 100%
3 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.632 0.1039 78% $67.4b $1.12b 100%
6 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.935 0.0370 97% $70.8b $1.12b 100%
9 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.993 0.0063 100% $72.8b $1.13b 100%




0 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.084 0.0372 0% $67.8b $1.65b 100%
1 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.262 0.0816 0% $68.5b $1.66b 100%
3 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.666 0.0948 63% $69.9b $1.65b 100%
6 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.947 0.0302 95% $72.1b $1.65b 100%
9 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.995 0.0044 100% $74.2b $1.66b 99%
12 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 95% 0.999 0.0001 100% $76.3b $1.67b 99%
















0 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.101 0.0254 0% $71.3b $1.34b 100%
1 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.316 0.0558 11% $72.0b $1.32b 100%
3 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.757 0.0536 100% $73.3b $1.29b 100%
6 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.979 0.0090 100% $75.3b $1.25b 100%
9 13.3 mT 0.84 mT 100% 0.999 0.0001 100% $77.3b $1.21b 99%




0 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.189 0.0092 0% $70.5b $1.63b 100%
1 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.485 0.0150 100% $71.3b $1.64b 100%
3 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 65% 0.885 0.0081 100% $72.9b $1.63b 99%
6 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.995 0.0006 100% $75.2b $1.63b 99%
9 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.999 0.0001 100% $77.5b $1.64b 98%
12 26.8 mT 45.3 mT 66% 0.999 0.0001 100% $79.8b $1.64b 97%
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offset by the higher development cost associated with propellant depot technologies.
With the availability of redundant vehicles, the architecture does not suffer from
reduced reliability with the increase in propellant flights as a result of boil-off, and
the performance feasibility increases dramatically as the depot dry mass is reduced
without the high cryocooler power requirement.
The overall benefit for utilizing the Falcon vehicle is a slight reduction in the
overall architecture cost due to lower launch cost. However, as discussed in Chapter
6, the propellant aggregation mission phase only accounts for less than 20% of the
total architecture cost. So the potential savings provided by the Falcon vehicle does
not have as much appreciable impact on the overall architecture feasibility as the
Delta vehicle’s improved reliability. If the Delta IV’s launch price can be reduced by
30-40%, then the Delta architecture’s total cost will be fairly indistinguishable from
the Falcon architecture. On the other hand, if the Falcon Heavy’s reliability can be
demonstrated improved to the level of the Delta IV, then the Falcon architecture can
provide the same cost saving without sacrificing launch reliability. As mentioned in
Chapter 6, there is potential for launch price reduction by negotiating bulk purchase




DISSERTATION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter of the dissertation draws conclusions regarding the overall feasibility
of propellant depot based exploration architecture. A review of the research goals is
provided and discussion of the fulfillment of each goal is presented. The chapter also
summarizes the results from each of the individual feasibility assessments as well as
the integrated assessment of architecture feasibility.
8.1 Research Goals
The primary goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to investigate the
feasibility of exploration architectures that utilizes on orbit propellant depot and pro-
pellant transfer as a mean to eliminate the need for heavy lift class launch vehicles.
The research question presented in Chapter 1 requires the feasibility of the architec-
ture be evaluated objectively without bias. The research accomplishes four distinct
goals in response to the research question as defined in Section 1.2: system modeling,
constraint definition, and uncertainty analysis.
System models are developed to evaluate the design options for feasibility as-
sessment. Chapter 4 presented the propellant depot thermal and mass models that
provide the basis for performance feasibility assessment. The thermal model is used
to evaluate the various cryogenic fluid management strategies in the design space.
The different strategies result in different levels of propellant boil-offs that dictates
the launch vehicle requirements. The propellant load is derived from the mission
requirements provided by the baseline architecture and the propellant depot system
mass is computed using mass estimating relationships derived from historical data.
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The mass estimation models are used to evaluate the impact of cryogenic fluid man-
agement strategies on the overall system mass.
Launch vehicle reliability models are developed using Bayesian probability analysis
of the launch records for the launch vehicles of interest. Launch records for the vehicles
as well as the vehicle’s relating family is combined to form posterior probability
distribution for the launch vehicle’s reliability. The posterior reliability distribution
is used to estimate the overall mission success probability with the use of Monte Carlo
simulation and Poisson binomial distributions. The propellant aggregation mission
success probability compounded with the hardware launch success probability yields
the total architecture mission success probability, which is used as the evaluation
metric for reliability feasibility assessment.
Architecture cost models are developed using historical cost data from the Transcost
model. The cost estimating relationships are used to investigate the impact of vari-
ous design options on the overall cost for the unique elements of the propellant depot
architecture. The cost of the common elements from the baseline architecture was
taken at face value, and the overall architecture cost is used as the evaluation metric
for economic feasibility assessment.
These metrics are evaluated with the architecture constraints to determine fea-
sibility. The performance feasibility constraint is derived from the launch vehicle
payload capacity. To meet performance feasibility, the launch vehicle of choice must
be able to deliver all of the necessary hardware into orbit with high probability. The
reliability feasibility constraint is derived from the baseline architecture launch re-
quirement. Using the Bayesian model developed to estimate launch reliability, the
baseline architecture’s newly developed heavy lift launch vehicle’s reliability can be
estimated with global historical launch records. The overall baseline architecture
mission success probability can be then computed using the resulting posterior reli-
ability distribution. Finally, the analysis of NASA’s Exploration Systems budget in
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the past decade provided a basis for the economic feasibility constraint. The budget
expectation for the duration of the baseline architecture is used as the constraint for
evaluation.
Sensitivity of each of the system metrics to the available design options is investi-
gated using probabilistic methods. The probabilistic method also enabled the analysis
of uncertainties in the evaluation of system metrics. Monte Carlo simulations are uti-
lized to capture the uncertainties and to investigate the impact of uncertainties on the
feasibility assessment in each of the areas. This analysis provides an unique insight
into the assessment of feasibility, as it provides the levels of risk associated with the
feasibility claim.
8.2 Conclusions
The stochastic feasibility assessment of a propellant depot space exploration architec-
ture shows that the utilization of propellant depot has greater than 90% probability
of meeting payload, reliability, and cost feasibility with the use of redundant launch
vehicles. The challenge to feasibility of propellant depot based architecture (Sec-
tion 2.7) provided the basis for the feasibility areas of interest. The analysis in this
dissertation shows these challenges to the propellant depot based architecture can
be mitigated. The challenges to the a propellant depot architecture produced three
research questions that were addressed systematically in this dissertation.
The first research questions set forth in Section 2.7 addresses the major technical
challenge of propellant depot based architecture. The analysis shows the boil-off of
cryogenic propellant can become a burden to overall mission mass required for mission
duration longer than six months if active cryocoolers are not utilized. The current
state-of-the-art cryocoolers are capable of providing cooling capacity to achieve ZBO
of the cryogenic propellants. For both passive and ZBO thermal management, the
probability of meeting the performance metric is greater than 95% if the larger Falcon
200
Heavy vehicle is utilized to deliver the depot. The uncertainty in the performance esti-
mation of cryocoolers, primarily from the estimation of the coefficient of performance,
increases the overall risk to the performance feasibility. The infusion of additional
technologies have the potential to reduce the propellant boil-off without the increase
in the overall system mass, but it bring additional technical risk to the architecture.
The second research question addresses the launch reliability of the propellant de-
pot architecture. The mission reliability feasibility analysis agrees with the challenge
that the increase in the number of required launches decreases overall mission relia-
bility. However, the analysis also shows that the utilization of redundant or backup
flights can significantly mitigate this effect. Because the depot architecture can use
commercial launch vehicles, it can utilize multiple providers with multiple vehicles
for redundancy. The majority of the increase in required flights in the depot archi-
tecture consists of the aggregation of propellant in orbit. Propellant in orbit can be
considered as a common commodity, and the loss of the vehicle delivering propellant
into orbit is not detrimental to the overall mission success. Also, the utilization of a
propellant depot removes the aggregation of propellant from the mission critical path.
The launch reliability is further enhanced in the depot based architecture with the
ability to utilize highly reliable launch vehicles with extensive launch records rather
than newly developed vehicles with high risk of failure due to the reliability infancy
problem.
The final research question addresses the economic implication of the propellant
depot based architecture. The economic feasibility analysis shows that regardless of
design options, the depot based architecture is less than half of the cost of the baseline
architecture and has nearly no risk of exceeding the defined budget constraint of $4
billion per year. The claim that a propellant depot based architecture is more costly
due to the increase in the number of flights is not true. One of the great benefits
201
of the depot architecture is the ability to utilize existing launch vehicles and infras-
tructure. The development cost of new launch vehicles and new infrastructure can
often dominate the overall architecture cost, as in the case of the baseline architecture
where more than 50% of the total architecture cost is devoted to the HLLV and its
ground operations.
The integrated architecture feasibility analysis shows the lower technology option,
without the need of advanced cryocoolers, provides the highest probability of satis-
fying all three feasibility constraints. Despite the increase in launch vehicles required
as a result of propellant boil off replenishment, the mission reliability and economic
feasibility both remain relatively high for the scenarios without high-power cryocool-
ers. The critics’ challenge that the advanced technology is required in order for depot
based architecture to be feasible is not an accurate reflection of the analysis shown.
The design decision of the choice of launch vehicle tends to lean toward the vehicle
with the highest reliability because of the high sensitivity of overall mission success
probability. The economic feasibility is not affected at all by the choices of the two
launch vehicles that can be utilized as the sole launch provider in the depot based
architecture. The performance feasibility is not an issue if the high power cryocooler
option is removed from the design space. If the economic constraint becomes more
stringent, the launch vehicle choice may become a feasibility challenge as there would
be a trade-off between high reliability and low cost. In this scenario, there could
potentially be compromise solution, where the low-cost, low-reliability launch vehicle
can be utilize from the non-mission critical flights that can utilize redundancy to
improve the overall reliability, and the high cost-high reliability launch vehicle can
be utilized to launch mission critical hardware. This combination of launch vehicles
also provide an added layer of redundancy as the failure of a single vehicle will not
impact the schedule of the other vehicle.
The mixed fleet vehicle concept can be extended even further with the inclusion
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of other vehicles that have been eliminated for various reasons. For example, the
Atlas V vehicle was eliminated from consideration because it does not have enough
performance capability to deliver the necessary mission hardware. However, the high
reliability of the Atlas is still desired in the overall architecture. Thus, utilizing the
Atlas wherever its limited performance allows can bring an extra level of robustness to
the architecture that the single provider scenario cannot reach. Going beyond the At-
las, if additional launch vehicles from international partners, such as Europe’s Ariane
or Russia’s Proton, can be utilized to deliver propellant or hardware, the international
cooperation can further strengthen the feasibility of the overall architecture.
To further the discussion, propellant depot architecture may make propellant de-
livery a commodity to be desired in orbit. This can drive the capitalistic innovation
for fully reusable launch vehicles that should be economical to operate and main-
tain. These innovations may lead to increased access to space and open the door for
limitless economic growth in the space exploration industry. The potential economic
benefit of a propellant depot based architecture alone is motivation enough to warrant
further consideration of the architecture.
8.3 Contributions and Future Work
The primary research goal for the research is to provide an objective evaluation of
the feasibility of the propellant depot architecture of interest. To accomplish the
goals, the research utilizes stochastic methods to evaluate the performance metrics.
This method is different than feasibility assessments in literature, as reviewed in
Chapter 3. The treatment of system metric as probabilistic variables allows for both
the evaluation of feasibility, when compared to a set of predefined constraints, as
well as the confidence of the feasibility assessment. The inclusion of uncertainty
analysis in the assessment of feasibility provide information on the levels of risks
associated with the various design options that can be difficult to quantify objectively
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with deterministic methods. The stochastic assessment method described in this
dissertation can be applied to any concept of operation to objectively evaluate its
feasibility.
The application of the stochastic methods in this dissertation is limited to the
areas of feasibility identified specifically for the propellant depot based exploration
architecture. These feasibility areas may not be applicable or appropriate to every
concept of operation of interest, thus additional stochastic methods to evaluate other
areas of feasibility can be developed. Additionally, there are areas of feasibility that
can be difficult to quantify with system metrics such as political or legal feasibil-
ity. These areas of feasibility would require additional work to develop the proper
evaluation metric as well as appropriate constraints for feasibility evaluation.
For the propellant depot exploration architecture, the feasibility assessment can
be expanded. The cryogenic fluid management technology considered for this disser-
tation is limited to the utilization of multi-layer insulation and cryocoolers. The pri-
mary objective was to investigate the impact on architecture performance feasibility
when utilizing current state-of-the-art technologies. The addition of more advanced
technologies in the cryogenic fluid management design space may provide increased
performance feasibility for all mission durations. The technical risks associated with
using advanced technology in the design space, however, must be quantified as part of
the performance feasibility assessment. Additionally, analysis of the lifetime of both
passive and active thermal management systems will be required to determine the
re-usability of the propellant depots.
As briefly discussed in Chapter 5, the global launch vehicle market is growing
rapidly with the introduction of various commercial launch vehicles. Any these launch
vehicles may be utilized to deliver propellant into orbit if there is high demand of pro-
pellant as an in-space commodity. The utilization of a mixed fleet of launch vehicles
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has three potential benefits. First, it improves the ability for an exploration architec-
ture to utilize redundancy to improve the overall launch success probability. If one of
the launch providers suffers a failure, the other launch providers can continue to sup-
ply the necessary propellant to orbit during the failure review and re-certification of
the failed launch vehicle. Second, it may increase the on-orbit propellant aggregation
rates as each of the launch vehicle can deliver on its own schedule. Finally, the mixed
fleet option creates natural competition between the launch providers, which may
reduce the cost of propellant aggregation. The utilization of a mixed fleet of launch
vehicles is likely to improve on the overall feasibility of propellant depot architecture.
Finally, the feasibility analysis shown in this dissertation compared the depot
architecture to the HEFT architecture directly. The comparison showed a cost savings
of more than $50 billion over the course of the program, which results only in a single
manned mission to an asteroid. The goal of human space exploration is to establish
a permanent human presence on the Moon or Mars. To achieve this goal would
require many manned missions to these destinations. The most relevant extension
of the work in this thesis is to perform stochastic feasibility assessment of an entire
exploration campaign. The full benefit of the utilization of propellant depots and
reusable elements in orbit will can be only be realized when multiple missions are
involved. The full architecture feasibility analyses need to be expanded to investigate
the recurring cost and reliability of sending flagship class manned missions to beyond












(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
A.D. Little RR 60 2670 40 210
A.D. Little RR 12 2670 1.5 210
Air Products CS 308 4.2 9000 1.7 344
Air Products CS 208L 20 6300 12 280
Air Products CS 208R 20 6300 8 280
Air Products CS 204SL 20 3200 8 100
Air Products CS 204 20 3200 4 105
Air Products CS 202 20 1700 2.25 75
Air Products CS 201 20 1700 0.6 71
Air Products CS 108 77 6300 100 316
Air Products CS 104 77 3200 60 103
Air Products CS 102 77 1700 30 75
Air Products CS 308L 1.2 9000 1 350
Air Products CS 304 4.2 4800 0.5 170
Air Products CS 302 4.2 2.5 0.25 127
AiResearch 20 2200 20 90.3
AiResearch Ai 851310 80 500 2.5 14.3
AiResearch IR TECH 20 4000 20 136
Aisin Aisin 20 6600 15 240
Aisin Aisin 100 6600 150 240
Cryogenic Consultants R400 4.2 5000 0.75 125
Cryogenic Consultants R700 4.2 8500 1.5 242
Cryomech GB07 16 8500 15 242
Cryomech GB04 12 5000 4 125
Cryomech GB04 20 5000 9 125
Cryomech GB03 20 5000 5 125
Cryomech AL05 40 5000 50 125
Cryomech AL05 80 5000 120 125
Cryomech AL03 30 700 2 21.3
Cryomech AL03 80 700 9 21.3
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206






(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Cryomech AL01 80 1200 20 36
Cryomech AL01 27 1200 3 36
Cryosystem 21 10 1500 0.25 55.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 21 4.5 1500 3 6.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 21 77 1500 15 6.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 22 77 1500 7.5 6.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 22 15 1500 0.3 6.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 350 15 1500 1.5 15
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 350 77 1500 19 15
CTI-Cryogenics Cti 1020 15 5000 0.6 15
CTI-Cryogenics Cti 1020 77 5000 37 15
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 1050 15 5000 1.7 15
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 1050 77 5000 62 15
CTI-Cryogenics CTI CM2 80 50 1 1.72
CTI-Cryogenics CTI CM4 80 60 1 2
CTI-Cryogenics CTI CM5 80 30 0.3 1.13
CTI-Cryogenics CTI SP77A 80 140 0.8 2.5
CTI-Cryogenics CTI VM1 80 370 0.8 4.8
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 120 80 830 8 15.8
CTI-Cryogenics CTI 120 26 830 1 15.8
Galileo Corp Galileo 80 30 0.25 15
Hitachi II 4.5 30 165
Hitachi III 4.5 5 45
JPL GAR-MII 4 129 1 2
L’Air Liquide RCF 30-4 20 1500 4 99
L’Air Liquide RCF 30-4 80 1500 30 99
Leybold Heraeus RG580/RW3 20 1800 3.75 64
Leybold Heraeus RG580/RW3 80 1800 37.5 64
Leybold Heraeus RG580/RW6 20 4000 6.3 160
Leybold Heraeus RG580/RW6 80 4000 100 160
Leybold Heraeus RG1040 20 4000 12.5 160
Leybold Heraeus RG1040 80 4000 43 160
Leybold Heraeus RG210/RW3 20 1800 2.5 64
Leybold Heraeus RG210/RW3 80 1800 15 64
Magnavox MX 7040 80 30 0.25 1.2
Magnavox MX 7045 85 25 0.25 1.1
Magnavox MX 7043 80 55 1 2.1
Magnavox HD1033C 80 50 1 1.7
MMR K7001 77 0.75 1
MMR RK01 90 3 0.2
Continued on next page
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(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Osaka Oxygen Cryomini D 20 2400 2.5 84
Oxford University 80 35 0.5 2
Philips Lab JHV/APL 10 30 1.5 7.2
Philips Lab JHV/APL 90 30 0.3 7.2
Philips USFA UA 7044 80 55 1 1.8
Philips USFA UA 7039 80 30 0.25 1.5
Ricor Ltd K 413G 80 40 0.4 3.8
Ricor Ltd K 505 80 30 0.25 1.35
Ricor Ltd K 405 80 150 1 3.8







(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Astrium 4K 4 250 0.009 52
Astrium 10K 10 228 0.045 35
Astrium 20K 20 133 0.12 18
JPL Planck 18 530 1.3 61
BATC 30K 30 75 0.3 15
BATC SB 235 40 132 0.5 16.2
BATC SB 235 110 132 3.5 16.2
BATC 335 35 80 0.4 16.4
BATC 335 60 80 0.6 16.4
Raytheon PSC 60 88 3 18.6
Raytheon PSC 35 88 1.2 18.6
NGST 45K 45 155 1.8 14
NGST 55 106 1.7 12.7
NGST 57 105 1 34.5
BATC HIRDLS 57 66 1 16.4
RSC 35K PSC 35 114 1.2 19
RSC 35K PSC 60 114 4.5 19
NGST 6020 65 101 5 18
LM MPT 65 25 0.3 5
Creare HST 72 315 7 25
NGST MPT 80 30 0.6 8
Astrium 50-80K 80 66 1.85 7.3
NGS HEC-CE 95 120 10 7
HNGST nextgen CE 55 170 2 8.2
HNGST nextgen CE 140 170 7 8.2
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(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Raytheon RSP2 58 131 1.75 13
Raytheon RSP2 110 131 5 13
NGST HEC ABI 60 170 1.5 8.2
NGST HEC ABI 200 170 20 8.2
NGST MPT 120 40 1.2 8.1
Ball SB160 60 71 1.6 10.9
Ball SB335 35 81 0.45 11.1
Northrop HEC 95 100 10 3.2
Northrop 6020 MTI 60 101 2 19.56






(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Ball 35 80 0.4 16.4
Ball 60 80 0.6 16.4
Ball 30 75 0.3 15
Ball 60 61 0.9 17
Ball 65 248 1.15 57
Ball 122 248 5 57
Ball 10 115 0.1 25
Creare 65 215 5 13.7
Creare 35 105 1 15
Creare 77 315 7.7 25.3
Creare 65 120 1 24
JPL 10 200 0.1 320
JPL 20 400 1.2 320
LMMS 60 130 2 14.6
LMMS 35 99 0.5 14.7
LMMS 59 133 1.2 17.9
LMMS 60 104 1.45 15
LMMS 77 215 9 19
MMS 60 73 1 9.1
MMS 80 73 1.7 9.1
MMS 20 122 0.12 11
MMS 30 122 0.4 11
MMS 10 186 0.075 38
MMS 4.2 250 0.009 52
Raytheon 65 104 1.75 25
Raytheon 60 125 2.8 25
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(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Raytheon 65 74 1.2 19.2
Raytheon 35 93 1 24
Raytheon 60 63 3 24
TRW 65 48.5 0.35 8.3
TRW 115 38.2 1.5 8.2
TRW 65 24.4 0.21 7.4
TRW 35 107 0.3 18
TRW 60 101 2 18
TRW 57 67 1 16.4
TRW 35 245 0.85 27.2
TRW 55 106 1.75 12.7
TRW 55 46 0.5 8.7







(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
Ball SB235E 35 255 2.64 14.4
Ball SB235E 85 255 10.4 14.4
Ball SB235 35 150 1 10.5
Ball SB235 85 150 2 10.5
Ball SB230 35 55 0.6 9.5
Space Dynamics Lab GIFTS 55 174 1.5 8.8
Space Dynamics Lab GIFTS 140 174 8 8.8
Air Liquide LPTC 50 160 2.3 5.5
Northrop NGST 77 1.1 0.782
Northrop NGST 150 4 0.782
Sunpower CPT60-A2 60 100.2 2.1 5






(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
CryoMech AL10 77 1300 14 63.2
CryoMech AL10 50 1300 10 63.2
CryoMech AL10 60 1300 11 63.2
CryoMech AL10 70 1300 13 63.2
CryoMech AL25 77 1250 25 65.5
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(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
CryoMech AL25 50 1250 15 65.5
CryoMech AL25 60 1250 18 65.5
CryoMech AL25 70 1250 22 65.5
CryoMech AL60 77 2000 60 68.2
CryoMech AL60 50 2000 40 68.2
CryoMech AL60 60 2000 49 68.2
CryoMech AL60 70 2000 57 68.2
CryoMech AL63 50 3200 37 82.4
CryoMech AL63 20 3200 5 82.4
CryoMech AL63 30 3200 18 82.4
CryoMech AL63 40 3200 28 82.4
CryoMech AL125 77 3900 120 91.1
CryoMech AL125 50 3900 70 91.1
CryoMech AL125 60 3900 90 91.1
CryoMech AL125 70 3900 108 91.1
CryoMech AL200 77 5100 190 129.6
CryoMech AL200 50 5100 104 129.6
CryoMech AL200 60 5100 133 129.6
CryoMech AL200 70 5100 162 129.6
CryoMech AL200 80 5100 190 129.6
CryoMech AL200 50 5100 88 129.6
CryoMech AL200 60 5100 111 129.6
CryoMech AL200 70 5100 135 129.6
CryoMech AL200 80 5100 158 129.6
CryoMech AL230 50 5500 115 131
CryoMech AL230 20 5500 25 131
CryoMech AL230 30 5500 60 131
CryoMech AL230 40 5500 90 131
CryoMech AL300 77 7500 320 134.8
CryoMech AL300 50 7500 200 134.8
CryoMech AL300 60 7500 250 134.8
CryoMech AL300 70 7500 285 134.8
CryoMech AL300 80 7500 320 134.8
CryoMech AL300 50 7500 166 134.8
CryoMech AL300 60 7500 208 134.8
CryoMech AL300 70 7500 237 134.8
CryoMech AL300 80 7500 266 134.8
CryoMech AL325 25 11200 100 219.5
CryoMech AL325 20 11200 70 219.5
CryoMech AL325 30 11200 140 219.5
Continued on next page
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(K) (Watts) (Watts) (kg)
CryoMech AL325 40 11200 195 219.5
CryoMech AL325 50 11200 230 219.5
CryoMech AL330 50 7500 170 137.1
CryoMech AL330 20 7500 40 137.1
CryoMech AL330 30 7500 94 137.1
CryoMech AL330 40 7500 135 137.1
CryoMech AL600 77 7500 600 139.7
CryoMech AL600 50 7500 350 139.7
CryoMech AL600 60 7500 430 139.7
CryoMech AL600 70 7500 510 139.7
CryoMech PT10 77 1300 12 68.1
CryoMech PT30 77 1900 37 69.9
CryoMech PT60 77 3300 60 79.6
CryoMech PT63 40 4000 23 85.7
CryoMech PT90 77 5000 90 122.4
CryoMech PT403 4.2 3000 0.25 91.2
CryoMech PT405 4.2 4900 0.5 128.7
CryoMech PT407 4.2 7000 0.7 130.7
CryoMech PT410 4.2 8400 1 186.2
CryoMech PT415 4.2 10700 1.5 256.5
CryoMech PT803 20 3400 4 90.2
CryoMech PT805 20 4900 8 128.7
CryoMech PT810 20 8000 14 173.9
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Figure B.4: Propellant Tank Inter-tank and Skirt Mass Estimating Relationship
[135]
Table B.1: Engine Mass as Function of Designed Thrust [135]
Thrust Mass Thrust Mass
[kN] [kg] [kN] [kg]
LEM Ascent 15.0 213 LE-7 1,080 1,700
LEM Descent 44.4 167 RS-27 1,085 1,146
RS-72 53 154 J-2X 1,310 2,427
RL10A-5 65.2 143 Vulcain 2 1,350 1,869
RL10A3-3A 73.26 140 NK-43 1,754 1,473
Apollo SM 91.0 376 SSME 2,278 3,177
RL10A-4 93.5 168 Titan LR-87 2,450 2,244
RL10A-4-2 99.1 167 RS-68 3,312 6,597
RL10B-2 110 277 RD-180 4,142 5,307
LE-5B 137.0 269 RS-76 4,448 3,955
MA-5 268.6 469 F-1 7,775 8,444
J-2 1,000 1,249 RD-170 7,890 8,776
Vulcain 1,075 1,300
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Table B.2: Propellant Tank Historical Mass Data
LH2 Tank LO2 Tank
Volume Mass Volume Mass
[m3] [kg] [m3] [kg]
Centaur 36 254 11 126
S-IV 128 964 36 382
S-IVB 298 2,262 82 937
S-I 264 6,100
S-II 1,088 9,312 355 4,332
Shuttle 1,519 12,287 556 5,478
SIC 1,338 17,232
Table B.3: Intertank & Skirt MER as Function of Wetted Area
Area Mass
[m2] [kg]
SIC Aft Skirt 194.2 4,112
SIC Intertank 220.7 5,975
SIC Forward Skirt 105.9 2,368
SIC-SII Stage 175.8 5,725
SII Forward Skirt 105.9 1,935
SII-SIVB Stage 131.6 3,468
SIVB Forward Skirt 48.69 558.8
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APPENDIX C
RESULT OF THE FIRST TEN LAUNCHES OF 99
LAUNCH VEHICLE FAMILY
The data compiled in this Appendix comes from a variety of sources. Most notably
the International Reference Guide to Space Launch System by Isakowitz [74], Space
Launch Report [139], and NASA’s Major Launch Record [140]. Additional informa-
tion was gather from a variety of internet sources, all of which are freely available to
the public. Launch data has been compiled into a Launch Vehicle History Database
spreadsheet which is continuously updated with new launch data. The database
spreadsheet can be requested by contacting the author at Patrick.Chai[at]gatech.edu .
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Table C.1: Result of the First 5 Launches of 99 Families of Launch Vehicles from Around the World [74,139,140]
1st Launch 2nd Launch 3rd Launch 4th Launch 5th Launch




Feng Bao 08/10/72 Success 09/18/73 Failure 07/12/74 Failure 07/26/75 Success 12/16/75 Success
LM CZ-1 04/24/70 Success 03/03/71 Success
LM CZ-2 11/05/74 Failure 11/26/75 Success 12/07/76 Success 01/26/78 Success 09/09/82 Success
LM CZ-3 01/29/84 Success 04/08/84 Success 02/01/86 Success 03/07/88 Success 12/22/88 Success
LM CZ-4 09/07/88 Success 09/03/90 Success 05/10/99 Success 10/14/99 Success 09/01/00 Success
Europe
Ariane
Ariane 1 12/24/79 Success 05/23/80 Failure 06/19/87 Success 12/20/81 Success 09/09/82 Failure
Ariane 2 05/31/86 Failure 11/21/87 Success 05/17/88 Success 10/28/88 Success 01/27/89 Success
Ariane 3 08/04/84 Success 11/10/84 Success 02/08/85 Success 05/08/85 Success 09/12/86 Failure
Ariane 4 06/15/88 Success 12/11/88 Success 03/06/89 Success 06/05/89 Success 08/08/89 Success
Ariane 5 06/04/96 Failure 10/30/97 Failure 10/21/98 Success 12/10/99 Success 03/21/00 Success
Diamant
A 11/26/65 Success 02/17/66 Success 02/08/67 Failure 02/15/67 Success
B 03/10/70 Success 12/12/70 Success 04/15/71 Success 12/06/71 Failure 05/21/72 Failure
BP4 02/06/75 Success 05/17/75 Success 09/27/75 Success





SLV 08/10/79 Failure 07/18/80 Success 05/31/81 Failure 04/17/83 Success
ASLV 03/24/87 Failure 07/13/88 Failure 05/20/92 Failure 05/04/94 Success
PSLV 09/20/93 Failure 10/15/94 Success 03/21/96 Success 09/29/97 Failure 05/26/99 Success
GSLV 04/18/01 Failure 05/08/03 Success 09/20/04 Success 07/10/06 Failure 09/02/07 Failure




L-4S 09/26/66 Failure 12/20/66 Failure 04/13/67 Failure 09/22/69 Failure 02/11/70 Success
M-3 09/16/74 Success 02/24/75 Success 02/04/76 Failure 02/19/77 Success 02/04/78 Success
M-4 09/25/70 Failure 02/16/71 Success 09/28/71 Success 08/19/72 Success
M-V 02/12/97 Success 07/03/98 Success 02/10/00 Failure 05/09/03 Success 07/10/05 Success
H-Vehicle
N-1 09/09/75 Success 02/29/76 Success 02/23/77 Success 02/16/78 Success 02/06/79 Success
N-2 02/11/81 Success 08/10/81 Success 04/04/83 Success 08/05/83 Success 01/23/84 Success
H-1 08/13/86 Success 08/27/87 Success 04/19/88 Success 09/16/88 Success 09/09/89 Success
H-2 08/29/01 Success 04/04/02 Success 09/10/02 Success 12/14/02 Success 03/28/03 Success
England Black Arrow 06/28/69 Failure 03/04/70 Success 09/02/70 Failure 10/28/71 Success
S. Korea Naro Naro-1 08/25/09 Failure 06/10/10 Failure 01/30/13 Success
N. Korea Unha Unha 09/19/88 Failure 04/03/90 Failure 09/15/94 Success
Brazil VLS VLS 12/01/85 Failure 05/18/89 Success 12/02/97 Failure 12/11/99 Failure 08/22/03 Failure
Continued on next page
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1st Launch 2nd Launch 3rd Launch 4th Launch 5th Launch




Energia Energia 05/15/87 Success 11/15/88 Success
Kosmos C-1 01/01/64 Success 01/01/65 Success 02/02/65 Success 03/03/65 Success 04/04/65 Success
Proton
8K82 07/16/65 Success 11/02/65 Success 03/24/66 Failure 07/06/66 Success
8K82K 03/10/67 Success 04/08/67 Failure 09/27/67 Failure 11/22/67 Failure 03/02/68 Success
R-7
Semyorka 03/15/57 Failure 07/12/57 Failure 08/21/57 Success 09/07/57 Success 01/26/58 Failure
Polyot 10/04/57 Success 11/03/57 Success 04/27/58 Failure 05/15/58 Success 11/01/63 Success
Luna 09/23/58 Failure 10/11/58 Failure 12/04/58 Failure 01/02/59 Failure 06/18/59 Failure
Vostok 05/15/60 Success 07/28/60 Failure 08/19/60 Success 12/01/60 Success 12/22/60 Failure
Molniya 10/10/60 Failure 10/14/60 Failure 04/04/61 Failure 02/12/61 Success 08/25/62 Failure
Voskhod 11/16/63 Success 05/18/64 Success 07/01/64 Success 09/13/64 Success 10/06/64 Success
Soyuz 12/17/65 Success 07/20/66 Success 11/28/66 Success 12/14/66 Failure 02/07/67 Success
Zenit
Zenit-2 10/22/85 Success 12/28/85 Success 07/30/86 Success 10/22/86 Success 02/14/87 Success




LV-3 12/18/58 Success 09/09/59 Failure 11/26/59 Failure 02/26/60 Failure 05/24/60 Success
SLV-3 08/14/64 Success 09/23/64 Success 10/08/64 Success 12/04/64 Success 01/23/65 Success
A 06/11/57 Failure 09/25/57 Failure 12/17/57 Success 01/10/58 Success 02/07/58 Failure
B 07/19/58 Failure 08/02/58 Success 08/29/58 Success 09/14/58 Success 09/18/58 Failure
C 12/24/58 Success 01/27/59 Success 02/20/59 Failure 03/19/59 Failure 07/21/59 Success
D 04/04/59 Failure 05/19/59 Failure 06/06/59 Failure 07/29/59 Success 08/11/59 Success
F 04/06/68 Success 07/11/68 Success 03/17/69 Success 08/06/71 Success 10/02/72 Success
E 12/08/80 Failure 12/18/81 Failure 12/20/82 Success 03/28/83 Success 07/14/83 Success
H 02/09/83 Success 06/13/83 Success 02/05/84 Success 02/09/86 Success 03/15/87 Success
G 06/09/84 Failure 03/22/85 Success 06/29/85 Success 09/28/85 Success 12/04/86 Success
I 07/25/90 Success 04/18/91 Failure 03/13/92 Success 08/22/92 Failure 03/25/93 Failure
II 12/07/91 Success 02/10/92 Success 06/09/92 Success 07/02/92 Success 07/19/93 Success
V 08/21/02 Success 05/14/03 Success 07/17/03 Success 12/17/04 Success 03/11/05 Success
Athena Athena 08/15/95 Failure 08/23/97 Success 01/07/98 Success 01/27/99 Success 04/27/99 Failure
Titan
I 02/06/59 Success 02/25/59 Success 04/03/59 Success 05/04/59 Success 08/14/59 Failure
II 03/16/62 Success 06/07/62 Success 07/11/62 Success 07/25/62 Success 09/12/62 Success
III 09/01/64 Failure 12/10/64 Success 02/11/65 Success 05/06/65 Success 06/18/65 Success
34D 06/20/83 Success 01/31/84 Success 04/14/84 Success 06/25/84 Success 12/04/84 Success
IV 06/14/89 Success 06/08/90 Success 11/13/90 Success 03/08/91 Success 11/08/91 Success
Continued on next page
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DM-18 01/26/57 Failure 04/20/57 Failure 08/30/57 Failure 09/20/57 Success 10/03/57 Failure
Able 04/24/58 Failure 07/10/58 Success 07/23/58 Success 08/17/58 Failure 10/11/58 Failure
Agena 02/28/59 Failure 04/13/59 Success 06/03/59 Failure 06/25/59 Failure 08/13/59 Success
Ablestar 04/13/30 Success 06/22/60 Success 08/18/60 Failure 10/04/60 Success 11/30/60 Failure
Burner 05/20/65 Success 09/10/65 Success 01/08/66 Failure 03/31/66 Success 09/16/66 Success
Delta 05/13/60 Failure 08/12/60 Success 11/23/60 Success 03/25/61 Success 07/21/61 Success
A 10/02/62 Success 10/27/62 Success
B 12/13/62 Success 02/13/63 Success 04/02/63 Success 05/07/63 Success 06/19/63 Success
C 10/03/64 Success 12/21/64 Success 01/22/65 Success 02/03/65 Success 05/29/65 Success
D 08/19/64 Success 04/06/65 Success
E 11/06/65 Success 12/16/65 Success 02/28/66 Success 07/01/66 Success 08/17/66 Success
G/J 12/14/66 Success 09/07/67 Success 07/04/08 Success
N 08/16/68 Success 12/15/68 Success 02/26/69 Success 06/29/69 Success 08/09/69 Success
M 09/18/68 Failure 12/18/68 Success 02/05/69 Success 03/21/69 Success 07/26/69 Failure
L 08/27/69 Failure 01/31/72 Success
0100 07/23/71 Success 10/15/72 Success 12/10/72 Success 07/16/73 Failure 11/06/73 Success
1000 09/22/72 Success 11/10/72 Success 04/20/73 Success 06/10/73 Success 10/26/73 Success
2000 01/18/74 Failure 04/13/74 Success 05/17/74 Success 10/10/74 Success 11/*15/74 Success
3000 12/12/75 Success 03/26/76 Success 09/13/77 Failure 05/11/78 Success 12/15/78 Success
4/5000 08/27/89 Success 11/18/89 Success 06/12/90 Success
II 02/14/89 Success 06/10/89 Success 08/18/89 Success 10/21/89 Success 12/11/89 Success
III 08/27/98 Failure 05/05/99 Failure 08/23/00 Failure
IV 11/20/02 Success 03/11/03 Success 08/29/03 Success 12/21/04 Failure 05/24/06 Success
Shuttle STS 04/12/81 Success 11/12/81 Success 03/22/82 Success 06/27/82 Success 11/11/82 Success
US
Historical
Juno 12/06/58 Failure 03/03/59 Success 07/16/59 Failure 08/15/59 Failure 10/13/59 Success
Jupiter-C 02/01/58 Success 03/05/58 Failure 03/26/58 Success 07/26/58 Success 08/24/58 Failure
Mercury 12/16/60 Success 01/31/61 Success 03/24/61 Success 05/05/61 Success 07/21/61 Success
Saturn I 10/27/61 Success 04/25/62 Success 11/16/62 Success 03/28/63 Success 01/29/64 Success
Saturn V 11/09/67 Success 04/04/68 Failure 12/21/68 Success 03/03/69 Success 05/18/69 Success
SCOUT 07/01/60 Success 10/04/60 Success 12/14/60 Failure 02/16/61 Success 06/30/61 Failure
Falcon
Falcon 1 03/24/06 Failure 03/21/07 Failure 08/03/08 Failure 09/28/08 Success 07/14/09 Success
Falcon 9 06/04/10 Success 12/08/10 Success 05/22/12 Success 10/08/12 Success 03/01/13 Success
Continued on next page
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1st Launch 2nd Launch 3rd Launch 4th Launch 5th Launch
Country Family Vehicle Date Result Date Result Date Result Date Result Date Result
Orbital
Sciences
Pegasus 04/05/90 Success 07/17/91 Failure 02/09/93 Success 04/25/93 Success 05/19/94 Failure
Minotaur 01/27/00 Success 05/28/00 Success 07/19/00 Success 12/04/01 Success 03/16/02 Success
Taurus 03/13/94 Success 02/10/98 Success 10/03/98 Success 12/20/99 Success 03/12/00 Success
Antares 04/21/13 Success 09/18/13 Success
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Table C.2: Result of the Launches 6-10 of 99 Families of Launch Vehicles from Around the World [74,139,140]
6th Launch 7th Launch 8th Launch 9th Launch 10th Launch




Feng Bao 08/30/76 Success 11/10/76 Failure 09/14/77 Success 04/16/78 Success 07/27/79 Failure
LM CZ-1
LM CZ-2 08/19/83 Success 09/12/84 Success 09/18/85 Success 10/06/86 Success 08/05/87 Success
LM CZ-3 02/04/90 Success 04/07/90 Success 12/28/91 Failure 02/08/94 Success 07/21/94 Success
LM CZ-4 03/15/02 Success 05/15/02 Success 10/21/03 Success 09/08/04 Success 11/06/04 Success
Europe
Ariane
Ariane 1 06/16/83 Success 10/19/83 Success 03/05/84 Success 03/23/84 Success 07/02/85 Success
Ariane 2 04/02/89 Success
Ariane 3 03/28/86 Success 09/16/87 Success 03/11/88 Success 07/21/88 Success 09/08/88 Success
Ariane 4 10/27/89 Success 01/22/90 Success 02/22/90 Failure 07/24/90 Success 10/12/90 Success












PSLV 10/22/01 Success 09/12/02 Success 10/17/03 Success 05/05/05 Success 01/10/07 Success
GSLV 04/15/10 Failure 12/25/10 Failure





M-3 09/16/78 Success 02/21/79 Success 02/17/80 Success 02/21/81 Success 02/20/83 Success
M-4
M-V 02/21/06 Success 09/22/06 Success
H-Vehicle
N-1 02/22/80 Success 09/03/82 Success
N-2 08/02/84 Success 02/12/86 Success 02/19/87 Success
H-1 02/07/90 Success 08/28/90 Success 08/25/91 Success 02/11/92 Success
H-2 11/29/03 Failure 02/26/05 Success 01/24/06 Success 02/18/06 Success 09/11/06 Success
England Black Arrow
S. Korea Naro Naro-1
N. Korea Unha Unha
Brazil VLS VLS
Continued on next page
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Kosmos C-1 05/05/65 Success 06/06/54 Success 01/01/66 Failure 01/01/67 Success 02/02/67 Success
Proton
8K82
8K82K 04/22/68 Failure 09/14/68 Success 11/10/68 Success 11/16/68 Success 01/20/69 Failure
R-7
Semyorka 03/29/58 Success 04/04/58 Success 05/24/58 Failure 07/10/58 Failure 12/24/58 Failure
Polyot 04/12/64 Success
Luna 09/12/59 Success 10/04/59 Success 04/15/60 Failure 04/16/60 Failure
Vostok 03/09/61 Success 03/25/61 Success 04/12/61 Success 08/06/61 Success 12/11/61 Failure
Molniya 09/01/62 Failure 09/12/62 Failure 10/24/62 Failure 11/01/62 Success 10/04/62 Failure
Voskhod 10/12/64 Success 02/22/65 Success 03/07/65 Success 03/18/65 Success 04/17/65 Success
Soyuz 04/23/67 Success 10/27/67 Success 10/30/67 Success 04/14/68 Success 04/15/68 Success
Zenit
Zenit-2 03/18/87 Success 05/13/87 Success 08/01/87 Success 08/28/87 Success 05/15/88 Success




LV-3 07/29/60 Failure 09/25/60 Success 10/11/60 Failure 12/15/60 Failure 01/31/61 Success
SLV-3 03/12/64 Success 04/03/65 Success 04/28/65 Success 05/27/65 Success 06/25/65 Success
A 02/20/58 Failure 04/05/58 Failure 06/03/58 Success
B 11/18/58 Success 11/29/58 Success 12/18/58 Success 01/16/59 Failure 02/04/59 Success
C 08/24/59 Success
D 09/09/59 Failure 09/09/59 Success 09/17/59 Failure 10/06/59 Success 10/10/59 Success
F 07/13/74 Success 04/12/75 Failure 04/30/76 Success 06/23/77 Success 12/08/77 Success
E 11/17/83 Success 06/13/84 Success 09/08/84 Success 12/12/84 Success 03/12/85 Success
H
G 03/26/87 Success 09/25/89 Success
I 09/03/93 Success 04/13/94 Success 06/24/94 Success 05/23/95 Success 04/30/96 Success
II 11/28/93 Success 12/15/93 Success 08/03/94 Success 10/06/94 Success 11/29/94 Success
V 08/12/05 Success 01/19/06 Success 04/20/06 Success 03/09/07 Success 06/15/07 Failure
Athena Athena 09/24/99 Success 09/30/01 Success
Titan
I 12/12/59 Failure 02/02/60 Success 02/05/60 Failure 02/24/60 Success 03/08/60 Failure
II 10/12/62 Success 10/26/62 Success 12/06/62 Failure 12/19/62 Success 10/10/63 Failure
III 10/15/65 Failure 12/21/65 Failure 06/16/66 Success 07/29/66 Success 08/26/66 Failure
34D 12/22/84 Success 08/28/85 Failure 04/18/86 Failure 10/26/87 Success 09/02/88 Success
IV 11/28/92 Success 08/02/93 Failure 02/07/94 Success 05/03/94 Success 08/27/94 Success
Continued on next page
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DM-18 10/11/57 Success 10/24/57 Success 12/19/57 Success 01/28/58 Failure 02/28/58 Failure
Able 11/08/58 Failure 01/23/59 Failure 02/28/59 Success 03/21/59 Success 04/08/59 Success
Agena 08/19/59 Success 11/07/59 Success 11/20/59 Failure 02/04/60 Failure 02/19/60 Failure
Ablestar 02/22/61 Success 06/26/61 Success 11/15/61 Success 01/24/62 Failure 05/10/62 Failure
Burner 02/08/67 Success 06/26/67 Success 08/23/67 Success 10/11/67 Success 05/23/68 Success
Delta 08/16/61 Success 02/08/62 Success 03/07/62 Success 04/26/62 Success 06/19/62 Success
A
B 07/26/63 Success 11/26/63 Success 12/21/63 Success 01/21/64 Success 03/19/64 Failure
C 07/01/65 Success 08/25/65 Failure 02/03/66 Success 05/25/66 Success 03/08/67 Success
D
E 10/02/66 Success 10/26/66 Success 01/11/67 Success 01/26/67 Success 03/22/67 Success
G/J
N 09/29/71 Success 10/21/71 Failure 03/11/72 Success
M 11/22/74 Success 01/04/70 Success 03/20/70 Success 04/22/70 Success 07/23/70 Success
L
0100
1000 12/16/73 Success 04/09/75 Success 06/21/75 Success
2000 11/22/74 Success 12/18/74 Success 01/22/75 Success 02/06/75 Success 03/07/75 Success
3000 12/06/79 Success 02/14/80 Success 09/09/80 Success 11/15/80 Success 05/22/81 Success
4/5000
II 01/24/90 Success 02/14/90 Success 03/26/90 Success 04/13/90 Success 06/01/90 Success
III
IV 06/28/06 Success 11/04/06 Success 11/11/07 Success 01/18/09 Success 06/27/09 Success
Shuttle STS 04/04/83 Success 06/18/83 Success 08/30/83 Success 11/28/83 Success 02/03/84 Success
US
Historical
Juno 03/23/60 Failure 11/03/60 Success 02/25/61 Failure 04/27/61 Success 05/24/61 Failure
Jupiter-C 10/23/58 Failure
Mercury
Saturn I 05/28/64 Success 09/18/64 Success 02/16/65 Success 05/25/65 Success 07/30/65 Success
Saturn V 07/16/69 Success 11/14/69 Success 04/11/70 Success 01/31/71 Success 07/26/71 Success
SCOUT 08/25/61 Failure 10/16/61 Success 03/01/62 Success 03/29/62 Success 04/26/62 Failure
Falcon
Falcon 1
Falcon 9 09/20/13 Success
Continued on next page
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6th Launch 7th Launch 8th Launch 9th Launch 10th Launch
Country Family Vehicle Date Result Date Result Date Result Date Result Date Result
Orbital
Sciences
Pegasus 06/27/94 Failure 08/03/94 Success 04/03/95 Success 06/22/95 Failure 03/09/96 Success
Minotaur 10/15/02 Success 12/11/02 Success 04/11/05 Success 09/23/05 Success 04/15/06 Success




[1] Review of US Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Augustine, N., et al., “Seek-
ing a Human Spaceflight Porgram Worthy of a Great Nation,” National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, October 22, 2009, Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
[2] Connolly, J. F., “Constellation Program Overview,” National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, October 2, 2006, Constellation Program Office.
[3] Obama, B., “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” June 28,
2010, Office of the President of the United States, Washington, DC: The White
House.
[4] Olson, J., “Human Exploration Framework Team Phase I Closeout,” National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 2, 2010.
[5] Wilhite, A., Arney, D., Jones, C., and Chai, P., “Evolved Human Space Ex-
ploration Architecture Using Commercial Launch/Propellant Depots,” IAC-
12,D3,2,3,x15379 , 63rd International Astronautical Congress, Naples, Italy, In-
ternational Astronautical Federation, October 2012.
[6] “Manned Lunar Landing: Program Mode Comparison,” National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, July 30, 1962, Office of Manned Space Flight,
NASA-TM-X-66764.
[7] Stanley, D. O., Cook, S., Connolly, J., Hamaker, J., Ivins, M., Peterson, W.,
Geffre, J., Cirillo, B., McClesky, C., Hanley, J., et al., “NASA’s Exploration
System Architecture Study,” Technical Memorandum 2005-214062, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, November 2005.
[8] Mars Architecture Steering Group and Drake, B. G., “Human Exploration of
Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0,” Special Publication 2009-566, Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, July 2009.
[9] Rogers, S., “NASA Budgets: U.S. Spending on Space Travel since 1958
UPDATED,” The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/
2010/feb/01/nasa-budgets-us-spending-space-travel, February 1, 2010,
accessed October 1, 2012.
[10] Arney, D. C., Wilhite, A. W., Chai, P. R., and Jones, C. A., “A Space Explo-
ration Strategy that Promotes International and Commercial Participation,”
Acta Astronautica, Vol. 94, January 2014, pp. 104–115.
226
[11] Chai, P. R. and Wilhite, A., “Design Considerations for Orbital Propellant De-
pot,” GLEX-2012,05,1,7,x12325 , 2012 Global Space Exploration Conference,
Washington D.C., International Astronautical Federation, May 2012.
[12] Chandler, F., Bienhoff, D., Cronick, J., and Grayson, G., “Propellant Depot
for Earth Orbit and Lunar Exploration,” AIAA 2007-6081 , AIAA SPACE 2007
Conference & Exposition, Long Beach, California, American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, September 2007.
[13] Chato, D., “Experimentation for the Maturation of Deep Space Cryogenic Re-
fueling Technologies,” Technical Paper 2008-214929, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2008.
[14] Griffin, M. D. and Pace, S., “Propellant Depot Instead of Heavy Lift?” Space-
News: http://www.spacenews.com/article/propellant-depots-instead-
heavy-lift, November 2, 2011, accessed January 1, 2013.
[15] “Manned Lunar Landing: Operation Analysis and Mode Comparison,” Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, June 1, 1962, NASA-TM-X-
74752.
[16] Mars Architecture Steering Group and Drake, B. G., “Reference Mission 3.0:
Addendum to the Human Exploration of Mars: The Reference Mission of the
NASA Mars Exploration Study Team,” Special Publication 6107-ADD, Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, June 1998.
[17] O’Keefe, S., “The Vision for Space Exploration,” February 2004, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration.
[18] Arney, D. and Wilhite, A., “Orbital Propellant Depots Enabling Lunar AArchi-
tecture Without Hevey-Lift Launch Vehicles,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rock-
ets , Vol. 47, No. 2, 2010, pp. 353–360.
[19] Dipprey, N. F. and Rotenberger, S. J., “Orbital Express Propellant Resupply
Servicing,” AIAA 2003-4898 , AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Con-
ference and Exhibit, Huntsville, Alabama, American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, July 2003.
[20] Cadu, E., Corban, R., and Stevenson, S., “Cryogenic Propellant Management
Architecture to Support the Space Exploration Initiative,” AIAA 1990-3713 ,
1990.
[21] Howell, J. T., Mankins, J. C., and Fikes, J. C., “In-Space Cryogenic Propel-
lant Depot Stepping Stone,” IAC-05-D3.2.01 , 56th International Astronauti-
cal Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, International Astronautical Federation, October
2005.
227
[22] Fikes, J., Howell, J. T., and Henley, M., “In-Space Cryogenic Propellant Depot
(ISCPD) Architecture Definition and Systems Studies,” IAC-06-D3.3.08 , 57th
International Astronautical Congress, Valencia, Spain, International Astronau-
tical Federation, October 2006.
[23] Goff, J. A., Kutter, B. F., Zegler, F., Bienhoff, D., Chandler, F., and Marchetta,
J., “Realistic Near-Term Propllant Depots: Implementation of a Critical Space-
faring Capability,” AIAA 2009-6756 , AIAA SPACE 2009 Conference & Exposi-
tion, Pasadena, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
September 2009.
[24] Mulder, T. A., “Orbital Express Autonomous Rendezvous and Capture Flight
Operations,” AIAA 2008-6768 , AIAA/AAS Astrodynamics Specialist Confer-
ence & Exhibit, Honolulu, Hawaii, Ameri, August 2008.
[25] Young, J. J., A Value Proposition for Lunar AArchitecture Utilizing On-Orbit
Propellant Refueling , Ph.d. thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, May 2009.
[26] Axdhal, E., Chai, P., Gaebler, J., Grimes, M., Long, M., Lugo, R., Rowland,
R., and Wilhite, A., “Reusable Lunar Transportation Architecture Utilizing
Orbital Propellant Depots,” AIAA-2009-6711 , AIAA SPACE 2009 Conference
and Exposition, Pasadena, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Sept 2009.
[27] Kutter, B. F., Zegler, F., O’Neil, G., and Pitchford, B., “A Practial, Affordable
Cryogenic Propellant Depot Based on ULA’s Flight Experience,” AIAA 2008-
7644 , AIAA SPACE 2008 Conference & Exposition, San Diego, California,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 2008.
[28] McLean, C., Pitchford, B., Mustafi, S., Wollen, M., Walls, L., and Schmidt,
J., “Simple, Robust Cryogenic Propellant Depot for near Term Applications,”
IEEEAC Paper # 1044 , 2011 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, March 2011.
[29] Zegler, F. and Kutter, B. F., “Evolving to a Depot-Based Trasnportation Ar-
chitecture,” AIAA 2010-8638 , AIAA SPACE 2010 Conference & Exposition,
Anaheim, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2010.
[30] Chai, P. R. and Wilhite, A., “Cryogenic Thermal Management of Orbital Pro-
pellant Depots,” IAC11-D.1.2.3 , 62nd Internaional Astronautical Congress,
Cape Town, South Africa, International Astronautical Federation, October
2011.
[31] Gravlee, M., Kutter, B., Wollen, M., Rhys, N., and Walls, L., “CRYOTE (Cryo-
genic Orbital Testbed) Concept,” AIAA 2009-6440 , AIAA SPACE 2009 Confer-
ence and Exposition, Pasadena, California, American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronaustics, September 2009.
228
[32] Moser, D. J., “Prospects for Composite LOX Tankage,” AIAA 93-2249 ,
AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE 29th Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Mon-
terey, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, June
1993.
[33] Mallick, K., Cronin, J., Arzberger, S., Tupper, M., Grimes-Ledesma, L., Lewis,
J., Paul, C., and Walsh, J., “Ultralight Linearless Composite Tank for In-
Space Applications,” AIAA 2004-5801 , Space 2004 Conference and Exhibit,
San Diego, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
September 2004.
[34] Larson, W. J. and Wertz, J. R., editors, Space Mission Analysis and Design,
Space Technology Series, Microcosm Press and Kluwer Academic Publishers,
El Segundo, California, 3rd ed., 2004.
[35] Humble, R. D., Henry, G. N., and Larson, W., Space Propulsion Analysis and
Design, Space Technology Series, McGraw-Hill, 1st ed., 1995.
[36] Emme, E. M., “Historical Perspectives on Apollo,” AIAA 67-839 , AIAA 4th
Annual Meeting and Technical Display, Anaheim, California, American Insti-
tute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, October 1967.
[37] Low, G. M., “Apollo Spacefcraft,” AIAA 69-1095 , AIAA 6th Annual Meeting
and Technical Display, Anaheim, California, American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, October 1969.
[38] Hyle, C., Foggatt, C., Weber, B., Gerbracht, R., and Diamant, L., “Abort Plan-
ning for Apollo Missions,” AIAA 70-94 , AIAA 8th Aerospace Sciences Meeting,
New York, New York, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Jan-
uary 1970.
[39] Braun, R. D., “Investment in Our Future: Exploring Space Through Innova-
tion and Technology,” Presentation at TEDxNASA, Newport News, Virginia,
November 20, 2010.
[40] Martin, J. J., “Cryogenic Testing of a Foam-Multilayer Insulation
Concept in a Simulated Preluanch Environment,” AIAA 92-3182 ,
AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE 28th Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit,
Nashville, Tennessee, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
July 1992.
[41] Gruszczynski, M., Throp, V., Heim, W., and Swanson, N., “Design, Develop-
ment, and Test of the Atlas Liquid Hydrogen Propellant Tank Foam Insulation
System,” AIAA 91-1438 , AIAA 24th Thermophysics Conference, Honolulu,
Hawaii, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1991.
[42] Stark, J., Leonhard, K., and Bennett, F., “Cryogenic Thermal Control Technol-
ogy Summaries,” Contractor Report 134747, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, San Diego, California, December 1974.
229
[43] Knoll, R. H., Stochl, R. J., and Sanabria, R., “A Review of Candidate Multi-
layer Insulation Systems for Potential Use on Wet-Launched LH2 TanTank for
Space Exploration Initiative Lunar Missions,” Technical Memorandum 104493,
National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration, Cleveland, Ohio, June 1991.
[44] Mather, J., “The James Webb Space Telescope and Future IR Space Tele-
scopes,” AIAA 2004-5985 , AIAA SPACE 2004 Conference and Exhibit, San
Diego, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Septem-
ber 2004.
[45] Dew, M., Lin, J., Kutter, B., Madlangbayan, A., Willey, C., Allwein, K., and
Pitchford, B., “Design and Development of an In-Space Deployable Sun Shield
for Atlas Centaur,” AIAA 2008-7764 , AIAA SPACE 2008 Conference & Expo-
sition, San Deigo, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronau-
tics, September 2008.
[46] Back, J., Schuettpelz, B., Ewing, A., and Laue, G., “James Webb
Space Telescope Sunshield Membrane Assembly,” AIAA 2009-2156 , 50th
AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materi-
als Conference, Palm Spring, California, American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, May 2009.
[47] Feller, J., Plachta, D., Millis, G., and McLean, C., “Demostration of a Cryogenic
Boil-Off Reduction System Employing an Actively Cooled Thermal Radiation
Shield,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 16, 2008, pp. 601–609.
[48] Haruyama, T., Kasami, K., Matsubara, Y., Nishitani, T., Maruno, Y., Giboni,
K., and Aprile, E., “High-Power Pulse Tube Cryocooler for Liquid Xenon Par-
ticle Detectors,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 13, 2005, pp. 689–694.
[49] Radebaugh, R., “Pulse Tube Cryocooler for Cooling Infrared Sensors,” Pro-
ceedings of SPIE, The Internaional Society for Optical Engineering, Infrared
Technolgoy and Applications XXVI , Vol. 4130, 2000, pp. 363–379.
[50] ter Brake, H. and Wiegerinck, G., “Low-Power Cryocooler Survey,” Cryogenics ,
Vol. 42, 2002, pp. 705–718.
[51] Radebaugh, R., “Cryocoolers: the State of the Art and Recent Developments,”
Journal of Physics: Condensed Matter , Vol. 21, No. 16, 2009, pp. 9.
[52] Daunt, J. and Goree, W., “Miniature Cryogenic Refrigerators,” Tech. Rep.
Contracts Nonr-263(70) and N00014-67-C-0393, Office of Naval Research, 1969.
[53] Smith, J., Robinson, J. G., and Iwasa, Y., “Survey of the State-of-the-Art of Mi-
nature Cryocoolers for Superconducting Devices,” NRL Memorandum Report
5490, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 1984.
230
[54] Bruning, J., Torrison, R., Radebaugh, R., and Nisenoff, M., “Survey of Cry-
ocoolers for Electronic Applications (C-SEA),” Cryocoolers , Vol. 10, 1999,
pp. 829–835.
[55] Chato, D., “Cryogenic Technology Development for Exploration Missions,”
AIAA 2007-953 , 45th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit, Reno,
Nevada, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, January 2007.
[56] Griffin, J., “Background and Program Approach for the Development of Orbital
Fluid Resupply Tankers,” AIAA 86-1601 , AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 22nd
Joint Propulsion Conference, Huntsville, Alabama, American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, June 1986.
[57] Chato, D., “Technologies for Refueling Spacecraft On-Orbit,” AIAA 2000-5107 ,
AIAA SPACE 2000 Conference and Exposition, Long Beach, California, Amer-
ican Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 2000.
[58] Baize, L., Vanhove, M., Flagel, P., and Novelli, A., “The ATV ‘Jules Verne’
Supplies the ISS,” AIAA 2008-3537 , SpaceOps 2008 Conference, Heidelberg,
Germany, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, May 2008.
[59] Boretz, J., “Orbital Refueling Techniques,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets ,
Vol. 7, 1970, pp. 513–522.
[60] Bonometti, J., Sorensen, K., Jensen, R., Dankanich, J., and Frame, K., “Free
Re-Boost Electrodynamic Tether on the International Space Station,” AIAA
2005-4545 , 41st AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and
Exhibit, Tucson, Arizona, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
July 2005.
[61] Martin, J. and Holt, J., “Magnetically Actuated Propellant Orientation Ex-
periment, ContControl Fluid Motion with Magnetic Field in Low-Gravity En-
vironment,” Technical Memorandum 210129, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
[62] Marchetta, J., “Simulation of LOX Reorientation Using Magnetic Positive Po-
sitioning,” Microgravity Science and Technology Journal , Vol. 18, 2006, pp. 31–
39.
[63] Marchetta, J. and Hochstein, J., “Simulation and Prediction of Magnetic Pro-
pellant Reorientation in Reduced Gravity,” Journal of Propulsion and Power ,
Vol. 20, No. 5, 2004, pp. 927–935.
[64] Schmidt, G., Carrigan, R., Hahs, J., Vaughan, D., and Foust, D., “No-
Vent Fill Pressurization Test Using a Cryogen Simulant,” AIAA 92-3062 ,
AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE 28th Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit,
Nashville, Tennessee, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, July
1992.
231
[65] Chato, D. J., “Thermodynamic Modeling of the No-Vent Fill Method-
ology for Transferring Cryogen in Low Gravity,” AIAA 88-3403 ,
AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 24th Joint Propulsion Conference, Boston,
Massachusetts, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, July 1988.
[66] Chato, D. J., “Ground Testing for the No-Vent Fill of Cryogenic Tanks: Results
of Tests of a 71 Cubic Foot Tank,” AIAA 93-1967 , AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE
29th Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Monterey, California, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1993.
[67] Blatt, M., Merino, G., and Symons, E., “Capillary Device Refilling,” AIAA
80-1095 , AIAA/SAE/ASME 16th Joint Propulsion Conference, Hartford, Con-
necticut, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1980.
[68] Chato, D. J. and Kudlac, M., “Screnn Channel Liquid Acquisition Device
for Cryogenic Propellants,” AIAA 2002-3983 , 38th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE
Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Indianapolis, Indiana, American In-
stitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, July 2002.
[69] Kudlac, M. T. and Jurns, J. M., “Screen Channel Liquid Acquisition Devices
for Liquid Oxygen,” AIAA 2006-5054 , 42nd AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint
Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Sacramento, California, American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, July 2006.
[70] Doux, C. J. and Justak, J. F., “Liquid Oxygen Test Results for an Optical
Mass Gauge Sensor,” AIAA 2009-5393 , 45th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint
Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Denver, Colorado, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, August 2009.
[71] Sullenberger, R. M., Munoz, W. M., Lyon, M. P., Vogel, K., Yalin, A. P.,
Korman, V., and Polzin, K. A., “Optical Mass Gauging System for Measuring
Liquid Levels in a Reduced-Gravity Environment,” Journal of Spacecraft and
Rockets , Vol. 48, No. 3, May-June 2011, pp. 528–533.
[72] Green, S. T., Walter, D. B., Dodge, F. T., Deffenbaugh, D. M., Siebenaler,
S. P., and VanDresar, N. T., “Ground Testing of a Compression Mass Gauge,”
AIAA 2004-4154 , 40th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference
and Exhibit, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, July 2004.
[73] Zimmerli, G. A., Asipauskas, M., Wagner, J. D., and Follo, J. C., “Propellant
Quantity Gauging Using the Radio Frequency Mass Gauge,” AIAA 2011-1320 ,
49th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting including the New Horizon Forum and
Aerospace Exposition, Orlando, Florida, American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, January 2011.
232
[74] Isakowitz, S. J., Hopkins, J. B., and Hopkins, J. P., International Reference
Guide to Space Launch Systems , American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics, Reston, Virginia, 4th ed., 2004.
[75] Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, “Falcon 9 Launch Vehicle Pay-
load User’s Guide,” SpaceX, http://www.spacex.com/falcon9.php, 2009, Ac-
cessed: January 1, 2013.
[76] United Launch Alliance, “Delta IV Payload Planners Guide,” http://www.
ulalaunch.com/site/pages/Products_DeltaIV.shtml, 2007, Accessed: Jan-
uary 1, 2013.
[77] United Launch Alliance, “Atlas V Launch Services User’s Guide,” http://www.
ulalaunch.com/site/pages/Products_AtlasV.shtml, 2010, Accessed: Jan-
uary 1, 2013.
[78] Lindsey, C., “SpaceX Awarded 2 EELV-Class Mission from USAF,”
NewSpaceWach, http://newspacewatch.com/articles/spacex-awarded-2-
eelv-class-missions-from-the-usaf.html, December 5, 2012, Accessed:
May 14, 2013.
[79] Associated Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, “Commer-
cial Space Transportation: Quarterly Launch Report (2002 First Quarter),”
United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/
media/quarter0201.pdf, 2002, Accessed: May 1, 2013.
[80] “Feasibility”, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus , Merriam-
Webster, Inc., May 2007.
[81] Vanderplaats, G. N., Numerical Optimization Techniques for Engineering De-
sign, Vanderplaats Research & Development, Inc., Colorado Springs, CO, 4th
ed., 2005.
[82] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA System Engineering
Handbook,” Special Publication 2007-6105, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Washington D.C., December 2007.
[83] Arney, D. A., Rule-Based Graph Theory to Enable Exploration of the Space
Sytem Architecture Design Space, Ph.d. thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology,
2012.
[84] Blanchard, B. S. and Fabrycky, W. J., Systems Engineering and Analysis , Pren-
tice Hall International Series in Industrial and Systems Engineering, Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 3rd ed., 1998.
[85] Heaton, A. F. and Longuski, J. M., “Feasibility of a Galileo-Style Tour of the
Uranian Satellites,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets , Vol. 40, No. 4, July -
August 2003, pp. 591–596.
233
[86] Parlos, A. G. and Metzger, J. D., “Feasibility Study of a Contained Pulsed
Nuclear Propulsion Engine,” Journal of Propulsion and Power , Vol. 10, No. 2,
March - April 1994, pp. 269–278.
[87] Loftus, H., Montanino, L., and Bryndle, R., “Powder Rocket Feasibility Evalu-
ation,” AIAA 72-1162 , AIAA/SAE 8th Joint Propulsion Specialist Conference,
November 1972.
[88] Hawke, R., Brooks, A., Fowler, C., and Peterson, D., “Electromagnetic Railgun
Launchers: Direct Launch Feasibility,” AIAA Journal , Vol. 20, No. 7, 1981,
pp. 978–985.
[89] Takayanagi, H., Suzuki, T., and Fujita, K., “Feasibility Assessment of Nonstop
Mars Sample Return System,” AIAA 2010-624 , 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences
Meeting Including the New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition, January
2010.
[90] Brophy, J. R., Gershman, R., Landau, D., Polk, J., Porter, C., Yeomans, D.,
Allen, C., willie Williams, and Asphaug, E., “Asteroid Return Mission Feasibil-
ity Study,” AIAA 2011-5665 , 47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion
Conference & Exhibit, July 2011.
[91] Deckert, W. H. and Hickey, D. H., “Summary and Analysis of Feasibility-Study
Designs of V/STOL Transport Aircraft,” Journal of Aircraft , Vol. 7, No. 1,
Januray - February 1970, pp. 66–72.
[92] Hammond, W. E., Space Transportation: A systems Approach to Analysis and
Design, AIAA Education Series, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics, 1999.
[93] Mankin, J. C., “Technology Rediness Levels,” April 1995, White Paper, Ad-
vanced Concepts Office, Office of Space Access and Technology, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration.
[94] Mankin, J. C., “Research & Development Degree of Difficulty,” March 1998,
White Paper, Advanced Concepts Office, Office of Space Access and Technology,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
[95] John, “Technology Readiness and Risk AAssessment: A New Approach,” Acta
Astronautica, Vol. 65, March 2009, pp. 1208–1215.
[96] Phillips, J. J., Return on Investment , Gulf Publishing, 1997.
[97] Alipour, M., Dorodi, H., and Pishgahi, S., “Feasibility Study of e-Insurance
Services in Iranian Insurance Companies (Asia Insurance Co),” International
Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 10, 2011, pp. 277–281.
234
[98] Burch, J. G., “Adaptation of Information Systems Building Blocks to Design
Forces,” Journal of Management Information Systems , Vol. 3, No. 1, 1986,
pp. 96–104.
[99] Overton, R., Feasibility Studies Made Simple, Martin Management Services,
2000.
[100] Dieter, G. E., Engineering Design: A Materials and Processing Approach,
McGraw-Hill Higher Education Series, McGraw Hill, Inc, 3rd ed., 2000.
[101] Meshkat, L. and Shapiro, A., “Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Concurrent,
Conceptual Design of Space Missions,” AIAA 2005-6765 , 2005.
[102] Matsumura, T., Haftka, R., and Kim, N. H., “Conservativeness in Failure Prob-
ability Estimate: Redesign Risk vs Performance,” AIAA 2013-1818 , 2013.
[103] Roy, C. J. and Oberkampf, W. L., “A Complete Framework for Verification,
Validation, and Uncertainty Quantification in Scientific Computing,” AIAA
2010-124 , 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the New Horizons
Forum and Aerospace Exposition, Januray 2010.
[104] Oberkampf, W. L., Helton, J. C., and Sentz, K., “Mathematical Representa-
tion of Uncertainty,” AIAA 2001-1645 , Non-Deterministic Approaches Forum,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, April 2001.
[105] Agarwal, H., Renaud, J. E., Preston, E. L., and Padmanabhan, D., “Uncer-
tainty Quantification using Evidence Theory in Multidisciplinary Design Opti-
mization,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety , Vol. 85, 2004, pp. 281–
294.
[106] Thunnissen, D. P., Propagating and Mitigating Uncertainty in the Design of
Complex Multidisciplinary Systems , Ph.d. thesis, California Institute of Tech-
nology, Pasadena, California, 2005.
[107] Rubinstein, R., Simulation and the Monte Carlo Methods , Wiley Series in Prob-
ability and Mathematical Statistics, John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
[108] Mathias, D., Go, S., Gee, K., and Lawrence, S., “Simulation assisted risk as-
sessment applied to launch vehicle conceptual design,” Reliability and Main-
tainability Symposium, 2008. RAMS 2008. Annual , Jan 2008, pp. 74–79.
[109] Maggio, G., Hark, F., and Sen, D., “Physics Based Risk Assessment of
Launch Vehicles,” Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management , edited by
C. Spitzer, U. Schmocker, and V. Dang, Springer London, 2004, pp. 2199–2205.
[110] Koelle, D. E., Handbook of Cost Engineering for Space Transportation System,
No. Report No. TCS-TR-190, TCS-TransCostSystems, 3rd ed., 2010.
235
[111] Bate, R. R., Mueller, D. D., and White, J. E., Fundamentals of Astrodynamics ,
Dover Publications, 1971.
[112] Gilmore, D. G. and Bello, M., editors, Satellite Thermal Control Handbook ,
The Aerospace Corporation Press, El Segundo, California, 1994.
[113] Griffin, M. D. and French, J. R., Space Vehicle Design, AIAA Education Series,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2nd ed., 2004.
[114] Donabedian, M. and Gilmore, D., Spacecraft Thermal Control Handbook , Vol. 2,
AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics), Reston, Virginia,
2003.
[115] Hastings, L., Hedayat, A., and Brown, T., “Analytical Modeling and Test Cor-
relation of Variable Density Multilayer Insulation for Cryogenic Storage,” Tech-
nical Memorandum 2004-213175, National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, May 2004.
[116] Keller, C., Cunnington, G., and Glassford, A., “Thermal Performance of Multi-
layer Insulations,” Contractor Report 134477, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, April 1974, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company.
[117] Hedayat, A., Brown, T., Hastings, L., and Martin, J., “Variable Density Mul-
tilayer Insluation for Cryogenic Storage,” AIAA 00-36922 , 2000.
[118] Glaister, D., Donabedian, M., Curran, D., and Davis, T., “An Overview of the
Performance and Maturity of Long Life Cryocoolers for Space Applications,”
Cryocoolers , Vol. 10, 2002, pp. 1–19.
[119] Gully, W., Glaister, D., Hendershott, P., Kotsubo, V., Lock, J., Marquardt, E.,
Garcia-Perciante, A., Callen, J., Shaing, K., Hegna, C., et al., “Ball Aerospace
Next Generation Two-Stage 35K coolers: the SB235 and SB235E,” Cryocoolers ,
Vol. 14, 2007, pp. 49–55.
[120] Trollier, T. et al., “Design of a Large Heat Lift 40 K to 80 K Pulse Tube
Cryocooler for Space Applications,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 14, 2007, pp. 75–82.
[121] Petach, M., Waterman, M., Tward, E., and Bailey, P., “Pulse Tube Microcooler
for Space Application,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 14, 2007, pp. 89–93.
[122] Wilson, K., Fralick, C., Gedeon, D., Yoshida, M., and Kawahara, S., “Sun-
power’s CPT60 Pulse Tube Cryocooler,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 14, 2007, pp. 123–
132.
[123] CryoMech, “Cryorefrigerators,” http://www.cryomech.com/products/
cryorefrigerators/, 2014, Accessed: July 1, 2014.
[124] Kittel, P., “Cryocooler Performance Estimator,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 14, 2006,
pp. 563–572, Proceedings of the 14th International Cryocooler Conference, An-
napolis, Maryland. June 14-16, 2006.
236
[125] Radebaugh, R., “Development of the Pulse Tube Refrigerator as an Efficient
and Reliable Cryocooler,” Proc. Institute of Refrigeration (London), 2000.
[126] Walker, G., Cryocoolers , Springer, New York, New York, 1983.
[127] Stronbridge, T., “Cryogenic Refrigerators - An Updated Survey,” Technical
Note 655, National Bureau of Standards, 1974.
[128] Davis, T. and Abhyankar, N., “Long Life Cryocoolers for Space Applications,
A Database Update,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 13, 2005, pp. 599–608.
[129] Dylewski, T. J., “Criteria for Selecting Curves for Fitting to Data,” AIAA
Journal , Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1970, pp. 1411–1415.
[130] Glaister, D. and Curran, D., “Spacecraft Cryocooler System Integration Trades
and Optimization,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 9, 2001, pp. 873–884.
[131] Ladner, D., “Performance and Mass vs. Operating Temperature for Pulse Tube
and Stirling Cryocoolers,” Cryocoolers , Vol. 16, 2011, pp. 633–644.
[132] Salerno, L. and Kittel, P., “Cryogeinc and the Human Exploration of Mars,”
Cryogenics , Vol. 39, 1999, pp. 381–388.
[133] Plachta, D. W., Christie, R., Jurns, J., and Kittel, P., “Passive ZBO storage of
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen applied to space science mission concepts,”
Cryogenics , Vol. 46, 2006, pp. 89–97, doi:10.1016.
[134] Doherty, M. P., Meyer, M. L., Motil, S. M., and carol A. Ginty, “Cryogenic Pro-
pellant Stroage Transfer (CPST) Technology Maturation: Establishing a Foun-
dataion for Technology Demonstration Mission (TDM),” AIAA 2013-5458 ,
AIAA SPACE 2013 Confernece and Exposition, San Diego, CA, American In-
stitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 2013.
[135] Chai, P. R. and Wilhite, A. W., “Quantifying the Effects of Model Uncertainty
on Design Mass Margin in Advanced Earth-to-Orbit Launch Vehicles,” AIAA
2010-8631 , AIAA Space 2010 Conference and Exposition, Anaheim, California,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2010.
[136] Wilhite, A., Arney, D., and Chai, P., “Permenant Manned Outpost with Com-
merical Launch and Propellant Depot,” AIAA 2012-5112 , AIAA SPACE 2012
Conference & Exposition, Pasadena, California, American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, September 2012.
[137] “Mass Properties Control for Space Systems,” Dec. 2006, AIAA S-120-2006.
[138] “AIAA Recommended Practice for Mass Properties Control for Satellites, Mis-
siles, and Launch Vehicles,” Aug. 2000, AIAA R-020A-1999e.
[139] Kyle, E., “Space Launch Report,” http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/,
2013, Accessed: July 1, 2013.
237
[140] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Major Launch
Record,” http://history.nasa.gov/pocketstats/sect%20B/MLR.pdf, Ac-
cessed: July 1, 2013.
[141] Morse, E., Fragola, J., and Putney, B., “Modeling Launch Vehicle Reliability
Growth as Defect Elimination,” AIAA 2010-8836 , AIAA SPACE 2010 Confer-
ence and Exposition, Anaheim, California, 2010.
[142] Mak, T., “Infant Mortality - The Lesser Known Reliability Issue,” 13th IEEE
International On-Line Testing Symposium, 2007.
[143] Guikema, S. D. and Pate-Cornell, M. E., “Probatility of Infancy Problems for
Space Launch Vehicles,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety , Vol. 87,
2005, pp. 303–314.
[144] Devore, J. L., Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences , CEN-
GAGE Learning, Brooks/Cole, Boston, MA, 8th ed., 2001.
[145] Guikema, S. D. and Pate-Cornell, M. E., “Bayesian Analysis of Launch Vehi-
cle Reliability,” AIAA 2003-1175 , 2003, 41th Aerospace Sciences Meeting and
Exhibit, Reno Nevada.
[146] Guikema, S. D. and Pate-Cornell, M. E., “Bayesian Analysis of Launch Vehicle
Success Rate,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets , Vol. 41, No. 1, 2004, pp. 93–
102.
[147] United Launch Alliance, “ULA Launch Manifest, 12 Month Projection,”
http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/pages/News_Manifest.shtml, 2012, Ac-
cessed: October 20, 2012.
[148] Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, “Falcon 9 Launch Manifest,”
http://www.spacex.com/launch_manifest.php, 2012, Accessed: October 1,
2012.
[149] Bergin, C., “Preliminary NASA Plan shows Evolved SLS Vehicle is
21 Years Away,” http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/07/preliminary-
nasa-evolved-sls-vehicle-21-years-away/, July 27, 2011, Accessed: April
23, 2012.
[150] “Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster Engineering Demonstration
and/or Risk Reduction,” NASA Solicitation and Proposal Integrated Review
and Evaluation System, Feb. 2011, Solicitation: NNM12ZPS001N.
[151] Shah, B., “On the Distribution of the Sum of Independent Interger Valued
Random Variables,” American Statistics , Vol. 27, No. 3, June 1973, pp. 123–
124.
238
[152] Chen, S. X. and Liu, J. S., “Statistical Applications of the Poisson-Binomial and
Conditional Bernoulli Distributions,” Statistica Sinica, Vol. 7, 1997, pp. 875–
892.
[153] Polites, M., “As Assessment of the Technology of Automated Rendezvous and
Capture in Space,” NASA/TP 1998-208528, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1998.
[154] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Budget Documents, Strategic
Plans and Performance Reports,” http://www.nasa.gov/news/budget, Ac-
cessed: January 31, 2014.
[155] Kutter, B. F., “Commercial Launch Services: an Enabler for Launch
Vehicle Evolution and Cost Reduction,” United Launch Alliance Pub-
lications: http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/publications/
CommercialLaunchServicesanEnabler20067271.pdf, 2006, Accessed:
October 1, 2013.
239
